In a recent case, the Defendants moved to dismiss a copyright infringement claim. Plaintiff issued discovery; Defendants answered; and, Plaintiff moved to compel.
One defendant “asks to delay this motion until after resolution of the pending motion to dismiss. This request is effectively a request to stay discovery.” Sadeghpour v. Nakamoto, 2026 WL 2267345 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2026).
The court wrote that:
[N]o federal or local rule, statute, or binding case law automatically stays discovery pending a ruling on a motion to dismiss. Nor is a stay of discovery permitted merely because defendant believes it will prevail on its motion to dismiss: “[H]ad the Federal Rules contemplated that a motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) would stay discovery, the Rules would contain a provision to that effect.”
It added: “As a matter of federal procedure, the request to stay discovery is considered a motion for protective order under Rule 26(c)(1)(A)-(B).” [emphasis added].
That holding is important because it sets the governing “good cause” standard: “Good cause may exist when the party from whom discovery is sought shows that it would suffer ‘annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expensive’ [sic] absent a stay. Courts are accorded the discretion to stay discovery where the disposition of a motion to dismiss might preclude the need for discovery entirely.”
However, there must be a “particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Therefore: “In determining whether a stay of discovery is appropriate, courts are to balance any harm produced by a stay against the possibility that a motion to dismiss would be granted and eliminate the need for any discovery.”
Further: “A stay of discovery while dispositive motions are pending is more the exception than the rule. Although the exception, courts have issued protective orders to stay discovery pending disposition of a motion to dismiss and/or motion for summary judgment when the party seeking such protection proves its necessity, such as when the dispositive motion raises a purely legal issue. But a stay of discovery is not appropriate when it could prevent a party from having a sufficient opportunity to develop a factual basis to defend against the dispositive motion.”
On the facts presented: “Nakamoto has failed to particularly and specifically demonstrate good cause as necessary to establish that a protective order staying discovery is appropriate in this case. Accordingly, the request to delay resolution of this motion [to compel discovery] until after a decision on the pending motion to dismiss is denied.”
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