“Whereas a human being might simply answer ‘I don’t know’ when faced with a question that exceeds their knowledge, AI models typically do not admit defeat.”  A. Spence and N. Bustard, Practical AI for Lawyers: Meeting the Challenges of Competence, Confidentiality, and Candor, 56 U. Balt. L.F. 331, 340 (2026).

CITATIONS TO HALLUCINATIONS BY ATTORNEYS

The leading Maryland decision on hallucinations is Mezu v. Mezu, 267 Md. App. 354, 367 (2025), cert. dismissed, 493 Md. 184 (2026).  It resulted in referral of the attorney to Bar Counsel.  There, the attorney tried to shift the blame to a law clerk. Maryland Fake Citation Case – Court Issues a Warning – Referral to Atty. Grievance Comm’n. (Nov. 2, 2025).  The Court wrote: “Before addressing the merits of the issues raised, we address this problem. We do so as a warning to others and to determine the court’s appropriate response in this case.” It explained:

This case… appears to be the first where the Maryland appellate courts have addressed the problems that occur when lawyers use AI, without the diligence required, in drafting briefs. The failure to use AI responsibly in legal research raises ethical issues and can result in sanctions when used improperly. It is unquestionably improper for an attorney to submit a brief with fake cases generated by AI.

The key facts applicable to sanctions were: “In determining whether to refer counsel to the Attorney Grievance Commission, we have considered the nature and severity of the conduct in this case. The brief here did not contain an isolated instance of a citation mistake. Rather, it cited multiple cases that did not exist, as well as others that did not support the proposition for which they were cited. When asked at oral argument about the concern when a lawyer obviously has not read the cases cited to the court, counsel indicated that this was not a unique circumstance, stating that he typically did not read the cases he cited in pleadings submitted to the court. Based on all the circumstances, we shall refer this case to the Attorney Grievance Commission.”

On January 14, 2026, the Court issued Boyd v. Lee, 2026 WL 111263 (Appl. Ct. Md. Jan. 14, 2026)(unreported), which is discussed in Hallucinations Are “Old News,” But a Recent Maryland Decision Addresses Ethical Contours  (Jan. 17, 2026).  There, an appeal was dismissed for procedural violations. The Court reiterated that:

It is unacceptable for counsel (or unrepresented parties, for that matter) to submit or attempt to rely on statements or authorities that are fabricated, hallucinated, or unsubstantiated, whether they are generated by artificial intelligence tools or “real” ones.  The signature of an attorney contained in a brief constitutes a certification that the attorney has read the brief, and that “to the best of the attorney’s knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it[.]” Md. Rule 1-311(b). Thus, signing and filing a brief that contains hallucinated law may implicate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct. Mezu v. Mezu, 267 Md. App. 354, 369, 374 (2025) (holding that counsel’s submission of brief with hallucinated case law implicated the Rules of Professional Conduct and referring case to the Attorney Grievance Commission). This conduct can also result in sanctions. Id. at 371-72 (declining to impose monetary sanctions when none were requested by opposing counsel).

“Though the court did not impose monetary sanctions against the three attorneys, it did issue public reprimands, disqualified them from the case, and referred them to the Alabama State Bar. Butler Snow narrowly escaped sanctions itself, but it was unable to escape the nationwide embarrassment, media ridicule, and client loss.”  Spence and Bustard, “Practical AI,” 56 U. Balt. L.F. at 338–39.

That was followed by Maryland Copy and Paste “Hallucinations” Case, citing Ajakaiye v. Oladipupo, 2026 WL 1733336 (Appl. Ct. Md. Jun. 16, 2026). There, “[t]he Court’s review of Father’s briefing confirms that, for most of the offending citations, Father’s counsel simply copied and pasted from the Father’s pro se second motion for reconsideration. Father’s counsel further concedes that he did not confirm whether AI was used in the Father’s preparation of that second motion for reconsideration, seemingly relying on the fact that the pro se briefing was drafted with the assistance of Father’s sister, who is a non-practicing attorney (having attended a foreign law school).”  Citing Mezu, the matter was referred to the Attorney Grievance Commission.

Next, in Benjamin v. State, 2026 WL 2491126 (App. Ct. Md. Aug. 25, 2026)(unreported), an appellant’s request to file a corrected brief three days before appellee’s briefing date was denied. “In this case, however, the brief was filed before the decision in Mezu, the inaccuracies were not excessive and did not include totally made up cases, counsel tried to correct the errors before the State filed its brief, and the State does not contend that it was harmed. Given these circumstances, we shall not, as we did in Mezu, refer counsel to the Attorney Grievance Commission. We again urge counsel, however, to use AI responsibly and check the accuracy of all citations before submitting a brief to this Court, or any other court.” [emphasis added]. For a discussion of this decision, please see Maryland: No Sanctions for Apparent Hallucinations (Aug. 29, 2026).

CITATIONS TO HALLUCINATIONS BY UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS

The Dorsey decision involved an informal brief by an unrepresented litigant. Dorsey v. Livramento, 2026 WL 1413152 (Appl. Ct. Md. May 20, 2026)(unreported), cert. denied, 496 Md. 453 (2026).  After citing Mezu, the Court wrote:

Although there is no parallel disciplinary action for pro se litigants, Maryland Rule 1-311(c) authorizes us to strike the offending filing. Where, as here, the filing is an appellant’s principal brief, striking it could result in dismissal under Maryland Rule 8-602(c)(5) for failure to file a brief….

We exercise our discretion to decline striking Mother’s informal brief in its entirety. As explained below, several issues are not properly before us, so we need not identify or address the problematic citations because we do not reach the merits of these issues. See infra, Parts I–III. However, this does not excuse the impropriety of such conduct. To the extent an issue is properly before us, we will strike from the brief any cases that are fictitious and any authorities that clearly do not support the propositions for which they are cited. See infra, Part IV, notes 8–17. Mother is warned and put on notice that continued citation of fabricated cases or misrepresented legal authorities may result in sanctions, including the striking of future filings in their entirety.

In footnotes 8 through 17 parts of the brief were stricken.

