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	<title>Experts &#8211; E-Discovery LLC</title>
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		<title>Request for Forensic Examination of Laptop Was Denied</title>
		<link>https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/request-for-forensic-examination-of-laptop-was-denied/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 16:50:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Berman]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[District of MD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ESI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Experts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Software]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Forensics]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/?p=5779</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In this breach of contract case arising out of an employment agreement, Defendant asked “that the Court compel Plaintiff to produce his personal laptop for a forensic examination….”  Evans v. Fortiline, Inc., 2026 WL 3216193 (D. Md. Oct. 27, 2026)(Coulson, J).  The former employer, Fortiline, asserted that the former employee, Mr. Evans,<span class="excerpt-hellip"> […]</span>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this breach of contract case arising out of an employment agreement, Defendant asked “that the Court compel Plaintiff to produce his personal laptop for a forensic examination….”  <em>Evans v. Fortiline, Inc.</em>, 2026 WL 3216193 (D. Md. Oct. 27, 2026)(Coulson, J).  The former employer, Fortiline, asserted that the former employee, Mr. Evans, was “soliciting a current Fortiline employee to start a competing business in violation of his Employment Agreement.” Plaintiff disputed the allegation.  The request for a forensic examination was denied.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><u>THE FACTUAL PREDICATE</u></strong></p>
<p>Mr. Evans’ use of his personal laptop for Fortiline business was not in dispute:</p>
<blockquote><p>Defendant asserts that when it first employed Plaintiff, he “performed Fortiline work using his personal Apple laptop computer” after syncing “his Fortiline email account with his Apple email account, which allowed him to access his Fortiline email on his personal laptop.” &#8230; Plaintiff does not dispute that he used his personal laptop for Fortiline business for several months, with which he claims Defendant took no issue.</p></blockquote>
<p>It was undisputed that he had once sent company information to his Gmail account.</p>
<p>In its Request for Production of Documents, however, Defendant “included a request for forensic imaging of all electronic devices used by Plaintiff from March 1, 2025 to present in relation to his employment with Defendant.” In my view, that was a risky request:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/standard-for-court-ordered-forensic-examinations-when-does-misconduct-cross-the-rubicon/">Standard for Court-Ordered Forensic Examinations – When Does Misconduct “Cross the Rubicon”? – E-Discovery LLC</a> (Jul. 24, 2025)(“Courts have also looked to the existence of evasive behavior and purposeful delay…. Although cases describe various approaches and considerations pertinent to this issue, there is no precise formulation describing exactly when discovery misconduct crosses the Rubicon into territory warranting a forensic examination.” (citation omitted));</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/another-decision-on-forensic-imaging-of-an-opponents-cell-phone/">Another Decision on Forensic Imaging of an Opponent’s Cell Phone – E-Discovery LLC</a> (May 10, 2026);</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/request-to-appoint-neutral-forensic-expert-denied-as-speculative-and-unsupported/">Request to Appoint Neutral Forensic Expert Denied as Speculative and Unsupported – E-Discovery LLC</a> (Jan. 28, 2025).</li>
</ul>
<p>Unsurprisingly, Plaintiff refused.  However, “Defendant states that Plaintiff also did not produce any emails or other Electronically Stored Information (‘ESI’), but upon review of materials in its possession, Defendant discovered that Plaintiff previously emailed Fortiline information to his personal Gmail containing “confidential/trade secret pricing information&#8230;.”  Plaintiff responded that the email was sent to that account by mistake.</p>
<p>However, “[i]n light of Defendant’s discovery, the parties met and conferred, during which Defendant claims that it learned <em>Plaintiff himself conducted a search of responsive documents, which did not include his personal email or laptop</em>.”  To say that was a risky practice is an understatement, especially where the searcher is directly involved in the merits. <em>See</em>:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/unsupervised-self-collection-the-fox-guarding-the-chicken-coop-leads-to-discovery-on-discovery/">Unsupervised Self Collection—The Fox Guarding the Chicken Coop—Leads to Discovery on Discovery – E-Discovery LLC</a> (Sep. 19, 2026);</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/self-collection-discovery-about-discovery-and-curative-sanctions/">Self-Collection, Discovery About Discovery, and Curative Sanctions – E-Discovery LLC</a> (Sep. 22, 2024);</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/self-collection-may-be-reasonable-using-ralph-loseys-dual-protection-system/">“Self-Collection” May Be Reasonable Using Ralph Losey’s Dual-Protection System – E-Discovery LLC</a> (Jan. 19, 2024).</li>
</ul>
<p>Plaintiff ran two separate searches for “@fortiline.com” and (2) andrew.evans@fortiline.com&#8230;. Additionally, he ran searches for each of the following terms individually: “recruiter,” “headhunter,” “private equity,” “termination,” “fired,” “contract,” “Mark Boring,” “startup,” and “new business.”</p>
<p>Next, Mr. Evans made a supplemental production. Defendant asserted that this supplement “raised additional questions about what happened to the Fortiline information [Plaintiff] emailed to himself during his employment, and whether the searches done to date are adequate to find all responsive ESI.”</p>
<p>And, there was more: “Additionally, Defendant states that on October 12, 2026, it learned that Plaintiff had Fortiline documents on his personal laptop.”  Mr. Evans did not deny that but claimed that those documents were “’run of the mill’ and without relevance to any claims or defenses in the current litigation, but such documents will nevertheless be produced.”</p>
<p>To recap, at this juncture, Defendant had made an early request for a forensic examination, it was undisputed that Mr. Evans had used his personal laptop for company business for several months, after a search by Plaintiff apparently without attorney supervision, Mr. Evans initially failed to produce certain responsive materials and did so only after defense inquiry,  and even after a supplemental production, Mr. Evans’ production appeared incomplete.</p>
<p>In the Defendant’s words a forensic examination was justified because, “Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s prior ‘piecemeal and lackadaisical approach to searching for responsive documents raises questions about the sufficiency of his search efforts to date.’”  In response, “Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s request is not proportional given that he will provide Defendant with relevant non-privileged emails and documents.”</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><u>DEFENDANT FAILED TO CARRY ITS BURDEN OF PROOF</u></strong></p>
<p>The <em>Evans</em> Court first explained that forensic examinations are not lightly ordered:</p>
<blockquote><p>Courts have been cautious in requiring the mirror imaging of computers where the request is extremely broad in nature and the connection between the computers and the claims in the lawsuit are unduly vague or unsubstantiated in nature….  As this Court has observed, a forensic examination imposes ‘intrusions, costs, and delays making it a “drastic discovery measure&#8230;that must be proportional to the needs of the case…. Mere skepticism that an opposing party has not produced all relevant information is not sufficient to warrant drastic electronic discovery measures.”</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Id</em>. at *3 (cleaned up).</p>
<p>The <em>Evans</em> Court then set out when a forensic examination may be ordered:</p>
