Litigant Forfeited Claim that Court Erred by Relying on Hallucinated/Fictional Cases

A recent decision begins as follows:

Joan Pablo Torres Campos (Torres) appeals from a family court order denying his request for shared custody and visitation of a dog. He contends the court committed error by citing and relying on fictitious case authorities in its order. We agree the court so erred, but we conclude Torres forfeited this claim by drafting and submitting the very order he now challenges and failing to object or alert the court that the cited authorities were fake.

In re the Domestic Partnership of Campos and Munoz, 2026 WL 622292 (Ct. Apl. Cal. 4^th Dist. Mar. 5, 2026)(emphasis added).

Former President Reagan said “trust but verify. It’s still play, but cut the cards. It’s still watch closely. And don’t be afraid to see what you see.”

Ms. Munoz’s attorney wrote to Mr. Torres’ attorney that Munoz relied on “established case law” and cited two purported decisions.  One was not a real case. The other had a different citation.  Id. at *2.  Later, the fictional case was cited to the court by Ms. Munoz’s attorney.  Mr. Torres’ reply did not point out that the case was fictional. Id. at *2.

A hearing was held and Mr. Torres’ attorney was directed to submit a formal proposed order that denied Mr. Torres’ request for pet custody.  Mr. Torres’ counsel submitted proposed Findings and Order After Hearing.  The court approved the proposal as conforming to its oral ruling.  However, the order cited both fictional cases. Id. at *2.

Mr. Torres appealed the order that denied his pet custody request.  Id. Ms. Munoz cited the non-existent cases. Id. at *2. After dismissal of his appeal on procedural grounds, Mr. Torres moved to reinstate it.  In that motion, for the first time, he pointed out that the cases were “invented case law.”

Ms. Munoz responded that the hallucination claim was false, asserting that one was a parallel citation and the other a typographical error. The court wrote that the new information was also fictitious.

After the court reinstated Mr. Torres’ appeal, it wrote:

On the merits, Torres first argues the family court’s order must be reversed because of its reliance on fictional cases cited by Bonar and her client Munoz. We agree the court erred by citing and relying in material part on fictional cases in its written order. We conclude, however, that Torres forfeited this claim by drafting and submitting the very order containing these fabricated citations and doing so without calling the court’s attention to the error or asserting any objection to its reliance on them.

Id. at *5 (emphasis added).

Review of the family law court order was on an abuse of discretion standard.  The court continued:

We have no difficulty concluding that it is an abuse of discretion for a court to rely in material part on fictional case authorities in rendering a decision or making an order. Reliance on fake cases is fundamentally incompatible with an informed exercise of discretion controlled by genuine principles of law. It seriously undermines the integrity of the outcome and erodes public confidence in our judicial system. It can also hinder meaningful appellate review. (See, e.g., Shahid v. Esaam (2025) 376 Ga.App. 145, 150 [918 S.E.2d 198, 202–203] [citation of fake cases rendered trial court’s written order defective on its face and required reversal because it prevented meaningful appellate review].) Although we appreciate that trial courts must often rely on the parties to prepare written orders, it is imperative for both the court and the parties to verify that the citations in all orders are genuine and truly stand for the propositions cited. This is especially vital with the increasing incidence of hallucinated case citations generated by AI tools. (See Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, 443 (Noland).)

The family court therefore erred by citing and relying solely on fictional cases in its final order. This is not to say that the factors the court relied on were legally improper or that it could not have reached the same result applying proper legal reasoning grounded in genuine law. We hold only that the path the court took to reach its result constituted an abuse of discretion because it relied in material part on the holdings of nonexistent legal authorities purportedly emphasizing the importance of the parties’ well-being and stability in determining pet custody, which may have influenced the weight the court gave to these factors.

Id. at *5 (emphasis added).

However, the court wrote that there were “highly unusual circumstances” that led to the forfeiture holding.  Id. at *6. “Under [the forfeiture] doctrine, ‘a party loses the right to appeal an issue caused by affirmative conduct or by failing to take proper steps at trial to avoid or correct the error.’”

Torres forfeited his claim of error both by his affirmative conduct and his inaction. Although Munoz and Bonar were responsible for improperly citing these fictitious authorities in the first place, Torres’s own counsel affirmatively drafted and submitted the proposed order with these citations that was ultimately signed by the family court. And even though his own counsel drafted the order, Torres failed to object to the court’s reliance on these citations or call the court’s attention to the issue. The forfeiture rule applies to a party’s failure to object to the language of a proposed order when it had an opportunity to do so.

Id. at *6 (emphasis added). The court held:

Accordingly, we conclude that Torres has forfeited this claim. We reach the same conclusion regarding Torres’s related claim that Bonar’s professional misconduct in citing the fake authorities requires reversal. This claim could have been raised and any prejudice cured in the trial court if Torres’s counsel had just attempted to verify the cited cases. Although we have discretion to overlook the forfeiture, we decline to do so because it would effectively excuse Torres’s own counsel’s breach of her duty to the court in submitting the proposed order without verifying the citations.

Id. at *7. In sum:

Notwithstanding [attorney] Bonar’s own misconduct in citing these nonexistent authorities, which we address later in this opinion, it was Torres’s counsel who ultimately prepared and submitted the proposed order without verifying the citations contained in it or alerting the court.

Id. at *6.  Sanctions were imposed on counsel. This blog does not address those issues.  Id. at *9.