Meziane v. Aitouche, 2026 WL 1101776 (Appl. Ct. Md. Apr. 23, 2026), involved a self-represented litigant whose brief contained two apparently fictitious citations. The Court cited Mezu and wrote:

[I]ndeed, attorneys who submit filings containing fake citations may be referred to the Attorney Grievance Commission depending on the nature and severity of the misconduct…. Although there is no parallel disciplinary action for pro se litigants, at the least, Rule 1-311(c) authorizes us to strike the offending filing. Where, as here, the filing is an appellant’s principal brief, striking it could result in dismissal under Rule 8-602(c)(5) for failure to file a brief….

That said, given the significant rights involved for the parties here, we shall exercise our discretion and take no action regarding Mother’s brief and will address the merits of her appeal. This does not excuse Mother’s suspected misconduct. Rather, despite her reliance on inapposite and apparently fictitious authorities, we can sufficiently address the issues raised.

This month, the Court wrote that “despite being made aware of its fictitiousness by the State’s opposition to that motion, [appellant] still included it in his brief on appeal.”  Sare v. Central Collection Unit, 2026 WL 3093192 (Appl. Ct. Md. Oct. 1, 2026)(unreported).  After citing Mezu, the Court wrote: “Although there is no parallel disciplinary action for pro se litigants, at the least, Rule 1-311(c) authorizes us to strike the offending filing. Where, as here, the filing is an appellant’s principal brief, striking it could result in dismissal under Rule 8-602(c)(5) for failure to file a brief….  Although we have decided not to take further action regarding Sare’s brief and will address the merits of his appeal, this does not excuse his suspected misconduct. We caution that future filings submitted to the Court with fake citations may be struck.”

In another recent decision concerning an unrepresented litigant, the Appellate Court of Maryland wrote:

In its brief, the Commission noted that Appellant cited to cases that did not exist and that he further cited an existing case for a proposition it did not support. Appellant did not address the Commission’s concern and in his reply brief once again cited the non-existent case law or propositions. In conducting review of this matter, we have confirmed that the authorities and proposition identified by the Commission are non-existent. While we recognize that Appellant is self-represented in this appeal, a note of caution is appropriate. We recently discussed the ethical issues concerning the use of AI to conduct legal research or generate filings, including the risk of “hallucinated” citations. See Mezu v. Mezu, 267 Md. App. 354, 367–68 (2025). Further, the citation of fake cases in a brief implicates multiple Maryland Rules. See, e.g., Md. Rule 1-311(b). Indeed, attorneys who submit filings with fake citations may face sanctions and may be referred to the Attorney Grievance Commission. See Mezu, 267 Md. App. at 367, 374. Although there is no parallel disciplinary action for pro se litigants, Md. Rule 1-311(c) permits us to strike an offending filing, which, in turn, could cause a dismissal under Md. Rule 8-602(c)(5) for failure to file a brief. In this case, we shall exercise our discretion and take no action regarding Appellant’s citation to non-existent cases or proposition and thus address the merits while noting that this does not excuse Appellant’s presentation of invalid authorities to this Court.

In the Matter of Gary Brown, Jr., 2026 WL 3025765 (Appl. Ct. Md. Oct. 2, 2026).

In each unreported decision, the Court wrote: “This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).”

Among other things, it is important for Maryland attorneys to be aware of:

• Proposed Changes to the MD Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct Re: AI (Jul. 21, 2026);
• Maryland’s Proposed Anti-Hallucination Rule (Mar. 16, 2026);
• Child’s Best Interest Trumps Sanction for Possibly Hallucinated Case Citation (Mar. 15, 2026);
• “Hallucinations” by West’s CoCounsel? (Apr. 7, 2026);
• , Sanctions and Remedies Where Parties Submit Citations Hallucinated by Artificial Intelligence Programs—State Cases, 110 A.L.R.7th Art. 3 (2026).

After Leafwell was awarded a fee sanction, however, it did not follow the court’s direction on liquidating its claim.  The court wrote:

For the fee sanction, the parties were directed to make a good faith attempt to resolve the amount and to apprise us of any dispute. But [defendant] Leafwell and its counsel chose instead to simply make the situation worse. Turning a blind eye to the fact that all of its piling on was denied as moot (a motion for sanctions, a motion for leave to reply to Castro’s response to our order to show cause, and a request for oral argument), Leafwell and its counsel cast aside the obligations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1927, Rules 1 and 11, and the Civil Action Order…; ignored the directive in the sanctions order to simply file a notice advising of any hourly-rate or amount-of-hours dispute…; and filed an 83-page submission seeking $215,401.60 in fees!…

Id. at *1 (emphasis added). The court wrote: “They’re lucky we don’t require them to reimburse Castro for responding to it.”

The court wrote: “As tempting as it might be to zero out the fee award (and justifiably so), we stay the course on which we embarked at our own choosing.”  Id. The court awarded a Rule 11 sanction of $6,720, after a detailed analysis of the record.

A recent article, Amanda Robert, “Shared Responsibility” (ABA Journal Fall 2026), 19, states that “Judges are increasingly faulting lawyers who fail to point out AI-generated fake citations in their opponent’s filings.”  The article states that one court wrote that it “should not be left as the last line of defense against citations to fictional cases in briefs.” [citation omitted].

However, Ms. Robert quotes an attorney who states that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that justify sanctions against the citing attorney, do not apply to an attorney who has not signed the filing.  This difference has led to a different result.

Ms. Robert states that “[i]n at least two cases, judges refused to award attorney fees or grant relief to counsel who didn’t bring AI-induced errors to their attention.” She reports that courts have used “increasingly ‘stronger language’” in admonishing “non-offending counsel.” [citation omitted].

One attorney is quoted as stating: “This is requiring counsel to continue to respond to all arguments in all cases, and by dong that, you should be able to identify cases that just don’t exist at all….”

See generally, Litigant Forfeited Claim that Court Erred by Relying on Hallucinated/Fictional Cases(Mar. 11, 2026).