<blockquote><p>However, restrained and orderly computer forensic examinations have been permitted, where the moving party has demonstrated that the opposing party has defaulted in its discovery obligations by unwillingness or failure to produce relevant information by more conventional means…. In cases where the existence of a document on an electronic device would itself be probative of an issue in dispute, courts are more likely to find that the intrusions, costs, and delays attendant to a forensic examination are proportional to the needs of the case.</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Id</em>. (cleaned up).</p>
<p>Next, the Court explained where Fortiline fell short.  First, “it fails to suggest that Plaintiff deleted or otherwise destroyed responsive information that could only be obtained through forensic imaging….  Rather, Defendant relies on Plaintiff’s email to his personal Gmail to argue that responsive information is being withheld on the personal laptop. However, Defendants generalized allegations fail to make a showing sufficient to warrant an order allowing for the forensic imaging and examination of Plaintiff’s personal laptop.”  <em>Id</em>. at *3.</p>
<p>The <em>Evans</em> Court then looked at Plaintiff’s delay: “Also, while the Court is certainly mindful of Plaintiff’s delays in producing all relevant information to Defendant, both in producing emails and documents on the laptop, it does not find that Plaintiff’s brief delay justifies such an intrusive remedy at this juncture.”  <em>Id</em>. at *4.</p>
<p>And, in response to Defendant’s argument that it “is not obligated to take [Plaintiff’s] word about what&#8230;information he does/does not still possess,” the Court wrote: “Yet, that is precisely how discovery operates.” <em>Id</em>. at *4 (citation omitted).</p>
<p>Even though Defendant offered to pay the cost of the forensic examination, “both the privacy concerns and concerns about the scope of discovery related to Rule 26 clearly weigh against a forensic examination. Defendant has not carried its burden beyond mere suspicion that forensic imaging Plaintiff’s personal laptop is necessary to uncover relevant evidence unavailable through less intrusive means considering Plaintiff’s representations that no documents have been deleted from his laptop and all responsive information has been or will ultimately be produced.”  <em>Id</em>. at *4.</p>
<p>The Court emphasized: “To be clear, Defendant will still receive discovery from Plaintiff’s personal laptop. Even when a forensic examination is not warranted, the Federal Rules require a party to conduct a reasonable search of its files to determine whether it has responsive documents in its possession, custody, or control.”  <em>Id</em>. at *4 (cleaned up). And, it left the door open for a future request for a forensic examination upon a factual predicate.</p>
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		<title>Are an Expert’s A.I. Prompts Discoverable?  Maybe.</title>
		<link>https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/are-an-experts-a-i-prompts-discoverable-maybe/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 21:21:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Berman]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Commercial Litigation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ESI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ESI Protocol a/k/a Discovery Plans]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Experts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conference of Parties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cooperation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Discoverability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privilege]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/?p=5643</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Villanueva v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 2026 WL 2942348 (D. Nev. Sep. 29, 2026),  is the second recent Nevada A.I. decision involving use-of-force expert Tom Melton.  At issue was discovery of the expert’s 40-page ChatGPT history log. The first was discussed in Opposing Expert’s Allegedly Inaccurate Description of Use of A.I.<span class="excerpt-hellip"> […]</span>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Villanueva v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept.,</em> 2026 WL 2942348 (D. Nev. Sep. 29, 2026),  is the second recent Nevada A.I. decision involving use-of-force expert Tom Melton.  At issue was discovery of the expert’s 40-page ChatGPT history log.</p>
<p>The first was discussed in <a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/opposing-experts-allegedly-inaccurate-description-of-use-of-a-i-did-not-justify-modification-of-scheduling-order-on-facts-presented/">Opposing Expert’s Allegedly Inaccurate Description of Use of A.I. Did Not Justify Modification of Scheduling Order on Facts Presented</a> (Sep. 15, 2026), citing <em>Martin v. U.S.A.,</em> 2026 WL 2582963 (D. Nev. Sep. 1, 2026).</p>
<p><em>Villanueva </em> was before the court on objections to the report of a U.S. Magistrate Judge.  Plaintiff’s claim arose out of his incarceration by the County.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><u>BELATED DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT’S USE OF A.I.</u></strong></p>
<p>Plaintiff’s expert testified that he relied on ChatGPT to research and draft his expert report. <em>Id</em>. at *2.  However: “Prior to the deposition, Plaintiff did not disclose Melton’s usage of artificial intelligence in response to Defendant’s prior subpoena for ‘all data, documents, and other information considered by expert witness in forming the expert’s opinions.’”  <em>Id</em>.</p>
<p>After the deposition, “Defendants requested Plaintiff’s production of the ChatGPT history log….” <em>Id</em>. Plaintiff refused “and subsequently designated [the history log] as protected by ‘Attorney/Expert Work Product; Trial Preparation: Materials’ within their discovery privilege log.”  <em>Id</em>. Defendants moved to compel.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><u>THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S RULING</u></strong></p>
<p>The Magistrate Judge granted the motion to compel, holding “that the history log should have been disclosed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii) ‘because Melton considered it in forming and supporting his opinions.’”  Further, it was not protected as work product because it was not a draft report nor was it created by the expert. Finally, the Magistrate Judge held that the log was not protected by the attorney-client privilege and was relied on by the expert in forming his opinion.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><u>THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING EXPERT DISCOVERY</u></strong></p>
<p>Upon objection, the District Judge agreed in part and disagreed in part.  The court’s decision explained the principles governing expert discovery:</p>
<blockquote><p>Expert witnesses may also invoke discovery privileges related to their draft reports. In their expert report, expert witnesses are required to include “the facts or data considered by the witness in forming” their opinion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii). Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) was amended in 2010 to limit disclosures to “facts or data considered,” instead of previous language on “data or other information” that was interpreted by many courts as requiring the disclosure of “all attorney-expert communications and draft reports.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment. The rules distinguish between the required disclosure of facts or data considered, and an expert’s drafts of their report, which are protected from discovery. “Rules 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) protect drafts of any [expert] report or disclosure required under Rule 26(a)(2).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Id</em>. at *3.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><u>APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES</u></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><em><u>Components of the A.I. History Log That Must Be Disclosed</u></em></p>
<p>The <em>Villanueva</em> court ordered disclosure of those parts of the ChatGPT history log that constitute “facts or data” within the meaning of Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii).  In the Ninth Circuit, this encompasses “any material considered by the expert, from whatever source, that contains factual ingredients,” and includes material “considered,” not just material “relied upon by the expert.” <em>Id</em>.</p>
