Authentication of Printouts of Instagram Profile Pages

Deamonte Spencer was convicted of murder and handgun charges. Among the evidentiary errors alleged on appeal was a challenge to authentication of printouts of profiles of Instagram pages. The Appellate Court of Maryland rejected the challenges and affirmed. Spencer v. State, 2025 WL 2741459 (Apl. Ct. Md. Sep. 26, 2025)(unreported).

A local business contacted police and provided an audio recording of the shooting. Gunshots could be heard and a person shouted “Sconey, are you serious? You shot her Sconey.”

As a result, the police tried to find out who “Sconey” was. Detective Jones performed an internet search, located two profile pages, and printed two “Instagram profile pages for ‘Scony_g’ and ‘Scony_da_g,’ each with a profile picture that resembles Spencer.”[1]

At trial, the State tried to prove that “Sconey” was the defendant, Mr. Spencer. In addition to cell phone location data and DNA evidence, the State introduced the Instagram pages.

In response to the challenge to authentication, the State contended that the Instagram printouts were offered for a limited purpose and therefore authenticated.

In footnote 3, the Court wrote that “authentication of the mere existence of a social media profile is a relatively novel issue….” [emphasis added]. It wrote that “our courts have not opined on it yet….”

As such, one may ask why the Spencer opinion, which decided a “relatively novel issue,” was unreported. Maryland’s New and Improved Unreported Opinion Rule Does Not Go Far Enough – E-Discovery LLC (citing unreported decisions that were found “cert-worthy” by Maryland Supreme Court); Maryland Appellate Decision Permitting Limited Forensic Search of Non-Parties’ Cell Phones – E-Discovery LLC (discussing unreported decision on novel issue); Admissibility of Internet Searches About Terminating Pregnancy – E-Discovery LLC (same).

In Spencer: “The State made clear that it was not offering the printouts to prove that Spencer had created the Instagram profiles, but only to show that the police had found the profiles while researching ‘Sconey.’”

The Appellate Court wrote: “Although our courts have not opined on it yet, it seems obvious that, … if the proponent merely wants to establish the existence of the social media evidence, they only need proof to support a finding that the social media evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.” It stated:

There was sufficient proof from which a reasonable juror could find that the printouts are what the State purported them to be. The State proffered the printouts to show that the police had found the profiles while investigating the nickname “Sconey.” Because the State did not offer the printouts to show who had authored them, it was not necessary for the State to authenticate the source of the profiles. [emphasis added].

In short, because the profiles were offered for a limited purpose, they were properly authenticated.[2]

Mr. Spencer also argued that the pages could have been fabricated or “the photographs associated with the Instagram profiles could have been manipulated.” The Court rejected that argument. It wrote that the proponent need not exclude every possibility in order to authenticate evidence and this objection went only to weight. It wrote: “Because the State need not guarantee that the printouts are what it purports them to be, Spencer’s arguments are unpersuasive.” [emphasis in original].

As a precaution, the Court addressed harmless error, writing:

In this case, the printouts of the Instagram profile pages are cumulative of other properly admitted evidence. The printouts were admitted to prove that Spencer is “Sconey.” There was other evidence at trial, however, that makes this same point. First, the State introduced Detective Jones’s testimony in which he described YouTube videos that he found that tie Spencer to “Sconey.” In researching what the nickname “Sconey” was, Detective Jones testified that he “went onto YouTube … and came across music videos for Sconey G., otherwise known as Deamonte Spencer.” Detective Jones identified Spencer as the individual in the videos. Second, the State introduced significant evidence linking the nickname “Sconey” to Spencer’s phone. This evidence included: that in Kamira and Leah’s phones, Spencer’s phone number was listed as “Sconey”; that the billing subscriber listed for Spencer’s phone number was “Sconey Smith”; that Spencer’s phone sent Leah’s phone two audio files titled “Sconey G, Snakes in the Grass” and “Sconey G, blood in the streets.” Because this body of evidence repeatedly links “Sconey” to Spencer, it proves the same point as the printouts of the Instagram profile pages and is thus cumulative. Accordingly, the admission of the printouts, if erroneous, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Maryland has an extensive body of case law governing authentication of social media and video evidence:

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[1] The Court wrote that sometimes “Sconey” was spelled without an “e”.

[2] While I do not suggest that there was a need to discuss Griffin, the State’s approach in Spencer distinguishes it from Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343 (2011).

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