The article reports that: “U.S. District Judge Loren AliKhan is the latest in a string of judges and opposing lawyers in Maryland and Washington to call out [this named attorney’s] work.”  Id.

The Daily Record reported that, when it could not contact the attorney, it contacted the managing partner “who has also been scolded for false citations….” Id.

The article also states that one Judge wrote that Her Honor’s concerns “extend to counsel’s entire firm.”   Id.

To the same effect, see Almudhafer v. Spotsylvania Cnty. Pub. Schs., 2026 WL 49654, at n. 2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 7, 2026)(Young, J.); Almudhafer v. Spotsylvania Volunteer Rescue Squad, 2026 WL 49652, at n. 3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 7, 2026)(Young, J.).  Another decision states:

The Court respectfully proposes that the time may be near for an exception to the Erickson liberal-construction rule, where a pro se individual relies on AI to draft pleadings and thus blurs the line between what is a good faith pro se assertion of an actionable claim and what is a computer-generated morass that only serves to waste court time and resources.

Mitchel v. Stellantis Fin. Servs., Inc., 2025 WL 2676569, at n. 6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 18, 2025)(Young, J.).

In Hickam, among other things, the unrepresented plaintiff made a “Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint…, which is accompanied by a 121-page proposed Second Amended Complaint.”

The court wrote: “Based on the Court’s inherent power to manage its docket, and mindful of the requirements set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to which all parties, including those proceeding pro se, are bound, the Court will sua sponte dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Furthermore, the Court will deny without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and direct Plaintiff, should he desire to continue this matter, to submit a proposed Second Amended Complaint that complies with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.”

In part, the court explained that “to determine the viability of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court would have to engage in the improper task of sifting through 416 paragraphs to piece together a cogent timeline of events in order for the Court to assess how each of Plaintiff’s claims relates to each of the Defendants.”

The Hickam court recognized that a pro se complaint is “to be liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In a footnote, the court added:

The Court notes that Erickson’s liberal-construction requirement for pro se pleadings predates the advent of artificial intelligence (“AI”) drafting tools, which are being used with increasing prevalence by pro se parties in particular.…  Such tools both increase pro se litigants’ ability to draft voluminous pleadings and increase the odds that such pleadings contain fractured assertions and “hallucinated” legal propositions, which courts must wade through in construing claims…. While its analysis does not ultimately turn on this point, the Court notes that several of Plaintiff’s filings appear to carry the hallmarks of AI drafting assistance beyond that to which Plaintiff certifies. [emphasis added].

In the Spotsylvania Volunteer Rescue Squad decision, the court added: “[I]t respectfully proposes that the time may be near for an exception to the Erickson liberal-construction rule, where a pro se individual relies on AI to draft pleadings and thus blurs the line between what is a good faith pro se assertion of an actionable claim and what is a computer generated morass that only serves to waste court time and resources.”  2026 WL 49652, at n. 3.

The liberal construction rule has been recently and frequently cited. For example: “When a party is pro se, the court will construe her submissions ‘liberally to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Shah v. Bhagat, 2026 WL 2859875, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2026)’

It will be interesting to see if an A.I. exception to the rule of liberal construction begins to emerge.

This blog was initially posted on  Electronic Discovery Reference Model.

The Bulldog court recited that it had issued four show cause orders and: “The July 20 Order gave Defendant one final opportunity to correct several of its deficiencies in complying with discovery. Despite the Court spelling out every step Defendant needed to take to correct its deficiencies, Defendant still failed to comply with the Court’s order.”  Id.

As to one of its orders, the court wrote: “To conceal their failures, rather than admitting their deficiencies, Defendant and its counsel made misrepresentations to the Court.”  Id. That led to another show cause process. However, the court wrote: “Defendant and defense counsel’s responses were not sufficient, and they continued the pattern of misrepresentations to the Court.”  Id.

The Bulldog court imposed monetary sanctions based on “lack of candor to the Court,” referred one attorney to the court’s Standing Committee on Discipline, awarded attorney’s fees, and recommended an adverse jury instruction. Id.

I wrote about a prior decision in this case in “Bulldog Attorneys” v. “Bulldog Law” – Sanctions Granted in Part; Denied Without Prejudice in Part (Mar. 12, 2026)(“The law firm of Batta Fulkerson, LLP, sued Bulldog Law, PC, over use of its registered mark, ‘Bulldog Attorneys.’”).

The recent decision describes the dispute over the phrase “BULLDOG ATTORNEYS.”  2026 WL 2644053, at *1-2.

Suffice it to say that plaintiff alleges that it “has advertised as ‘the bulldog lawyers’ since the firm’s inception in 2016” and that it has registered the mark.  Id. at *1.  Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant was formed in 2022 and “commenced operation as a law firm under the name, BULLDOG LAW at some point thereafter.” Id. at *2.

Defendant asserts that its use of “BULLDOG LAW” is not infringing for various reasons. Id.  “Defendant also alleges ‘Plaintiff’s attempt to police the legal profession for uses of the term ‘Bulldog,’’  constitutes unfair business acts and practices.” Id.

The Bulldog court wrote:

As of the date of this Order, it appears Defendant has now, finally, served a complete verified response to the Revised Interrogatories that were first served well over a year ago. This compliance required the issuance of two Orders to Show Cause, the filing of two motions for sanctions, multiple Discovery Conferences and orders, and the appointment of a special master. Despite Defendant finally providing a response to the Revised Interrogatories that complies with the Court’s orders, Plaintiff has not, however, received any intake call recordings, intake call transcripts (except for one call transcript), or intake call notes or summaries—all of which potentially could have contained evidence of confusion.

This is largely due to Defendant’s failure to preserve ESI the timeline of which is as follows:

February 19, 2025 June 13, 2025 July 14, 2025 July 31, 2025 May 13, 2026 Plaintiff alerted the Defendant about the need to preserve ESI in a demand letter. Plaintiff served RFPs seeking ESI and other documents. Plaintiff served interrogatories requesting that communications be identified, which would have included ESI. David Precilla, the person responsible for administrative matters in Defendant’s office, testified during his deposition that he did not know what a “Litigation Hold” is, and that no special process was put in place to preserve evidence. During a conference call with the special master, Defendant’s counsel could not confirm whether ESI documents exist, were deleted, or never existed.