<p>One category of chat history sought was “material [that] asks for a case summary of certain controlling court cases on excessive force, in other words legal research conducted by the expert….” <em>Id</em>. at *2.</p>
<p>Looking to precedent, the court wrote: “The legal case summaries generated by ChatGPT constitute ‘facts or data’ that Melton considered and must be disclosed under Rule 26.”  <em>Id</em>. at *3.  In short:</p>
<blockquote><p>Plaintiff explains that Melton used the AI software to ask “for a case summary of certain controlling court cases on excessive force.” &#8230; Because Melton generated case summaries and “consulted” them to reach his expert opinion on excessive force, the ChatGPT-generated case summaries constitute “facts or data” that are subject to disclosure under Rule 26.</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Id</em>. at *3.  The court added: “Because AI-generated case summaries are “facts or data,” disclosure under Rule 26 requires the disclosure of all case summary responses supplied by ChatGPT. As <em>Defendant correctly contends, the history log is the only place where Defendant can review alleged ‘hallucinated case citations&#8230;quotes&#8230;and references to broad legal standards’ that Melton relied upon</em>, or at least considered, to reach his opinion.” <em>Id</em>. (emphasis added).</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><em><u>Components of the A.I. History Log That Are Protected From Disclosure</u></em></p>
<p>The court found it was clear error to order production of the “entirety” of Mr. Melton’s ChatGPT history.  It held that “Melton’s: 1) questions and prompts to ChatGPT, 2) use of the program to create a deposition outline, and 3) creation of a draft report are all protected from disclosure,” addressing each individually.  <em>Id</em>. at *3.</p>
<p><em>First</em>, Mr. Melton’s questions and prompts were protected because they were neither facts nor data considered by him.  “The Court finds that a question is not something that an expert can ‘consider’ or ‘rely’ upon as ‘facts or data’ in reaching their opinion, just as an expert would not ‘consider’ or ‘rely’ upon their online research queries.”  <em>Id</em>. at *4.  It wrote that, regardless of whether the prompts were viewed as part of an expert’s draft report or trial preparation materials, they were core work product: “The Court finds Plaintiff’s argument persuasive that Melton’s questions and prompts to ChatGPT reveal his ‘mental impressions or strategy&#8230;as to what issues he found of particular importance’ and Melton’s theory of the case.”</p>
<p><em>Second</em>, the ChatGPT log used to predict likely questions was protected.  “Unlike case summaries, articles, or print materials relied upon by an expert to reach their opinion, the Court finds that a deposition outline is not ‘facts or data’ within the meaning of Rule 26. Instead of using ChatGPT’s outputs to inform his expert opinion, Melton used ChatGPT’s responses to structure his preparation for his deposition and trial. Plaintiffs should not have to disclose the portion of the history log related to deposition preparation.”  <em>Id</em>. at *4.  Whether viewed as protected trial preparation materials or, alternatively, Mr. Melton’s “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories,” the logs were protected because disclosure “would reveal Melton’s focus, priorities, or areas of concern to address in the deposition and at trial.” <em>Id</em>.</p>
<p><em>Third</em>, “the portions of the history log related to Melton’s creation of a draft report” were not discoverable.  <em>Id</em>. at *4.</p>
<blockquote><p>The Court finds that Melton’s prompts to create a draft report on “certain issues, such as qualifications of the opposing expert or analysis of the opposing expert’s report”… is squarely within the protections of an expert’s draft reports. <em>Rule 26(b)(4)(B) mandates the protection of expert drafts “regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded.” </em>Melton testified to sometimes copying and pasting the outputs of ChatGPT into his own report…. It appears that Melton’s usage of the ChatGPT responses was to assist in his writing and analysis of his expert report, rather than to create “facts or data” to consider in forming his opinion.</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Id</em>. (emphasis added).  The court rejected the defense argument that these were not Mr. Melton’s “own generation of a report….”  <em>Id</em>.</p>
<blockquote><p>Melton testified that some of this information was directly incorporated into his own written report. Even if the ChatGPT output is not a draft report protected under Rule 26(b)(4)(B), it would still be mental impressions protected from disclosure under Rule 26(b)(3)(b). As addressed above, the ChatGPT responses would provide direct insight into Melton’s “mental impressions” and “legal theories” that he considered relevant in a report.</p></blockquote>
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Miscellaneous Objections</u></p>
<p>Plaintiff asserted that it was clear error for the Magistrate Judge to find that privilege was waived by Mr. Melton’s use of ChatGPT.  However, the court wrote that “Judge Albregts did not reach a decision on whether the log was privileged, and if so, if any such privilege was waived by Melton’s disclosure of information to ChatGPT.”  It added:</p>
<blockquote><p><em>Because ChatGPT is not a person, but was an application used in this instance as a research, drafting, and editing program, the Court finds that any privileged information is not waived by Melton’s use of the program.</em> The Court also notes that many of Defendant’s concerns about Melton’s methodology and reliance on ChatGPT are appropriate to address at trial as matters of impeachment.</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Id</em>. at *5 (emphasis added).</p>
<p>Plaintiff also objected that it was clear error for the Magistrate Judge not to conduct in camera review.  The District Judge, having conducted an in camera review, disagreed.</p>
<p>For more on in camera review, please visit:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/the-standard-for-in-camera-review/">The Standard for In Camera Review</a> (Sep. 25, 2026)(quoting court statement that: “The standard for in camera review is not high, but it’s not nothing either, and the Court doesn’t think it’s been met here.”);</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/order-granting-in-camera-review-of-work-product-claim/">Order Granting In Camera Review of Work Product Claim</a> (Apr. 14, 2025);</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/the-standard-for-in-camera-review-of-assertedly-privileged-documents/">The Standard for In Camera Review of Assertedly Privileged Documents</a> (Jul. 9, 2024).</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><u>RELATED ISSUES</u></strong></p>
<p>For related information on whether A.I. is protected by privilege or as work product, please visit:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/defendants-discovery-request-relate-to-plaintiffs-alleged-use-of-a-i-is-denied/">Defendant’s Discovery Request Relating to Plaintiff’s Alleged Use of A.I. is Denied</a> (Sep. 19, 2026);</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/upload-of-documents-to-anthropic-products-leads-to-denial-of-motion-to-seal-record/">Upload of Documents to Anthropic Products Leads to Denial of Motion to Seal Record</a> (Aug. 28, 2026);</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/tara-emory-and-maura-grossman-address-protection-of-attorney-prompts-in-genai-tar/">Tara Emory and Maura Grossman Address Protection of Attorney Prompts in “GenAI TAR”</a> (Jul. 5, 2026);</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/deponents-use-of-a-i-to-answer-deposition-questions-barred-chatgpt-was-not-an-attorney/">Deponent’s Use of A.I. to Answer Deposition Questions Barred; ChatGPT Was Not an Attorney</a> (May 2, 2026);</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/colorado-policy-could-shield-ai-from-complaints-regarding-unauthorized-practice-of-law/">“Colorado policy could shield AI from complaints regarding unauthorized practice of law”</a> (Apr. 1, 2026);</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/important-a-i-work-product-and-protective-order-decision/">Important A.I. Work Product and Protective Order Decision</a> (Mar. 31, 2026);</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/does-openai-provide-legal-assistance/">Does OpenAI Provide Legal Assistance?</a> (Mar. 11, 2026);</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/discovery-permitted-about-development-and-use-of-ai-program/">Discovery Permitted About Development and Use of AI Program</a> (Mar. 10, 2026);</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/two-courts-two-answers-when-does-using-ai-waive-privilege/">“Two Courts, Two Answers: When Does Using AI Waive Privilege?”</a> (Mar. 3, 2026);</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/a-i-documents-deemed-not-privileged/">I. Documents Deemed Not Privileged</a> (Feb. 12, 2026);</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/a-i-privilege-heppner-and-how-did-the-court-learn-about-the-absence-of-certain-attorney-client-communications-between-mr-heppner-and-his-attorneys/">I. Privilege, Heppner, and How Did the Court Learn About the Absence of Certain Attorney-Client Communications Between Mr. Heppner and His Attorneys?</a> (Mar. 2, 2026);</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/against-an-ai-privilege-are-prompts-discoverable-is-output/">“Against an AI Privilege” – Are Prompts Discoverable?  Is Output?</a> (Jan. 2, 2026).</li>
