Sanctions for Failure to Comply With a Scheduling Order That Set Discovery Milestones

While the facts were somewhat unique and egregious, in Little v. Hyde, 2025 WL 79685 (Appl. Ct. Md. Jan. 13, 2025)(unreported),[1] sanctions were imposed for failure to comply with discovery milestones in a scheduling order.

Mr. Little sued Ms. Hyde and others for an auto tort.  However, he failed to comply with a Scheduling Order, among other things, and the trial court issued preclusive sanctions.  That resulted in summary judgment for the defendants.  The Appeals Court affirmed.

The Court wrote that the purpose of scheduling orders is to maximize judicial efficiency and minimize judicial inefficiency.

The principal function of a scheduling order is to move the case efficiently through the litigation process by setting specific dates or time limits for anticipated litigation events to occur.”

Id. at *3 (quotations and citation omitted).  They are not “unyieldingly rigid,” and may be modified; however, “they serve to light the way down the corridors which pending cases will proceed.”  Id. at *3 (citation and quotation omitted).  It is reasonable for courts to demand substantial compliance or , at least, a good faith and earnest effort to comply.  Id.  However, they should not be “complaisantly lax….”  Id. (same).

Importantly, the Court wrote:  “Maryland courts possess the inherent power to enforce their scheduling orders through the threat and imposition of sanctions.”  Id. at *4 (cleaned up; citation and quotations omitted; emphasis added).

Further: “Where the asserted scheduling order violation involves a discovery failure, the trial court has wide discretion to determine what sanction, if any, is appropriate.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted).

The Scheduling Order in Little set a milestone for identifying expert witnesses.  Mr. Little did not meet that deadline.  That – together with other things – led to the sanction.  Mr. Little “was precluded from introducing evidence of liability or damages….” Id. at *1, 3, 8. The Court wrote:

Appellees moved for sanctions against appellant on June 21, 2023, claiming that he had not responded to Nova Biomedical’s interrogatories or its request for production of documents, both of which were purportedly propounded upon appellant on November 9, 2022. Appellees also alleged that appellant had “failed to designate any expert witnesses.” [by the deadline in the Scheduling Order]. As relief, appellees asked the court to preclude appellant from either (1) “introducing into evidence at … trial … any evidence of [appellees’] alleged liability or [appellant’s] claimed damages” or (2) “relying on any expert testimony or opinions[.]” In an order entered on July 25, 2023, the court granted appellees’ unopposed motion and imposed the sanctions they sought.

Id. at *2.  Appellees then moved for summary judgment.  Mr. Little moved to vacate the sanctions.  Defendants’ motion was granted; Mr. Little’s was denied.

In denying Mr. Little’s appeal from summary judgment, the Court pointed to several flaws:

• “We note at the outset that appellant [Mr. Little] failed to file an opposition or other response to appellees’ motion for sanctions.”
• “It was also evident that appellant did not designate any expert witnesses by the April 23, 2023, deadline for doing so.”
• The defendants/appellees had served discovery on November 9, 2022. “As was plain from the record before the court when it granted appellees’ motion for sanctions, appellant did not respond to those discovery requests by July 9, 2023—the deadline set in the scheduling order—or even by July 25, 2023—the date on which the sanctions were imposed.”

While dispositive sanctions are reserved for “egregious” situations, “neglect or failure to act” can be willful or “contumacious” conduct. Id. at *6.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in imposing sanctions.

Mr. Little also appealed denial of his motion to reconsider sanctions and to modify the scheduling order.  He “attributed the scheduling order violations to his incarceration.”  That argument also failed.  The defendants/appellees argued that Mr. Little’s attorney had several options, including, among others, filing a motion to stay.  Id. at *6.  Mr. Little was incarcerated on the same day as the Scheduling Order issued.  As to the incarceration defense, the Court was “not persuaded” that Mr. Little’s counsel made “a good faith effort to surmount the obstacle….”

The Appellate Court wrote that disregarding discovery deadlines is a “substantial violation.”

Here, appellant failed to comply with the scheduling order’s deadlines for either designating expert witnesses (i.e., April 23, 2023) or completing discovery (i.e., July 9, 2023). Accordingly, his violations of the scheduling order were clearly substantial rather than technical.

Mr. Little waited ten months to answer interrogatories and did so two months after the discovery deadline.  Further, “the record does not reflect that appellant [Mr. Little] ever responded to [appellee/defendant] Nova Biomedical’s request for production of documents, which was served contemporaneously with its interrogatories.”  That was not, the Court wrote, “substantial compliance with the Scheduling Order.

Delay of the trial was not an option. “[T]his Court has recognized that there is prejudice inherent in delaying a trial, because the memories and even the location of witnesses can become problematic when the years go by.”  Id. at *7 (cleaned up; citations and quotations omitted).  According to the Court, a continuance was not an appropriate cure because Mr. Little’s “disregard for the scheduling order was both persistent and egregious.”  After reciting the facts showing that disregard, the Court wrote that “[c]ounsel’s track record… gave the court no reason to think he would suddenly start cooperating or responding to … appellees in the event the court permitted postponement.” Id. (cleaned up; quotations and citation omitted).

The Appellate Court held that, because there was no evidence on which a jury could find for plaintiff – it described a “complete failure of proof” – summary judgment was proper.

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[1] This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).