Id. at * 8 (emphasis added).

Considering that and other factors, the court found that Defendant “has acted with the requisite intent to deprive Plaintiff of the intake call recordings and that Plaintiff has been prejudiced by Defendant’s failure to preserve. Despite ample notice of its ongoing duty to retain the intake call recordings, Defendant is not currently doing so. Moreover, Defendant has not produced its call intake information in any format, thus prejudicing Plaintiff.”  Id. at *10.

The Bulldog court rejected terminating sanctions and found “that a jury instruction stating that Defendant failed to preserve intake call recordings during the pendency of this litigation despite its obligation to do so, and that the jury may infer that at least some of those recordings may have been unfavorable to Defendant, including as evidence of actual consumer confusion, is appropriate.”

As noted above, counsel were also sanctioned for violation of the duty of candor and for violation of a court order.

“Here, the Court finds that defense counsel violated their duty of candor to the Court. As set forth herein, the declarations filed by Mr. Tafur and Mr. Berwish in response to the Court’s Orders to Show Cause and the statements made by Mr. Tafur and Mr. Berwish at the Show Cause hearings are internally inconsistent and contain multiple misrepresentations to the Court.” Id. at *11.

Sanctions were also imposed for violating a court order.  “The Court gave Defendant and its counsel, which in this case are one and the same, the benefit of the doubt in the July 20 Order, giving Defendant a final opportunity to correct several of its discovery failures. However, Defendant once again failed to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with an order of this Court….  The Court emphasizes that this was not a one-off, unique event, but rather a pattern and practice in this case.”  Id. at *12.

Additionally, the court recommended that pro hac vice status of one attorney be revoked.

This blog was initially posted on  Electronic Discovery Reference Model.

Counsel blamed the hallucinations on the use of Spellbook AI. On its website, Spellbook describes itself as: “The first AI system that powers contracts end-to-end….”

In summary, respondents notified petitioner that they found hallucinated authorities in connection with the Petition. Petitioner denied the allegation, “doubled down,” and counter-punched with a threatening response.

Petitioner later amended the Petition and admitted to hallucinations that it claimed were due to its use of Spellbook AI.  The court imposed monetary sanctions, awarded attorneys’ fees, and struck the amended Petition, writing that, what the court described as “fraud,” cannot be amended away.  The court appeared to leave open the door for a bona fide amendment.

THE “GLASS HOUSES” PRINCIPLE

Counter-punching may be problematical.  Another court recently advised: “A well-known proverb warns those who live in a glass house not to throw stones. What Plaintiffs did here is worse than that. The proverb assumes a rough parity — two flawed parties, each exposed, the hypocrite merely imprudent for hurling what could be hurled back. That is not what happened here. Plaintiffs did not throw stones from a glass house at another glass house. They stood inside a house made entirely of glass, pointed at the brick house across the street, and declared that structure the fragile one…. Each charge, however, was not merely overstated, but rather exactly backwards.”  Glass Houses Proverb—Don’t Throw Stones and Invective (Jul. 14, 2026)(citation omitted).

FACTS AND THE COUNTER-PUNCH

In this challenge to an administrative decision, the court set the stage as follows:

Unfortunately, shortly after commencement, issues regarding the contents of the petition and accompanying memorandum of law became the subject of litigation rather than the underlying merits. The short yet storied history of the case is as follows. On May 15, 2026, counsels for respondents informed counsel for petitioners, Thomas A. Bizzaro, Esq., that the petition and accompanying memorandum of law contained a myriad of false citations to legal authority using artificial intelligence (”AI”). A more detailed description of the hallucinated citations is contained infra. After discovering the AI errors, respondents requested that Mr. Bizzaro respond with an explanation and/or withdraw the petition; otherwise, they would notify the Court and seek sanctions, including striking the pleadings. Mr. Bizzaro responded to counsels with an eight-page letter, the sum and substance of which was a categorical denial. Mr. Bizzaro stated that his firm undertook a full citation audit in response to respondents’ concerns. His firm identified seven issues which were minor citation and misapplication issues and did not involve fabricated authority. Mr. Bizzaro stressed that the errors were inadvertent and that opposing counsels failed to identify any specific erroneous citation. He rejected respondents’ request that he withdraw the petition as well as any threat of sanctions. In fact, Mr. Bizzaro threatened to seek sanctions and attorney’s fees himself, stating that the unfounded accusations by respondents violated Section 130-1.1 of the NY Compilation of Codes, Rules, and Regulations (”NYCRR”). [emphasis added].

The parties agreed to meet and confer. However:

Prior to that meeting, Mr. Bizzaro filed a letter to the Court, explaining all of the foregoing and annexing the correspondence between the attorneys. In conclusion, Mr. Bizzaro requested a conference with the Court. Thereafter, the Court learned that the May 18, 2026 meeting between the attorneys was unsuccessful. On May 18, 2026 and May 19, 2026 respondents filed additional letters to the docket, which laid out the purported fraud contained in the petition.

THE ADMISSION AND DEFECTIVE AMENDED PETITION

Respondents demanded withdrawal of the petition.  Mr. Bizzaro refused, offered to pay reasonable attorneys fees, and “informed the respondents he would be filing an amended petition and proceeding with the action….”

After a court conference, Mr. Bizzaro filed an amended petition. However, the court wrote: “A review of the 55 page petition reveals that it is essentially the same petition, which was filed upon commencement, less citation to the purported fraudulent legal authority as well as a few additional minor changes.”

Petitioner’s attorney also wrote to the court and the “letter conceded for the first time that the original petition contained ‘AI-citation errors.’ …  Mr. Bizzaro stated that he offered to reimburse respondents for their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with the ‘letter exchanges and virtual conference.’”