</ul>
<p>Oct. 8, 2026</p>
<p>This blog was initially posted on  <a href="https://edrm.net/author/michaeldberman/">Electronic Discovery Reference Model</a>.</p>
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		<title>Expert’s Use of GenAI Was Proper on Facts Presented</title>
		<link>https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/experts-use-of-genai-was-proper-on-facts-presented/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 19:33:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Berman]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[ESI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Experts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Software]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Evidence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Objections]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/?p=5620</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Ferlito v. Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc., 2025 WL 1181699 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2025), isn’t  the most recent decision concerning an expert’s use of GenAI, but it is an interesting one. Mr. Ferlito sued Harbor Freight. He alleged that he purchased a “splitting maul,” which is a specialized axe used to split<span class="excerpt-hellip"> […]</span>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Ferlito v. Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc.,</em> 2025 WL 1181699 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2025), isn’t  the most recent decision concerning an expert’s use of GenAI, but it is an interesting one.</p>
<p>Mr. Ferlito sued Harbor Freight. He alleged that he purchased a “splitting maul,” which is a specialized axe used to split wood, that was defective. While he was hanging the maul up for storage, the head detached and struck him.  He alleged that this was caused by a design defect.  The defense asserted that the cause was misuse.</p>
<p>The decision begins:</p>
<blockquote><p>“If I had four hours to chop down a tree, I&#8217;d spend the first two hours sharpening the axe.”</p>
<p>-Aphorism incorrectly attributed to Abraham Lincoln. See <a href="https://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/03/29/sharp-axe/">https://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/03/29/sharp-axe/</a>.</p></blockquote>
<p>One issue turned on the qualifications of the plaintiff’s expert on liability. Another was the reliability of his testimony.</p>
<p>This post looks only at the expert’s use of ChatGPT.  The court found “no issue” with Mr. Lehnert’s use of GenAI, writing:</p>
<blockquote><p>Federal courts have grappled with the appropriateness of an expert&#8217;s use of artificial intelligence to form opinions, and the validity of AI as a research tool in litigation more broadly. <em>See Kohls v. Ellison</em>, No. 24-CV-3754 (LMP)(DLM), 2025 WL 66514, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 10, 2025) (excluding expert testimony when the expert&#8217;s affidavit contained ChatGPT-generated references to non-existent academic articles)….</p>
<p>In <em>Kohls</em>, the expert&#8217;s “citation to fake, AI-generated sources in his declaration &#8230; shatter[ed] his credibility with th[e] Court” such that his testimony would not be reliable as required by Rule 702 and <em>Daubert</em>. 2025 WL 66514, at *4. However, <em>the Court emphasized that experts can use “AI for research purposes” given its “potential to revolutionize legal practice for the better.”</em> <em>Id</em>. <em>Daubert</em> issues arise only “when attorneys and experts abdicate their independent judgment and critical thinking skills in favor of ready-made AI-generated answers.” <em>Id</em>. [emphasis added].</p></blockquote>
<p>The<em> Ferlito</em> court explained:</p>
<blockquote><p>Here, there is little risk that Lehnert&#8217;s use of ChatGPT impaired his judgment regarding proper methods for securing the maul&#8217;s head to its handle. <em>The record from the hearing reflects that Lehnert used ChatGPT after he had written his report to confirm his findings</em>, Tr. at 46, which were based on his decades of experience joining dissimilar materials, Tr. at 12. <em>During the hearing, Lehnert professed to being “quite amazed” that the “ChatGPT search confirmed what [he] had already opined.” </em>Tr. at 47. <em>On re-direct, Lehnert reiterated that he did not rely on ChatGPT:</em></p>
<p>Q: Now, the other items that you have consulted and listed, [including] ChatGPT &#8230; those aren&#8217;t things that you relied upon in reaching your conclusions and opinions, correct?</p>
<p>A: Correct.</p>
<p>Tr. at 67. <em>There is no indication that Lehnert used ChatGPT to generate a report with false authority or that his use of AI would render his testimony less reliable. Accordingly, the Court finds no issue with Lehnert&#8217;s use of ChatGPT in this instance</em>. [emphasis added].</p></blockquote>
<p>The <em>trial</em> testimony that was cited by the court is not available on Westlaw.  A portion of the expert’s <em>deposition</em> testimony follows:</p>
<blockquote><p>Q. And under that, you refer to ChatGPT; is that correct?</p>
<p>A.  Correct.</p>
<p><em>Q. Are these the reference materials that you relied upon</em> on page 7 of your expert report?</p>
<p>A.  Yes. [emphasis added].</p></blockquote>
<p>Later testimony was:</p>
<blockquote><p>Q.  Okay. I&#8217;d like to go back to what we marked as Defendant&#8217;s Exhibit 3, which is that Excel spreadsheet. Again, I want to talk a little bit about the materials that you relied upon or you identified in connection with your report. You identified ChatGPT as a resource that you utilized in connection with your report, correct?</p>
<p>A.  I&#8217;ve identified that, but I have to qualify that it was more of a &#8212; since I &#8212; I wanted to show, and that&#8217;s what I&#8217;ve done here, what is a collection of common knowledge relative to this subject. And that&#8217;s what ChatGPT does, it collects all the information. And I thought it was kind of an interesting exercise that I&#8217;d ask at this question. And so when you look at the universe of information that ChatGPT collects and then look at the response that it gives, I thought that very germane to this issue.</p>
<p>Q.  Did you &#8212; did &#8212; was this the free service of ChatGPT or a paid subscription?</p>
<p>A.  Free service.</p>
<p>Q.  Did you do anything to verify the content of the response that you were given by ChatGPT?</p>
<p>A.  No.</p>
<p>Q.  No independent research to verify the response that ChatGPT gave you?</p>
<p>A.  No.</p>
<p>Q.  Okay. Did ChatGPT provide you any sources where they got their information from?</p>
<p>A.  I don&#8217;t recall. I didn&#8217;t look for that.</p>
<p>Q.  Okay. You just did a search and this is what came up?</p>
<p>A.  That&#8217;s correct.</p>
<p>Q.  Okay. Have you ever used ChatGPT in connection with issuing an expert report previously?</p>
<p>A.  No, I haven&#8217;t.</p></blockquote>
<p>Additionally, the expert stated in deposition: “And my own &#8212; my intent on putting all of this reference material together was, I thought very interestingly summed up in that ChatGPT common knowledge.”</p>
<p>A final pretrial conference is scheduled for November 19, 2026.  Docket Entry No. 70 (9/8/2026).</p>
