Maryland Appellate Court Affirms Sanctions Award for Inappropriate Deposition Conduct

It does not bode well for a litigant when an appellate court cites as precedent that it is sanctionable to refer to opposing counsel as “babe” or a “bimbo.”  But that is the reference made in Ginexi v. Liberty Mountain Race Team, Inc., 2026 WL 1242829 (Appl. Ct. Md. May 6, 2026)(unreported).[1]

Ms. Ginexi, a ski instructor, was injured when she collided with a 12-year-old skier who was a member of the Liberty Mountain Race Team, Inc. (“LMRT”). She sued, alleging lack of supervision and improper equipment.

COLLISIONS AND SKIING

Much of the decision addresses employment issues and Pennsylvania law applicable to skiing.

For all of you who ski:  “We hold that Ginexi’s collision with Ma was an inherent risk of downhill skiing. Both the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Hughes) and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania (Bell) have made plain that collisions such as the one between Ginexi and Ma are a common, frequent, and expected risk of downhill skiing…. By engaging in the sport of downhill skiing, Ginexi assumed the inherent risk of colliding with another skier. As such, her claim was, as a matter of law, precluded by the Act.”

SANCTIONABLE DEPOSITION CONDUCT

However, there was an important decision regarding deposition conduct.  Although the sanctioned attorney’s name is in the Court’s opinion, I have replaced it here with XXXX.

On October 25, 2024, Ginexi and her attorney, XXXX, appeared for a deposition at the offices of LMRT’s attorney, Jessica Butkera. Also present was counsel for the Mas [defendant], Mark Klemens. That deposition, which was video recorded, ended abruptly for reasons discussed in greater detail below. Following Ginexi’s deposition, LMRT filed a motion for sanctions against XXXX.

The Appellate Court wrote: “We now turn to XXXX’s challenge to the court’s order sanctioning him for his behavior at Ginexi’s deposition. Before doing so, we will set forth the relevant facts and procedural background.”

It would be unduly burdensome to describe all of those facts in their entirety. Id. at *12-13, passim. LMRT asserted that “XXXX’s obstructive behavior during the deposition resulted in only 80 minutes of actual questioning, even though the parties were together for over four hours….” Id. at 13. It alleged that XXXX objected 79 times, and LMRT asserted that many were improper speaking objections. Id.

LMRT also noted that XXXX exhibited unprofessional behavior toward Jessica Butkera, LMRT’s counsel, including: putting his hand in front of Butkera’s face to get her to stop talking; talking to her and about her in a condescending manner; and criticizing her knowledge of the law.

Id.  LMRT sought an order for the cost of the deposition, transcript, and sanctions motion.

The Ginexi Court wrote that “XXXX lodged dozens of speaking objections and, at several points, precluded Ginexi from answering questions without providing a reasonable explanation as to why either the question or Ginexi’s answer was improper.”  It described “generally obstructive behavior” such as tell opposing counsel to rephrase her questions and “stopping the questioning to chastise Butkera regarding the phrasing of her questions; accusing Butkera, without a proper foundation, of not acting in ‘good faith;’ and forcing Butkera to explain the purpose of her questions before allowing Ginexi to answer.”

When Ms. Butekra attempted to pose questions based on a letter, “XXXX interjected and inquired as to whether the letter had been produced in discovery. Butkera responded that the letter had not been produced because the document was already in Ginexi’s possession, given that she had written the letter.”  XXXX then “refused to allow the deposition to proceed….” Further events followed and:

After this prolonged exchange, which lasted approximately 40 minutes, Butkera asked XXXX if he was “going to let the witness answer questions.” XXXX responded that he would “consider it.” At that point, Butkera declared that she was suspending the deposition to seek intervention from the court. XXXX then accused Butkera of “blackmail” and insisted that the deposition proceed. When Butkera reiterated that she was making the decision to suspend the deposition and seek court intervention, XXXX again accused Butkera of engaging in blackmail and stated that she could “either go forward or you’re done.”

Id. at *13.  After additional discussion, the deposition ended.

LMRT filed a motion to compel Ms. Ginexi to “finish her deposition” and for sanctions.  The motion to compel was granted.