Next, “Respondents both informed the Court of their intention to file a motion to strike the pleadings and for sanctions. Mr. Bizzaro responded to the foregoing by filing correspondence on June 2, 2026. Petitioner’s letter argues that there was no prejudice suffered as a result of the citation errors, that the amended petition was filed as a matter of right, and that his offer to reimburse respondents for fees and costs incurred in connection with the letter exchanges and the conference remains.”

THE COURT HEARING

The court held a hearing:

At the hearing, Mr. Bizzaro conceded that the underlying commencement documents contained citations to “hallucinated” quotations. He explained that his firm, of which he is the sole principal, uses Lexis and Westlaw. The subscription to Westlaw contains certain AI tools which are linked to Microsoft Word. The program, “Spellbook AI,” is a tool embedded into Microsoft Word. It was represented to Mr. Bizzaro that the AI-tool enhanced writing and detected drafting errors. He was informed that Spellbook AI did not provide legal authorities or citations to work product, but only enhanced drafting. Mr. Bizzaro reviewed the petition prior to commencement but did not “re-run a cite check,” after accepting the changes made by Spellbook AI. Mr. Bizzaro was apologetic and explained the steps he and his office have taken to ensure this does not happen again. Mr. Bizzaro has discontinued his subscription to Spellbook AI and has changed his office policy so that he is the only individual permitted to use AI features. Additionally, Mr. Bizzaro informed the Court that he has registered with the National Academy of Continuing Legal Education for classes dealing with AI issues in the court system. [emphasis added].

The court described the use of AI as “all but unavoidable.”  However, it also wrote, misuse has become a “reoccurring problem….” It found that “petitioners included quotations from at least five otherwise legitimate cases which were either entirely fabricated, or which were altered from their original versions.” It added: “The nationwide imposition of monetary sanctions in similar cases ranges from mere warnings to tens of thousands of dollars….”

APOLOGIZING AFTER “DOUBLING DOWN” & COUNTER-PUNCHING

Instead of counter-punching, the court suggested that Petitioner should have gone “hat in hand” to Respondents.  The court wrote that, while five citations were inaccurate, the remainder were “legitimate,” and Mr. Bizzaro “apologized at length….”  He had explained the error and taken remedial action.

Nevertheless:

Importantly, when Mr. Bizzaro was confronted by counsel for respondents about the fabricated cases, he chose to essentially “double down” rather than to admit to the mistake. Mr. Bizzaro contends that he never denied the use of AI and his response was merely a “preliminary reply under extreme time constraints.” The Court disagrees. The May 16, 2026 response from Mr. Bizzaro was a detailed eight-page letter where counsel argued that there were no fabricated, hallucinated, or erroneous quotations or citations identified by respondents, that he had undertaken a detailed review of all citations, and essentially only identified what he labeled “discrete errors.” Mr. Bizzaro then demanded that respondents identify any inaccuracies and bring them to his attention. Mr. Bizzaro concluded by stating that the accusations levied and the threat of sanctions, absent any proof of wrongdoing, raised an issue of respondents’ good faith and frivolous conduct which may warrant an application by him for sanctions and attorney’s fees. The Court mentions the foregoing only to emphasize that Mr. Bizzaro’s time would have been better spent combing his petition, which very well may have eliminated the need for his letter. [emphasis added].

It added:

In any event, what ensued was months of back and forth between the parties, a “meet and confer” with all counsels, extensive letter practice to the Court, two court appearances, and a substantial amount of work undertaken by all parties. This could have been easily avoided had Mr. Bizzaro acknowledged the fabrications and approached the dispute with hat in hand. Indeed, as discussed supra, Mr. Bizzaro threatened to request sanctions upon the respondents when they broached the issue of these hallucinations. For this reason, the Court finds that Mr. Bizzaro’s conduct was egregious and qualifies as a more significant violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct than it would otherwise. [emphasis added].

MONETARY AWARD

The court awarded a $5,000 sanction plus $10,000 for attorney’s fees, explaining:  “Respondents identified the fabrications, the parties engaged in significant letter practice, which included considerable research, the parties appeared before the Court for a conference on May 19, 2026 and a hearing on July 22, 2026, the respondents filed their respective motions to dismiss the petition and amended petition, and the petitioners filed their opposition papers.”

DENIAL OF THE AMENDMENT: CAN’T “AMEND AWAY” HALLUCINATIONS

It then turned to a novel issue, specifically, respondents’ dismissal argument—that the original petition was defective and the amended petition was essentially a cut and paste, minus the erroneous citations.

Generally, the pleadings rule provides that an amended complaint supersedes the original…. The question is whether this principle should apply where the underlying petition is essentially permeated with fraud and petitioner seeks to amend solely to cure those defects. This Court’s research reveals that this question, under these circumstances, has not been previously addressed. Specifically: can a petitioner amend his or her pleadings as a matter of right to correct defects in the underlying petition where the allegations contained therein were at least partially based upon hallucinated citations to legal authority? This Court concludes that the principle does not apply where the original pleading is permeated with fraud, and the fraud cannot simply be amended away. [emphasis added].

The court found that the first pleading was permeated by fraud. “Petitioners used multiple bogus quotations from the case and submitted a lengthy argument in support based thereon….  Accordingly, after reviewing the cases and the original pleadings, the Court can only conclude that a significant portion of the legal arguments which formed the cornerstone for this specific proceeding were based upon fraudulent legal authority, such that the pleadings were permeated with fraud.”

It then wrote: “The next question the Court must determine is whether petitioners are entitled to amend the petition to remediate the defects. This Court finds that they are not.” [emphasis added].  It cited a prior decision in which the court found sanctionable conduct and rejected a request for a “redo.” It wrote:

Aside from striking the amended petition as a sanction, the Court finds that permitting the petitioners to “amend away” the fraud here would be an improvident exercise of discretion for two reasons. The first reason is that the fraud and the pleadings are inseparable. This is not a matter where a party merely cited to a few fictitious cases. Rather, a significant foundation of this Article 78 proceeding was premised on the reliance of hallucinated quotations and bogus legal authority. Moreover, the amended petition is essentially a replica of the original petition, less the hallucinated quotations. The amended petition includes assertions premised upon the fabricated legal authority. Second, public policy bars the amended petition from standing. Permitting the amendment would effectively reward careless legal drafting, and allow litigants to include false, misleading, and inaccurate allegations in their pleadings with the expectation that they could simply correct the defects through an amendment. As an aside, this Court also gives credence to the respondents’ argument that permitting the amendment would require the respondents and the Court to essentially “Frankenstein” the 55-page petition to determine which allegations are based in legitimate law and which are not. This is an undue burden that the Court refuses to impose. [emphasis added].