<p>In Her Honor’s discussion of the<em> Ferlito </em>case, K.B. Forrest, New York Practice Series, §<a href="https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I56567781004d11da9dcbbf6eefa49528/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=%2FRelatedInfo%2Fv1%2FkcCitingReferences%2Fnav%3FdocGuid%3DI50a5e73020fd11f08371dfe18a57bc79%26midlineIndex%3D4%26warningFlag%3DN%26planIcons%3DNO%26skipOutOfPlan%3DNO%26sort%3Ddepthdesc%26filterGuid%3Dh41554ea1965e1d2fac01b1e102fb72a7%26category%3DkcCitingReferences%26origRank%3D1%26origDocSource%3D83d7fcfef04841abb5b465e5bdb727ad&amp;listSource=RelatedInfo&amp;list=CitingReferences&amp;rank=4&amp;docFamilyGuid=I94b204eff8f911d99f28ffa0ae8c2575&amp;overruleRisk=true&amp;ppcid=af2df881a9fb47c49a3a215a9110a360&amp;originationContext=citingreferences&amp;transitionType=CitingReferencesItem&amp;contextData=%28sc.Keycite%29">79.15. “AI and the courtroom—Federal approach to AI-related evidence and proposed rules”</a> (Oct. 2025), Judge Forrest notes that New York applies the <em>Frye</em> standard and: “By contrast, in <em>Kohls v. Ellison</em>, [2025 WL 66514, at *5 (D. Minn. 2025,] a federal court excluded an expert declaration after learning that the expert had relied on an AI tool to draft portions of the report, including fabricated legal citations. The court held that the expert&#8217;s failure to verify the accuracy of the AI&#8217;s output fatally undermined the reliability of the testimony under FRE 702, and illustrated the danger of substituting machine output for expert reasoning.”</p>
<p>Judge Forrest wrote:</p>
<blockquote><p>Taken together, these cases illustrate the emerging contours of permissible AI use under the FRE. Courts may tolerate limited use of generative AI for secondary verification, provided the expert retains independent judgment and applies reliable methods. But experts who defer to AI without scrutiny—or use it in lieu of personal expertise—risk exclusion under FRE 702.</p></blockquote>
<p>A future post titled “Are an Expert’s A.I. Prompts Discoverable?  Maybe,” will discuss <em>Villanueva v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept.,</em> 2026 WL 2942348 (D. Nev. Sep. 29, 2026).</p>
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		<title>Opposing Expert’s Allegedly Inaccurate Description of Use of A.I. Did Not Justify Modification of Scheduling Order on Facts Presented</title>
		<link>https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/opposing-experts-allegedly-inaccurate-description-of-use-of-a-i-did-not-justify-modification-of-scheduling-order-on-facts-presented/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 17:00:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Berman]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[ESI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Experts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cooperation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rules]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/?p=5544</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[“This is a Federal Tort Claims Act case involving allegations of an unlawful shooting by a Bureau of Land Management ranger.”  Martin v. U.S.A., 2026 WL 2582963 (D. Nev. Sep. 1, 2026). Defendant moved to reopen and extend case management deadlines based on Plaintiffs’ expert’s having used AI, allegedly more extensively than<span class="excerpt-hellip"> […]</span>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“This is a Federal Tort Claims Act case involving allegations of an unlawful shooting by a Bureau of Land Management ranger.”  <em>Martin v. U.S.A.,</em> 2026 WL 2582963 (D. Nev. Sep. 1, 2026).</p>
<p>Defendant moved to reopen and extend case management deadlines based on Plaintiffs’ expert’s having used AI, <em>allegedly</em> more extensively than disclosed. The motion was denied based on lack of diligence.</p>
<p>The chronology follows:</p>
<ul>
<li>February 10, 2025: The parties held a Rule 26(f) conference. The court wrote that there was “no impediment to proceeding with discovery.”</li>
<li>March 26, 2026: Plaintiffs disclosed Tom Melton as an expert and served his report.</li>
<li>May 1, 2026: The extended rebuttal expert deadline expired.</li>
<li>June 9, 2026: “Melton testified at his deposition that he used an artificial intelligence aid to assist him with grammar and sentence structure in his written report…. Defense counsel knew as of at least that date (June 9, 2026) that there may be an issue with the use of artificial intelligence. Indeed, counsel began researching the issue and looking for an expert at that time.”</li>
<li>July 16, 2026: “Apparently due to some sort of scheduling issue, Melton’s deposition was continued and eventually completed….”</li>
<li>August 10, 2026: The discovery cutoff expired.  “On the discovery cutoff, Defendant filed the instant motion seeking to reopen the rebuttal expert disclosure deadline and to extend the discovery cutoff (and subsequent case management deadlines) by 90 days.”</li>
</ul>
<p>The basis of the defense request was:</p>
<blockquote><p>Defendant explains that, based on the record in a different case involving Melton, counsel “believes that there is a possibility” that Melton has misrepresented the extent of his use of artificial intelligence.</p></blockquote>
<p>Defense counsel had “suspicions” of misrepresentation.</p>
<p>For the <em>unexpired</em> discovery cutoff, the court explained that good cause is required to modify an unexpired case management deadline.  Good cause “turns on whether the subject deadlines cannot reasonably be met through the exercise of diligence throughout the allotted period…. The diligence obligation is ongoing and the movant must have been diligent throughout the entire period already provided….  Courts may find a lack of good cause when, <em>inter alia</em>, the movant did not promptly seek judicial relief from the subject deadline.”  The burden of proof is on the movant and if it is not carried, “the inquiry should end.”</p>
<p>For the <em>expired</em> rebuttal expert deadline: “Seeking to revive already expired deadlines requires an additional showing of excusable neglect….  When there is no threshold showing of diligence for good cause, however, such request is properly denied without the need to separately address excusable neglect.”</p>
<p>Here, the inquiry ended:</p>
<blockquote><p>In this case with an already-extended discovery period, the record reflects that defense counsel was on notice of Melton’s testimony on his use of artificial intelligence since at least June 9, 2026. Although counsel represents that he began immediately researching the issue and trying to locate an expert, he did not file the instant motion until the last day of the discovery period more than two months later. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs…, that the failure to seek relief for two months shows that Defendant was not diligent….</p></blockquote>
<p>The court rejected the defense argument that the deposition was not concluded until July 16, 2026: “Defendant cites no legal authority and provides no meaningfully developed argument that a party can sit on its hands in seeking relief from an approaching case management deadline simply because a portion of a deposition is rescheduled. Again, counsel represents that he had spent the preceding weeks looking into the issue and trying to find an expert, so any need to seek relief from the case management schedule was known weeks before the second part of the deposition. Defendant fails to explain why counsel could not have conferred and sought relief from case management deadlines during the intervening period.”</p>
<p>The court added: “Defendant also cites no legal authority that a party must already find and retain a particular person to act as its expert before it can seek relief from the expert disclosure deadlines.”</p>
<p>In a footnote, the court wrote: “The lack of diligence is dispositive of this motion. The Court notes that there is also some force to Plaintiff’s additional argument that <u>speculation</u> as to the use of artificial intelligence seems a weak basis for an eleventh-hour request to extend case management deadlines yet again.”</p>
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		<title>“‘Show How 3M Is 0% at Fault:’ Expert Witness Used ChatGPT to Write Report Defending Company in Deadly Explosion Lawsuit”</title>
