A Scheduling Order is – – an Order; Sanctions Imposed Despite Consent Request to Modify

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A Scheduling Order is, after all, an Order. Violating it has consequences.  Estate of Taylor v. Spring, 2025 WL 3294714 (Appl. Ct. Md. Nov. 26, 2025)(unreported).[1]

This is an application of the Cinderella principle: “Like Cinderella, the attorney in this case tripped on the electronic stairs at midnight, but his client lost more than a glass slipper.”  Tom Donlon, Silly Lawyer Tricks XXX (americanbar.org)(Mar. 14, 2023).

Mr. Spring sued the Estate for damages resulting from a car crash.  After granting the first motion to extend the trial court’s scheduling order, a second, consent motion to extend was denied.

The Appellate Court wrote: “The Estate provided late expert disclosures to Spring, including the proffered testimony of Sgt. Gore of the Maryland State Police. The court excluded the testimony of Sgt. Gore based on the late disclosure.”  A verdict of $452,163.71 was entered for plaintiff. After denial of a motion for new trial, the Estate appealed.

The first scheduling order set a June 2022 milestone for expert disclosures. “Spring timely designated his proposed expert witnesses. June came and went, but the Estate had not designated its witnesses in accordance with the initial scheduling order.”  However, the Estate had noted depositions of four different medical centers.

Eight days before the close of discovery, the parties filed a joint motion to modify the Scheduling Order.  It cited Mr. Spring’s attorney’s serious health issues.  The motion was granted and the second Scheduling Order set a November 4, 2022, deadline for the Estate’s expert and a January 19, 2023, discovery cutoff.

The Court wrote: “However, November passed with no expert designations from the Estate.”  Roughly two months after the discovery cutoff, the Estate filed a Consent Motion to Extend Scheduling Order. “The motion explained that the parties had an agreement between themselves that they would attempt to settle the case before conducting the ‘invasive’ discovery necessary to develop Spring’s business loss claim; however, they were not able to reach a settlement.”

The trial court denied the motion and set a trial date. The Appellate Court stated:

The Estate filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Request for Hearing the same month, further expanding upon the first amendment of the scheduling order; the parties’ collaborative efforts to attempt settlement before conducting the invasive business loss discovery; and that neither party would have been prejudiced from a second amendment since trial was subsequently set for ten months in the future. Spring filed a brief response to this Motion for Reconsideration simply stating that he did not oppose the Estate’s request and deferred to the court. The court denied the Motion for Reconsideration without opinion. The Estate now appeals the denials of their Consent Motion to Extend and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

At trial, Mr. Spring moved to exclude the expert testimony of Sgt. Gore.  The expert had downloaded speed and acceleration data from Mr. Spring’s car after the accident.

The trial court noted that Sgt. Gore’s report was produced to plaintiff after the discovery deadline. The court sustained the objection to Sgt. Gore’s testimony solely “on the basis that the information came in after the discovery deadline.”  The Estate appealed.

The Appellate Court wrote that: “Discovery decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.”  Courts have broad discretion over scheduling orders.

First, the Appellate Court held that it was not error to deny the motion to amend the first Scheduling Order.  The Estate argued that it made a good faith effort to adhere to that order and its violation was merely technical. It asserted extraordinary circumstances.

However, the Appellate Court affirmed because the trial court “could have reasonably found that the Estate had not substantially complied with the scheduling order.”  It wrote:

“Though such orders are generally not unyieldingly rigid as extraordinary circumstances which warrant modification do occur, they serve to light the way down the corridors which pending cases will proceed.” [citation omitted].

The trial court’s order recited the facts on which it relied and that was sufficient to affirm under the abuse of discretion standard. The Appellate Court distinguished a situation where a different trial judge had said “that is not my way of handling it.… It’s always been the way I handled it. I think the rules are supposed to be the same for everybody.”  The latter is a failure to exercise discretion; the former is permissible.

Second, the Appellate Court also found the exercise of discretion to be reasonable under a four-factor test. “[B]oth substantial compliance and good cause must have been present to disturb the circuit court’s decision not to amend the scheduling order.” [emphasis in original]. Willfulness is not required, especially when the sanction is not “case-ending….”

Here, the Estate provides no explanation as to why it did not attempt to identify experts or develop its contributory negligence defense until settlement negotiations fell through. Additionally, the “sanction”––denial of the Estate’s motion to amend––was not a case-ending one such as dismissal. While we by no means believe the Estate engaged in willful or contemptuous non-compliance, we also cannot say there was a good faith effort at compliance. Therefore, denial of the motion was a sound exercise of the court’s discretion.

The Court rejected the Estate’s effort to blame Mr. Spring’s tardy discovery responses:

Here, in contrast, there was no attempt to designate experts pursuant to the (already extended) scheduling order deadline. While the Estate blames its non-compliance on Spring’s delayed responses to interrogatories coming after the Estate’s expert designation deadline, the burden, ultimately, falls on the Estate to prepare its defense. It was unreasonable for the Estate to wait for Spring’s answers to seek out experts in a case where lost profits were alleged in the complaint and contributory negligence was noted in the Estate’s answer. Further, the Estate’s ultimate expert disclosures came five months after the close of discovery and the Estate did not provide Sgt. Gore’s report to Spring until weeks after receiving it. [emphasis added].

This violation, according to the Court, “was a gross one….”  It wrote that: “Settlement discussions do not override counsel’s duty to prepare for trial in the event settlement cannot be reached.” [emphasis added].

Third, as to the exclusionary order, the Estate raised several issues. The Appellate Court wrote:

If the circuit court did not err in denying the motion to modify the scheduling order, then it also did not err in striking the witnesses whose designations or depositions did not comply with the scheduling order’s deadlines…. Because we concluded the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Estate’s motion to amend the scheduling order, we conclude, for the same reasons, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the late-disclosed testimony of Sgt. Gore. [cleaned up].

For more on Scheduling Orders, see:

See generally:

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[1] This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Maryland Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

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