The court struck the amended petition, but declined to dismiss with prejudice.  Presumably, this left open the possibility of a new amendment.

ONE LAST ISSUE

The court addressed one last issue: “In light of the foregoing, the Court need not reach the issue of the assertion that the signatures contained in the amended verified petition were falsely notarized. Briefly, the original verified petition includes a signature of petitioner Bobby Zargari, which was notarized by Mr. Bizzaro’s legal assistant on May 8, 2026. The amended verified petition dated May 20, 2026 is also signed by Zargari and notarized by Mr. Bizzaro’s legal assistant. A side-by-side review of the signatures reveals that they appear to be identical, and at the hearing petitioner admitted to reusing the original signature. Under ordinary circumstances, the Court would have set this matter down for a hearing on this specific issue. However, after reviewing the papers and addressing the matter on the record, the Court declines to render a decision on the issue of fraud regarding the notarization in light of its determination to issue sanctions and strike the petition and amended petition.” [emphasis added].

CONCLUSION

The denial of the right to amend in Youssian is not a unicorn.  For another decision denying amendment after disclosure of hallucinations, please see A Request to Refile Brief to Correct Hallucinations Was Denied (Aug. 30, 2026)(“we are denying the motion to withdraw the Opening Brief….”).

Sometimes, there is a duty to “’fess up.”  In a different context, please see Is There a Duty to “’Fess Up?” – Part II (Nov. 12, 2022).  Lack of Candor is “Always a bad idea.” (Jul. 13, 2026).

For a discussion of counter-punching in a different context, please see Rule 11 Sanctions for Impugning Character of Opposing Counsel (Apr. 20, 2022); Fraudulent or Unsupported Allegations of Misuse of A.I. Can be Sanctionable (Jun. 25, 2026); Conclusory (False?) Accusations of Using False Case Citations Are Sanctionable (Apr. 12, 2026).

However, Panasonic sought terminating sanctions for alleged deletion of thousands of text messages and other ESI.  The request for terminating sanctions was denied under Rule 37(e)(2).  Panasonic did not request lesser “curative” sanctions under Rule 37(e)(1).  Silva v. Panasonic Corporation of North America, Inc., 2026 WL 2334134 (D. Nev. Aug. 12, 2026).

First, the court credited the unrepresented plaintiff’s assertion that much of her ESI went missing due to events beyond her control.  Second, it held that defendant failed to show intent to deprive.

Plaintiff contended that seven co-workers would support her claims. She produced text messages from only Employees 2 and 7.  After additional efforts: “Silva produced supplemental documents, however, this supplemental production did not include any communications between Silva and the witnesses identified in her complaint about the allegations in the lawsuit…. At that time, Silva’s counsel indicated that no such documents existed.”

Panasonic did what any diligent litigant would do: “Panasonic then proceeded to conduct third party depositions…. Two witnesses produced communications with Silva that were responsive to Panasonic’s discovery requests that Silva had failed to produce.”

Panasonic went further, pursuing forensic collection.  That uncovered a lot.

First, it uncovered additional accounts:  “As part of the ESI protocol, Silva submitted a declaration listing two email accounts and two messaging applications; however, the vendor located eleven email accounts and ten messaging applications that contained data since January 1, 2021.” [emphasis added].

Second, the forensic examination “showed several documents that Silva had failed to produce related to Silva’s claims, including LinkedIn messages with various individuals regarding the allegations in her lawsuit….  The forensic report also showed that 40,681 text messages had been deleted in total, and that 3,252 text messages were deleted between June 28, 2024, and October 8, 2025…. The forensic report indicates that when the ESI deletion analysis occurred, Silva did not have auto-deletion enabled on her cell phone…. The deleted messages include, among others, messages with Employees 1, 2, 4, and 6 from Silva’s complaint.”

Based on that, Panasonic sought case-ending sanctions.

However, the court wrote that Rule 37(e) provides “circumscribed” authority for sanctions.

The threshold question was whether Ms. Silva had taken “reasonable steps” to preserve ESI.  Panasonic pointed to the large volume—thousands of messages and messaging applications deleted after the preservation duty was triggered.  It argued that this was clear evidence of manual deletion.  “Silva responds that she did not intentionally delete text messages, and that ESI was lost when she traveled out of the country and in a manner consistent with her phone being hacked.”

The court held that Panasonic failed to carry its burden of proof:

[T]he forensic report only indicates that, at the time Silva’s cell phone data was extracted, automatic message deletion was not enabled…. This, however, does not show that Silva, herself, manually deleted thousands of text messages, nor does it show that Silva never had automatic message deletion enabled.

Instead, the large deletion of messages and applications is consistent with Silva’s explanation for deletion. Silva contends that, as early as December 2024, her devices were behaving strangely, in a manner consistent with being hacked…. She even filed complaints and inquiries with Apple Support and the FBI regarding these issues, and a notification from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) indicated that her data had been compromised….  Additionally, she states that she traveled internationally several times, and during these trips she would change the eSIM of her phone, which often resulted in data being deleted.

The court held that “Silva is an individual litigant who is less familiar with preservation obligations that others who have considerable experience in litigation,” and “the steps that Silva took were reasonable, even if they were not perfect.” [cleaned up].

In short: “While the forensic report does show that text messages were deleted, it does not indicate that Silva, herself, manually deleted text messages. Instead, all available evidence indicates that Silva took reasonable steps to protect against deletion risks, but that ESI was destroyed by events outside of her control.”