		<link>https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/show-how-3m-is-0-at-fault-expert-witness-used-chatgpt-to-write-report-defending-company-in-deadly-explosion-lawsuit/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2026 17:43:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Berman]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[ESI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Experts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Evidence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[information governance]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/?p=5487</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Josh Autenrieth, Laake v. 3M Co., No. 2020-05505-A (11th Dist. Ct. Harris Cty., Tex. July 21, 2026), is not available on Westlaw; however, in this $61 million lawsuit, Jason Koebler’s post, ‘Show How 3M Is 0% at Fault:’ Expert Witness Used ChatGPT to Write Report Defending Company in Deadly Explosion Lawsuit (Aug.<span class="excerpt-hellip"> […]</span>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Josh Autenrieth, Laake v. 3M Co</em>., No. 2020-05505-A (11th Dist. Ct. Harris Cty., Tex. July 21, 2026), is not available on Westlaw; however, in this $61 million lawsuit, Jason Koebler’s post, <a href="https://www.404media.co/show-how-3m-is-0-at-fault-expert-witness-used-chatgpt-to-write-report-defending-company-in-deadly-explosion-lawsuit/">‘Show How 3M Is 0% at Fault:’ Expert Witness Used ChatGPT to Write Report Defending Company in Deadly Explosion Lawsuit</a> (Aug. 17, 2026), tells the story. He wrote:</p>
<blockquote><p>An expert witness testifying in a lawsuit about liability for a Houston explosion that killed three people and destroyed roughly 200 homes used ChatGPT to write significant portions of his “expert report.” The man, who was hired by the industrial product conglomerate 3M, exposed his AI prompts publicly. They showed that he asked ChatGPT to help him “create an exceptional expert witness report defending the standard of care at 3M,” and that the report should “show how 3M is 0% at fault for the explosion at Watson Grinding.”</p></blockquote>
<p>Mr. Koebler added:</p>
<blockquote><p>The incident shows that artificial intelligence has made its way into courtrooms not just in AI-generated legal briefings, hallucinated cases, and adversarial “prompt injections,” but in expert witness testimonies. Court transcripts, deposition documents, and discovery records shared with 404 Media show extensive AI use in an extremely high profile case, where multiple people died and hundreds of millions of dollars in total liability are at stake in ongoing litigation about the explosion. The case also shows that the specific prompts used to create this type of expert testimony can be discoverable during a case, and that those prompts can be quite embarrassing.</p></blockquote>
<p>The lawsuit centers on an explosion allegedly caused by a “degraded and poorly crimped” hose.  Dozens of homeowners have sued 3M.  <em>Id</em>.  The article reports that the expert was paid roughly $90,000.</p>
<p>The expert’s use of AI was discovered when <a href="https://moyefirm.com/">plaintiff’s attorney, Will Moye</a>, found a five-page document called “Citation Overlay” which he recognized as coming from ChatGPT.  He then demanded production of all of the prompts used to create the report.  Mr. Koebler reported:</p>
<blockquote><p>ChatGPT created a roughly 30-page report that included the line “From a technical and standard-of-care standpoint, 3M is <strong>0% responsible </strong>for the January 24, 2020 explosion.” This line did not make it into the final report filed with the court, because when Autenrieth later asked ChatGPT to “review this as the opposing council,” ChatGPT determined that writing “‘0% responsible’ is an easy target” for a lawyer to poke holes in, and is one of several &#8220;phrases [that] let opposing counsel paint you as an advocate rather than an expert.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Mr. Moye is quoted as stating that the expert “acknowledged [at trial] the prompts he put in were biased toward 3M to help 3M win the case […] it’s really egregious.”  Mr. Moye said that many of the prompts were entered the night before the expert’s deposition, and Mr. Moye uncovered a lot:</p>
<blockquote><p>[The expert] also asked ChatGPT to “grade” his report (it got a 97/100), and “what are the 5 main things in my report the prosecution could attack and how do I defend them?” He then asked ChatGPT if his resume was sufficient to be an expert witness; “will prosecution go after me for never having been [an expert witness] before based on wording and how do I defend that?”</p></blockquote>
<p>Additional details and part of the transcript are published in Mr. Koebler’s post. The post states: “In the examination at trial, Moye and Autenrieth agree that the submitted report is ‘90 to 85 percent ChatGPT.’” <em>Id</em>.</p>
<p>Mr. Moye said that “every lawyer needs to make sure their own experts aren’t generating work product in a way that’s insincere, and then knowing you can subpoena the prompts [&#8230;]”  <em>Id</em>.</p>
<p>In response, the expert said that he has a body of work and more than 20 years of experience in the relevant field of gas detection.  The article states: “He did not explain why he used ChatGPT, but said ‘my opinions were put in there, and AI helped me to draft a straw man to build off of,’ and added ‘I put information and opinions in up front before it ever generated […] if the output wasn&#8217;t of my opinion or what I agreed to, I did alter it.’”</p>
<p>The post states: “The jury in the 3M case awarded more than $61 million to the plaintiffs, apportioning 30 percent of the responsibility to 3M and 70 percent to Watson Grinding.” <em>Id</em>.</p>
<p><a href="https://moyefirm.com/jury-awards-118-million-to-victims-of-watson-grinding-explosion-3m-held-partially-liable/">Mr. Moye’s website</a> states: “The Watson Grinding and Manufacturing explosion occurred when a propylene gas leak ignited at the facility in northwest Houston, sending a massive fireball through the neighborhood. The blast killed three employees, injured many others, and caused an estimated $200 million in property damage.”</p>
<p>Thanks to Jason Koebler for his post.  This one is based entirely on his post, which has much more detail.</p>
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		<title>Discovery From a Dual-Hat Expert</title>
		<link>https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/discovery-from-a-dual-hat-expert/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 17:27:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Berman]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Experts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Important Posts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Evidence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Objections]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/?p=5350</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[A decision involving a so-called “dual-hat expert” arose out of tragedy.  “This case arises from a flood that swept through Waverly, Tennessee on August 21, 2021 ’killing at least 20 people, including children.’ … Plaintiffs claim that the flood resulted because Defendant allowed debris to clog one of its culverts, which caused<span class="excerpt-hellip"> […]</span>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A decision involving a so-called “dual-hat expert” arose out of tragedy.  “This case arises from a flood that swept through Waverly, Tennessee on August 21, 2021 ’killing at least 20 people, including children.’ … Plaintiffs claim that the flood resulted because Defendant allowed debris to clog one of its culverts, which caused millions of gallons of pent-up water to divert over the banks of Trace Creek and into the city.” <em>Rigney v. CSX Transportation, Inc.,</em> 2026 WL 2078596 (M.D. Tenn. Jul. 17, 2026).</p>
<p>The discovery issue turned on the roles of plaintiffs’ psychiatric injury expert, Dr. William Newman.  Dr. Newman was a “dual-hat expert” on the issue of negligent infliction of emotional distress (&#8220;NIED&#8221;).  He was a testifying expert as to some injured people and a non-testifying consultant as to others.</p>
<p>Dr. Newman interviewed “numerous individuals,” but produced only 17 reports.  “The briefing illustrates a stark disagreement about the number of interviews that were conducted. However, the Court need not resolve this dispute to address the merits of Defendant’s motion.”</p>
<p>During six days of depositions, “Newman refused, on the advice of Plaintiff’s counsel, to answer questions related to the interviews he conducted that did not result in a report.”  CSX asserted that it was entitled to any notes Dr. Newman took, regardless of whether he generated a report.</p>
