Four Factors for Imposing Discovery Sanctions Under Md. Rule 2-433; No Exception for Pro Se Litigant

In Smith v. Morris, 2026 WL 809126 (Appl. Ct. Md. Mar. 24, 2026)(unreported; per curiam),[1] the Court set out the four factors used to apply discovery sanctions under Maryland Rule 2-433.  The sanctioned party was proceeding pro se.

Plaintiff, Ms. Smith, sued her aunt, Ms. Morris, alleging torts in connection with a gift or inheritance.  Plaintiff asserted that Defendant withdrew funds from a bank account that Plaintiff alleged inherited by right of survivorship upon the death of her grandmother.

Plaintiff propounded discovery. Defendant did not answer. Plaintiff moved to compel.  The trial court granted the motion and compelled responses by a date certain.  Defendant did not provide those responses.

The parties appeared for trial. Plaintiff made an oral motion for sanctions. The motion was granted and Defendant was barred from presenting any evidence that would have been responsive to the discovery.  A judgment was entered in Plaintiff’s favor for $39,254.

On appeal, Defendant challenged the sanctions order. The Appellate Court affirmed.

First, it recognized that trial courts have great discretion in applying sanctions for discovery failures. As such, it reviewed the order on an abuse of discretion standard.

Defendant argued that she was pro se and therefore her failure should have been excused. The Court disagreed, writing that “the procedural, evidentiary, and appellate rules apply alike to parties and their attorneys. No different standards apply when parties appear pro se. Tretick v. Layman, 95 Md. App. 62, 86 (1993). Although we sympathize with pro se litigants, we also need to adhere to procedural rules in order to maintain consistency in the judicial system. Pickett v. Noba, Inc., 114 Md. App. 552, 554–55 (1997).” (internal quotations omitted).

The Appellate Court set out the factors to consider before imposing a discovery sanction:

(1) whether the disclosure violation was technical or substantial; (2) the timing of the ultimate disclosure; (3) the reason, if any, for the violation; (4) the degree of prejudice to the parties respectively offering and opposing the evidence; and (5) whether any resulting prejudice might be cured by a postponement and, if so, the overall desirability of a continuance. [citation omitted].

It then applied them:

Here, Smith was ordered to produce discovery, did not do so, and admitted to the failure to provide discovery as ordered on the record. The disclosure violation was substantial and, indeed, there was no ultimate disclosure…. The trial court acknowledged that Smith’s discovery failure was not willful, but it concluded that allowing Smith to present undisclosed evidence would unfairly prejudice Morris. On this record, we cannot say that “no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court[.]” …. Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in barring Smith from presenting evidence as a sanction for her discovery failure.

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[1] The Court wrote that this is a per curiam opinion. Under Rule 1-104, the opinion is not precedent within the rule of stare decisis, nor may it be cited as persuasive authority.