Alternatively, the court ruled that, even if Ms. Silva had not taken reasonable steps, Panasonic failed on Rule 37(e)(2)’s “intent to deprive” element.  Panasonic grounded its showing of intent on the foregoing forensic report.

Ms. Silva “responds that use of her devices in a manner that is usual and customary to her, which resulted in some deletion of information, does not evidence intentional spoliation.”

The court agreed: “Silva, instead, explains that she had ongoing issues with her devices, including overheating, messages about passwords being compromised, and an email from the EEOC indicating that her data was compromised, which indicate her device may have been hacked…. Additionally, she states that when she traveled, and replaced the eSIM in her cell phone, that messages were not received or went missing.”

Panasonic had another arrow in its quiver: “Panasonic also argues that Silva’s intent is evidenced by her failure to disclose all her relevant messaging applications and email addresses in her declaration as part of the ESI protocol.”

Silva responds that this case has been extremely stressful, and that while it is possible that she may have made mistakes when trying to respond to her attorneys, she did not delete or manipulate anything intentionally…. Instead, she contends that she disclosed the emails she used for communication, as it did not occur to her to disclose email addresses she only used for a work strategy known as “Inbox Zero by Project.” …  She did not provide several other email addresses to Panasonic because she does not use them for regular communication and would not have used them for any communication related to her claims against Panasonic…. Regarding the messaging applications, she contends that her cell phone offloads applications regularly and she did not recall using those applications to discuss her employment…. Similarly, she states that she did have messages related to her case on LinkedIn, but usually only accesses LinkedIn through a computer, and not on her cell phone….

On those allegations, the court concluded:

While Silva’s failures to disclose may evidence a careless mistake by a party unfamiliar with litigation, they do not show intent to deprive Panasonic of relevant ESI, even if deletion occurred while discovery is ongoing. In the absence of persuasive evidence that Silva intentionally deleted communications to deprive Panasonic of this evidence, the Court lacks the authority to impose sanctions enumerated in Rule 37(e)(2), including case ending sanctions. [emphasis added].

I wonder what the outcome would have been if Panasonic had argued that it was prejudiced and sought more limited, “curative” sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(e)(1).  See Court Recommends Denial of Rule 37(e)(2) Motion, While Providing Guidance Under Rule 37(e)(1)(May 19, 2025) (“In what may be dicta, the Court also wrote out the jury instruction it would have suggested if Defendants had filed a motion under Rule 37(e)(1).).

On November 4, 2024, Defendant Jung, an Uber driver, rear-ended Plaintiff Baez’s 1999 Honda Accord, driving it into a guardrail. One factual dispute was whether the Honda was stopped in the left lane.  Jung said it was. Baez “states that he has no recollection of the vehicle being stopped, and that the vehicle was in proper working condition and not disabled at the time of the collision.”  The Honda was not preserved.

The preservation/spoliation facts were straightforward:

Both vehicles were removed from the scene by N & S Towing….  Plaintiff suffered serious bodily injuries and while he was in the hospital, his mother “independently ascertained” the location of his vehicle…. On November 8, 2024, she traveled to the N & S Towing location and took photographs of his vehicle, which were later shared with defense counsel…. By November 12, 2024, Plaintiff had retained counsel…. And on November 20, 2024, Defendant Jung’s counsel provided a formal preservation request asking Plaintiff to preserve all relevant evidence, including the 1999 Honda Accord…. The request was sent to Plaintiff’s prior counsel, John Lyding of Morgan & Morgan…. Plaintiff is currently represented by Terence Davis of the same firm…. Defendant Jung’s counsel contacted Morgan & Morgan on three occasions about the status of the vehicle….

Suit was filed on August 11, 2025.  The Court wrote: “Finally, on August 15, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel (through his paralegal) notified Defendant Jung’s counsel that the vehicle was a total loss and had been discarded on an unknown date. [emphasis added].

First, the Court held that the defense motions to dismiss the Complaint were in fact “clearly intended to be motions for sanctions, the sanction requested being dismissal.”  This was significant because, instead of applying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, it meant that “the Motions will be construed as motions for sanctions based on the destruction of Plaintiff’s vehicle.”

The Fourth Circuit long ago addressed the duty to preserve an automobile.  Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2001).  Spoliation includes “the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.”  Id.  Because an automobile is not ESI, Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(e) is inapposite.  The Baez Court held that its inherent power governed the sanctions requests: “Here, Plaintiff failed to preserve a tangible piece of evidence and the Court’s inherent authority to impose sanctions is implicated.”

The Baez Court explained that a party seeking sanctions “must show that: (1) the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it when it was destroyed or altered; (2) the destruction or loss was accompanied by a culpable state of mind; and (3) the evidence that was destroyed or altered was relevant to the claims or defenses of the party that sought the discovery of the spoliated evidence, to the extent that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the lost evidence would have supported the claims or defenses of the party that sought it.”

TRIGGER AND BREACH OF THE DUTY TO PRESERVE

Trigger of the Preservation Duty

The first step was to determine when the duty to preserve was triggered, i.e., when Baez reasonably anticipated litigation. Id. at *3.  At that time, a party must institute a litigation hold.  “And when a party cannot fulfill this duty to preserve because he does not own or control the evidence, he still has an obligation to give the opposing party notice of access to the evidence or of the possible destruction of the evidence if the party anticipates litigation involving that evidence.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted). The Court wrote:

It cannot be disputed that Plaintiff had an obligation to preserve his vehicle. The accident occurred on November 4, 2024, and only four days later Plaintiff’s mother had located the vehicle and visited N & S Towing’s location to take photographs of it….  Less than ten days later, Plaintiff had retained counsel…. And sixteen days later, Defendant Jung’s counsel provided a formal preservation request asking Plaintiff to preserve all relevant evidence, including the 1999 Honda Accord…. Plaintiff’s duty to preserve arose on November 12, 2024, when he obtained counsel. Even had Plaintiff not obtained counsel, his duty to preserve would have been triggered on November 20, 2024, when Defendant Jung’s counsel sent him a preservation letter.… 

Id. at *3.