<p>In response, “Plaintiffs assert that Defendant is not entitled to any information generated by Newman for interviews he conducted where no report was generated because the information is not relevant and because he was acting as a consulting expert and thus protected by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(D).”</p>
<p>The court set out the governing standard as follows:</p>
<blockquote><p>Dual-hat experts are single experts who serve both roles, as non-testifying consulting experts and as testifying experts. In the case of dual-hat experts, only materials generated or considered uniquely in the expert’s role as a consultant are exempt from the broader discovery rules for testifying experts…. If there is any ambiguity regarding the role played by a party’s consultant in reviewing or creating documents, it should be resolved in favor of the party seeking discovery.</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Id</em>. at * 2 (cleaned up).</p>
<p>The court’s first step was to examine relevancy—the scope of discovery: “Defendant … weakens its argument by conceding that the information sought merely ‘could be’ relevant…. The Court struggles to see how the information gleaned by Newman during interviews of individuals who do not have a pending claim for [negligent infliction of emotional distress] is relevant to a pending claim or defense.”  The court also rejected the defense theory that the information was relevant to credibility or methodology.</p>
<p>It then turned to the “dual-hat” issue:</p>
<blockquote><p>Newman serves a dual purpose. He serves as a testifying expert for the 17 Plaintiffs with NIED claims; he also was a consulting expert for Plaintiffs who are not submitting that claim to the jury. As a dual-hat expert, materials generated or considered in his role as a consulting expert are not discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(D). Defendant’s argument that Newman considered the information gleaned as part of the interviews at issue when forming his opinions as to the 17 Plaintiffs is unavailing and is contradicted by the record. In his deposition, Newman testified that he did not evaluate any Plaintiff “through the lens of another.”</p></blockquote>
<p>The court added: “Even assuming that the requested information is relevant, there is no ambiguity in Newman’s role as a consulting expert for Plaintiffs who are not pursuing NIED claims, and Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that Rule 26(b)(4)(D) applies….  Therefore, Defendant’s only remaining avenue for production would be through a showing of exceptional circumstances. It has failed to do so.”</p>
<p>The court held: “The materials generated by Newman related to individuals who are not pursuing a claim of NIED were generated pursuant to his role as a consultant and are exempt from disclosure. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant is not entitled to discover his notes, unredacted schedules, or to depose Newman again.”</p>
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		<title>Stipulated A.I. Order Protects Expert’s Prompts and Outputs</title>
		<link>https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/stipulated-a-i-order-protects-experts-prompts-and-outputs/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 23:47:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Berman]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[ESI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ESI Protocol a/k/a Discovery Plans]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Experts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Important Posts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Discoverability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Litigation Hold: Scope]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/?p=5295</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The stipulated protective order in Waterford Township Gen. Employees Retirement System v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc., 2026 WL 1858112 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 29, 2026), addressed the protection of A.I. used by a party’s expert.  It stated: Neither side must preserve or disclose, including in expert deposition testimony, the following documents or materials:… <span class="excerpt-hellip"> […]</span>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The stipulated protective order in <em>Waterford Township Gen. Employees Retirement System v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc., </em>2026 WL 1858112 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 29, 2026), addressed the protection of A.I. used by a party’s expert.  It stated:</p>
<blockquote><p><em>Neither side must preserve or disclose, including in expert deposition testimony, the following documents or materials</em>:…  Artificial Intelligence (“Artificial Intelligence” or “AI” means any software, system, or technology that utilizes machine learning, deep learning, neural networks, natural language processing, computer vision, or other computational techniques to: (a) learn from data or experience; (b) make predictions, recommendations, classifications, or decisions; (c) generate content, including text, images, audio, video, code, or other outputs; or (d) perform tasks that would otherwise require human intelligence or judgment. Artificial Intelligence includes, without limitation, generative AI systems, large language models (LLMs), machine learning models, predictive analytics tools, and autonomous or semi-autonomous decision-making systems) <em>prompts and output that any expert or any person assisting an expert used in the course of their work on this matter,</em> including but not limited to producing an expert witness report, provided however, nothing contained herein is intended to or shall serve to limit a party’s right to examine the bases for an expert’s opinion, sources relied on, or methodology…. [emphasis added].</p></blockquote>
<p>I’m a bit curious to see how a party can depose an expert on “the bases for [the] expert’s opinion, sources relied on, or methodology,” but if the expert used A.I., the expert need not “disclose, including in expert deposition testimony,” “prompts and output” that  the “expert used in the course of their work on this matter….”</p>
<p>For examples of other types of A.I. confidentiality orders, see:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/are-protective-orders-limiting-upload-to-ai-of-documents-produced-by-an-opponent-in-discovery-becoming-the-standard-of-care/">Are Protective Orders Limiting Upload to AI of Documents Produced by an Opponent in Discovery Becoming the Standard of Care?</a> (May 26, 2026).</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/another-confidentiality-order-limiting-use-of-ai-to-analyze-protected-materials/">Another Confidentiality Order Limiting Use of AI to Analyze Protected Materials</a> (Apr. 27, 2026).</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/a-i-protective-orders-are-becoming-routine/">I. Protective Orders Are Becoming Routine</a>(Apr. 20, 2026).</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/deepfake-executives-created-via-depositions-pose-grave-threat-protective-order-suggested/">“Deepfake Executives, Created Via Depositions, Pose Grave Threat”: Protective Order Suggested</a>(Apr. 5, 2026).</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/important-a-i-work-product-and-protective-order-decision/">Important A.I. Work Product and Protective Order Decision</a>(Mar. 31, 2026).</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/order-prohibiting-upload-of-confidential-discovery-documents-to-artificial-intelligence-ai/">Order Prohibiting Upload of Confidential Discovery Documents to Artificial Intelligence (“AI”)</a>(Nov. 3, 2025), based on <em style="font-weight: inherit;">Warner v. Gilbarco, Inc., </em>2025 WL 3047881 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2025).</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/protective-order-limited-uploading-discovery-responses-to-open-a-i/">Protective Order Limited Uploading Discovery Responses to Open A.I.</a>(Mar. 26, 2026), discussing <em style="font-weight: inherit;">Jeffries v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc.,</em> 2026 WL 820218 (D. Kans. Mar. 25, 2026). Notably, in <em style="font-weight: inherit;">Jeffries</em>, the protective order applied to both confidential and non-confidential information produced in discovery.</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>Does Disclosure of Privileged Information to a “Non-Reporting” or “Hybrid” Expert Waive Privilege?</title>