XXXX then filed a responsive motion opposing the request for sanctions. “XXXX claimed that LMRT had committed a discovery violation in failing to disclose Ginexi’s letter. XXXX argued that LMRT’s ‘discovery misconduct’ was the reason Ginexi’s deposition ended early.”  Id. at *13.  “XXXX insisted that he merely wanted to resolve that issue before proceeding and that it was opposing counsel that acted unprofessionally.”

The trial court reviewed the video and imposed sanctions of $1,500.

On appeal, XXXX asserted that “his instructions to Ginexi not to answer questions during her deposition were justified by LMRT’s ‘deposition ambush’ regarding the undisclosed document.”  He said that he had not previously seen the letter and that it was potentially “protected.”  He also raised procedural arguments asserting lack of a proper hearing and absence of a verified statement of costs.

The Appellate Court looked to both the Maryland Rules and the Court’s inherent powers under common law. Quoting and referencing the sexist case of Mullaney v. Aude, 126 Md. App. 639 (1999), the court wrote:

The absence of civility and respect exhibited by lawyers towards one another has been for years the subject of significant concern for bar and bench leaders, and we reasoned that the legal profession is diminished when the ill feeling that may exist between litigants carries over into the conduct and demeanor demonstrated by one lawyer toward another…. We further noted that, although “scorched earth strategies” and “take no prisoners’ litigators” were in vogue, trial courts “have an obligation to step in and say it is unacceptable,” particularly in the context of depositions, where “there is no referee, no umpire, no judge to call a halt to the ad hominem attacks, the harassment, the abuse that too many lawyers today think is required in the service of their clients.”

Id. at *15 (cleaned up).  The Ginexi Court then ruled:

Against that backdrop, we hold that the court in the instant case did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning XXXX for his behavior at Ginexi’s deposition. XXXX’s obstructive behavior presented a significant obstacle to the orderly administration of Ginexi’s deposition, such that LMRT was left with little choice but to end the deposition prematurely and file a motion to compel and for sanctions. Not only that, but XXXX’s behavior was, at times, unprofessional and abusive. Such behavior included chastising opposing counsel regarding the phrasing of her questions, questioning opposing counsel’s knowledge of the law, interrupting opposing counsel’s questioning without a proper foundation, forcing counsel to engage in prolonged discussions and to provide answers to XXXX’s questions before allowing the proceedings to continue, refusing to accept opposing counsel’s responses or respect counsel’s decision to end the deposition, accusing opposing counsel of blackmail, and refusing opposing counsel’s repeated requests that he leave the office. We agree with XXXX that Butkera had an obligation to produce the resignation letter in discovery. Nevertheless, the record shows that XXXX’s objectionable behavior began well before LMRT confronted Ginexi with the letter. The record demonstrates that XXXX’s behavior far exceeded any reasonable response to LMRT’s alleged discovery violation and, while perhaps not as overt as the remarks at issue in Mullaney, represented the sort of uncivil and disrespectful conduct that we condemned in that case. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning XXXX.

Id. at *15 (emphasis added).

The Appellate Court then rejected XXXX’s procedural arguments.  He claimed that the trial court had not held a hearing. The Appellate Court wrote that the trial court had held a hearing. Id. at *16. It also rejected the argument concerning detailed time records.

See generally:

• “Bulldog Attorneys” v. “Bulldog Law” – Sanctions Granted in Part; Denied Without Prejudice in Part (Mar. 12, 2026);
• Profanity and Threats Are Not a “Good Faith” Conference (May 25, 2025);
• Ethical Contours of Discovery Sanctions and the Duty to Cooperate (Sep. 7, 2023);
• Alleged “Win-At-All-Costs” Tactics in Defense of Exoneree Lawsuits for Wrongful Conviction Damages (Jun. 23, 2022).

The Hon. Steve Leben wrote about a law firm that advertised “that going against it in discovery matters would be like meeting Genghis Khan on the steps of the court house.” S. Leben, “We All Have a Role in Protecting Our Justice System: Promoting Procedural Fairness,” 46 ABA Litigation 6, 8 (2019). The advertisement was effectively used in a sanctions motion against that firm.  Id.  Judge Leben wrote that this is a “justice system” and “Parties want fair treatment—not an encounter with Genghis Khan. We owe them that much.”  Id.

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[1] The Court wrote:  “This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).”