“Judges don’t have to recuse if sued by litigant, MD ethics committee rules”

Presentation to Judicial College of Maryland

July 17, 2026

Published by Michael Berman at August 12, 2026

Tags

Ethics

Yesterday, I posted Don’t Sue the Judge. There is an interesting spinoff. Ian Round reported on a Judicial Ethics opinion holding that Judges don’t have to recuse if sued by litigant, MD ethics committee rules – Maryland Daily Record (Aug. 11, 2026).

Mr. Round reports that the Judicial ethics opinion arose out of the lawsuit against the Judge: “The facts in the ethics committee’s opinion closely mirror the case of Nathan Charles, an immigration attorney in Baltimore who represented himself in contentious divorce and custody proceedings…. Charles has sued judges of the Montgomery County Circuit Court, alleging his rights to free speech and due process were violated because he criticized the court and all of its judges. Both lawsuits were filed in U.S. District Court. Charles represented himself in the family law proceedings and the lawsuits against the judges.” Id.

The Judicial Ethics Committee “concludes on the facts given that the Requester [a circuit court Judge] likely is not required to recuse for any objective reason. Recusal is required only if the Requester subjectively determines that the Requester is not able to remain fair and impartial.” The latter was determined to not be the case here.

Maryland Judicial Ethics Opinion 2026-22 (Aug. 10, 2026), begins by framing the issue:

Issue: Must a judge recuse from a matter in which a litigant has sued the judge in other jurisdictions and has disclosed filing a disciplinary complaint against the judge?

Answer: No, unless the judge determines subjectively that the judge is unable to remain fair and impartial in the matter.

The self-represented litigant had sued the Judge and also filed a Complaint with the Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities. The Opinion recites that the self-represented litigant “has now moved to disqualify the Requester [a circuit court judge] and every other active judge and magistrate in the Requester’s jurisdiction,” describing them as future defendants. (As noted in my prior post, leave to amend the Complaint was denied in federal court and it was dismissed.)

The Judicial Ethics Committee reviewed: Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct Rules 18-101 and 18-202; its standards of recusal decision, Opinion 2025-32 (Nov. 7, 2025); and, Art. IV of the Maryland Constitution, which applied here.

The Committee wrote that recusal has subjective and objective aspects. Subjectively, “[i]f the judge is not confident in the judge’s own subjective impartiality, then recusal is required on that basis alone.” Objectively, the Judge must decide if there is a reasonable perception of impropriety. The Committee added:

Disqualification in appropriate circumstances serves the goal of the judicial process not only being fair, but appearing to be fair…. At the same time, judges have a duty to preside when qualified that is as strong as their duty to refrain from presiding when not qualified. [cleaned up].

The Committee did not opine on the subjective prong. On the objective prong, it concluded that “there is not likely to be an objective reason to question the Requester’s impartiality based solely on the fact that the litigant has brought or may bring other claims against the Requester. Here, the Requester’s knowledge of the litigant is based entirely on prior judicial proceedings. Information derived entirely from judicial proceedings is not considered ‘personal.’”

The Committee wrote that a person with knowledge of all the facts “likely would understand that the litigant’s complaints are not a reasonable reaction to any action by the Requester, but a manifestation of dissatisfaction with decisions that have been adverse to the litigant. The facts presented suggest strongly that the litigant is using the other complaints tactically, to try to remove the Requester and other judges and magistrates from the matter. Judges have a responsibility to resist such tactics if they are able to maintain the necessary subjective impartiality.” [emphasis added].

Further, it wrote that “the litigant’s disclosure of the litigant’s complaints to the Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities likely was improper.”

In an interesting footnote, the Committee suggested that the self-represented litigant may have overplayed his hand:

The duty to recuse also is qualified by the rule of necessity. “[B]oth the constitutional and statutory provisions governing recusal must yield where recusal ‘would destroy the only tribunal in which relief . . . may be sought.’ Gordy v. Dennis, 176 Md. 106, 109 (1939).” Opinion 2025-32 (Nov. 7, 2025) at 5. If there were any merit to the litigant’s claims here, the rule of necessity could be implicated because the litigant seeks recusal of every judicial officer in the jurisdiction.

For posts on protecting the Judiciary, see