Breach of the Preservation Duty

The Court then addressed breach of the duty:

Despite having a duty to preserve his vehicle, Plaintiff’s counsel failed to inquire about the vehicle’s status with N & S Towing until almost a year after defense counsel sent the preservation letter…. The first step in the sanctions analysis is satisfied.

Id.  It added: “Plaintiff argues that because the preservation letter was sent to Plaintiff’s prior counsel, his current counsel was not aware of the Defendants’ desire to inspect the vehicle…. This argument borders on ridiculous. Morgan & Morgan has represented Plaintiff since November 12, 2024, and both Plaintiff’s previous and current counsel are Morgan & Morgan attorneys…. Any blame that Plaintiff directs at his former attorney is therefore properly attributed to Plaintiff himself.” Id. at n. 5.

CULPABLE STATE OF MIND

The next step was to evaluate culpability. Id. at *4. Sanctions may be imposed for “any fault—be it bad faith, willfulness, gross negligence, or ordinary negligence….  In the context of spoliation, ordinary negligence is the failure to identify, locate, and preserve evidence, where a reasonably prudent person acting under like circumstances would have done so.”  Id.

However, the degree of culpability affects the severity of the possible sanction. Id.  Case-dispositive sanctions are reserved for the “most extreme circumstances.”  Id.

PREJUDICE AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE

Here, the Defendants asked too much: “The only sanction requested by Defendants is dismissal. But because there is insufficient evidence to warrant such a sanction, the Motions are denied.”  Id. at *4.

The Court looked at what I call secondary evidence in deciding that Defendants could still defend the claims, writing: “Through the police report, vehicle images, the testimony of Plaintiff (who admits his memory of the collision is ‘hazy’ and contradicts the police report), Defendant Jung’s testimony, and any other materials produced throughout discovery, Defendants are able to build their defense without a forensic examination of Plaintiff’s vehicle.”

Moreover, following the collision on November 4, 2024, Plaintiff spent several days in the hospital…. His mother, on her own accord and while he was in the hospital, located and photographed his vehicle on November 8, 2024…. These photos were shared with defense counsel…. [emphasis added].

The Court also found, in my words, a lack of diligence by the defense:

Additionally, the police report states that both vehicles were removed from the accident scene by “NS Towing” and removed to the tow lot…. But despite having the details of what company removed the vehicles and where that company took the vehicles, neither party attempted to inspect or preserve Plaintiff’s vehicle while it sat in the tow lot. Defendant Jung’s counsel failed to follow up with Plaintiff’s counsel about the preservation of the vehicle until July 28, 2025, over eight months after the collision.

Id. at *4 (emphasis added).

DATE OF LOSS?

The first element of spoliation is that “the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it when it was destroyed or altered….”  Here, a key fact was absent—no one knew when the car went missing.  The Court wrote:

Finally, the parties do not provide any information about when Plaintiff’s vehicle was destroyed. It could be that N & S Towing destroyed the vehicle after Plaintiff’s mother photographed it on November 8, 2024, and before Plaintiff retained counsel on November 12, 2024, or received Defendant Jung’s preservation request on November 20, 2024….

Id. (emphasis added).  Further, this appeared to be relevant to culpability:

There is no evidence that Plaintiff or his counsel purposefully deprived Defendants of the opportunity to examine the vehicle or facilitated its destruction. To the contrary, the record reflects a police report providing where the vehicle was towed and the Plaintiff’s mother locating and photographing Defendant’s vehicle in a tow lot, where both parties knew it to be located, and where it was eventually disposed of on an unknown date and time. These facts do not support dismissal.

Id.

CONDUCT OF PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL WAS CONCERNING, BUT IRRELEVANT

The Court wrote:  “To be clear, Plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct is concerning. Only sixteen days after the collision, Defendant Jung sent a preservation letter to Mr. Lyding requesting that Plaintiff preserve his 1999 Honda Accord that was involved in the accident…. It is entirely unclear what Mr. Lyding did, if anything, to preserve this evidence. At some point, another Morgan & Morgan attorney, Mr. Davis, took over Plaintiff’s case and replaced Mr. Lyding. But despite both attorneys being from the same law firm and there being only one client, Mr. Davis now claims that he had no knowledge of the preservation letter sent to Mr. Lyding on November 20, 2024.” Id. at *5 (emphasis added).

However, that was irrelevant because Defendants asked only for dismissal, writing: “Any other remedy would be an unacceptable outcome and surely undermine the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. at *5.  Based on Defendants’ request, the Court wrote:  “While Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to comply with the fundamental obligation to preserve material evidence may indeed be considered negligence or with a culpable state of mind, the Court does not need to reach this question. Defendants have not asked the Court to impose any lesser sanction than dismissal.”

CONCLUSION: THE DOOR WAS LEFT OPEN

The Court held that:  “Because Defendants have not established that Plaintiff’s conduct was so egregious as to warrant dismissal, the vehicle’s relevance, as it relates to the sanctions analysis, is immaterial.” Id. at *5.

However, it left the door open to a lesser sanction, stating that “the Court need not reach the question of whether Plaintiff’s conduct warrants a lesser sanction. Instead, the Court retains the ability to consider this issue at trial, at which time the Court may order appropriate sanctions, including an adverse inference jury instruction.”

In prior decisional authority in this District, the Court has pointed out that a party asking only for game-ending sanctions may effectively waive lesser sanctions. Court Recommends Denial of Rule 37(e)(2) Motion, While Providing Guidance Under Rule 37(e)(1) (May 19, 2025)(Defendants moved for “game ending” sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(e)(2); however, the United States Magistrate Judge recommended that the motion be denied.  The Court provided a Rule 37(e)(1) suggestion.); Rule 37(e)(1) Sanctions for Breach of Duty to Preserve Communications (Oct.11, 2025).

The Court’s rejection of that motion was unequivocal: “Plaintiff cannot unilaterally set deadlines for Defendant and then seek to sanction Defendant for failing to comply with them.”  Dortie v. Marriott International, Inc., 2026 WL 2647599 (D. Md. Sep. 9, 2026)(Chasanow, J.).