		<link>https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/does-disclosure-of-privileged-information-to-a-non-reporting-or-hybrid-expert-waive-privilege/</link>
		<pubDate>Sun, 25 Jan 2026 20:08:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Berman]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Commercial Litigation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[District of MD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ESI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Experts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Discoverability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Objections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privilege]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/?p=4883</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Plaintiff KISS sought discovery of certain otherwise-privileged communications made by defendant Ardell to Ms. Theresa Cooper, an executive vice president at Ardell.  Initially, Ms. Cooper was designated as a fact witness. Later, she was designated as a “non-reporting expert” pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(c).  The court explained that “Ardell&#8217;s Expert Disclosures state that<span class="excerpt-hellip"> […]</span>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Plaintiff KISS sought discovery of certain otherwise-privileged communications made by defendant Ardell to Ms. Theresa Cooper, an executive vice president at Ardell.  Initially, Ms. Cooper was designated as a fact witness. Later, she was designated as a “non-reporting expert” pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(c).  The court explained that “Ardell&#8217;s Expert Disclosures state that it expects Ms. Cooper to testify about the same subject matter areas as were identified as the subjects of her testimony as a fact witness.”</p>
<p>Ardell asserted attorney-client privilege. KISS asserted waiver by disclosure to a designated expert.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><u>SPLIT OF AUTHORITY OVER HYBRID EXPERTS</u></strong></p>
<p>In <em>KISS Nail Products, Inc. v. Ardell International, Inc.,</em> 2026 WL 180031 (C.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2026), the court wrote:</p>
<blockquote><p><em>The parties&#8217; central dispute—whether the designation of a hybrid non-reporting expert witness waives privilege—is an issue that has divided district courts in recent years.</em> Some courts, following the reasoning of <em>United States v. Sierra Pac. Indus.,</em> No. 09-cv-2445-KJM-EFB, 2011 WL 2119078 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2011) (“<em>Sierra Pacific</em>”), interpret Rule 26(a)(2) to provide that a designating party waives privilege—at least in some circumstances—by designating a hybrid non-reporting expert. Other courts, led by <em>Advanced Magnesium Alloys Corp. v. Dery,</em> No. 1:20-cv-02247-RLY-MJD, 2022 WL 16743623 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 7, 2022) (“<em>Dery</em>”), find that the designation of a hybrid witness does not waive otherwise valid privilege claims.</p>
<p>For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees with Ardell that <em>Dery&#8217;s</em> reasoning is more applicable to the facts in this case and the Federal Rules governing non-reporting experts. The Court therefore finds that Ardell did not waive attorney-client or work product privileges and denies KISS&#8217;s motion to compel.</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Id</em>. at *2.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><u>SETTING THE STAGE: FED.R.CIV.P. 26(a)(2)(C)</u></strong></p>
<p>Because this is a deep dive into a small pool, it may help to set the stage.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a) governs “initial disclosures.”  Rule 26(a)(2)(A) requires expert disclosures.</p>
<p>As the <em>KISS</em> court explained, there are two types of testifying experts, “reporting” and “non-reporting” experts. <em>Id</em>. at *2.  Subsection (B) requires a written <em>report</em> from retained experts, experts who are specially employed to provide expert testimony, or employees who regularly do so.  They are “reporting experts.” Subsection (B) was not at play in <em>KISS</em>.</p>
<p>Subsection (C) governs expert witnesses who are not subject to the reporting requirement, <em>i.e.,</em> “non-reporting experts.”  It requires disclosure of “the subject matter” of the expert evidence and “a summary of the facts and opinions on which the witness is expected to testify.”  Subsection (C) was in play in <em>KISS</em>.  Subsection (C) witnesses are sometimes called “hybrid” witnesses. Other times, they are called “non-reporting expert witnesses.”  A classic example of a hybrid expert is a treating physician who will testify to both facts that were personally observed during treatment and expert opinions as a physician. Another example is “employees of a party who do not regularly provide expert testimony.” <em>Id</em>. at *2 (citation omitted).</p>
<p>As the <em>KISS</em> court noted, the scope of required disclosures for Subsection (C) witnesses is different for the two types of experts and it is ambiguous (<em>id</em>. at *4).</p>
<p>Some courts, like the District of Maryland, have Local Rules to provide clarity:</p>
<blockquote><p>Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, a party must provide the disclosures required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) only as to experts retained or specially employed by a party to provide expert testimony. The disclosures need not be provided as to hybrid fact/expert witnesses such as treating physicians. The party must disclose the existence of any hybrid fact/expert witness pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A), and disclose the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 702, 703, or 705, as well as a summary of the facts and opinions to which the hybrid fact/expert witness is expected to testify, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). In addition, an adverse party may obtain the opinions of such witnesses (to the extent appropriate) through interrogatories, document production requests, and depositions.</p></blockquote>
<ol start="104">
<li>Md., Local Rule 104.9.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><u>THE DEMARCATION LINE IS NOT CLEAR</u></strong></p>
<p>Caution and careful discovery planning has been advised: “Although it is clear that a treating physician is the quintessential example of a hybrid witness for whom no Rule 26(a)(2)(B) disclosures are required, it is a mistake to focus solely on the status of the expert, instead of the nature of the testimony which will be offered at trial. A witness can be a hybrid witness as to certain opinions, but a retained expert as to others, and with regard to treating physicians, <em>there is a debate over where the line should be drawn…. The failure to appreciate the distinction between a hybrid witness and retained expert can be a trap for the unwary.”</em>  <em>Sullivan v. Glock, Inc.,</em> 175 F.R.D. 497, 500 (D. Md. 1997)(Grimm, J.)(emphasis added).  Additionally, “in distinguishing between pure expert witnesses and hybrid witnesses, Judge Grimm specifically noted the availability of interrogatories to discover the opinions of hybrid witnesses.”  <em>Salvatore v. Benner, </em>2005 WL 8174320, at *2 (D. Md. June 17, 2005)(Gesner, J.).</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><u>THE <em>KISS</em> COURT OPTS FOR PRIVILEGE PROTECTION</u></strong></p>
<p>In <em>KISS</em>, Ardell’s attorneys had privileged communications with Ms. Cooper, a fact witness. She was a “long-tenured” executive employee and at the time of the communications with counsel, they were privileged.  Because Ms. Cooper was an Ardell employee, there was “no cloak of independence or lack of bias,” like a treating physician may have.  Further, she would be testifying about product specifications and sales based on her personal knowledge. <em>Id</em>. at *7.</p>
<p>The <em>KISS</em> court exhaustively explained the evolution and history of the expert disclosure rules, pointing out that the revisions “did not expressly address protections for non-reporting experts, leaving some ambiguity about whether the designation of a non-reporting expert waives otherwise applicable privileges.” <em>Id</em>. at *4.</p>
<p>The <em>KISS</em> court described the factual and legal issue:</p>
<blockquote><p>Through this motion, KISS seeks the communications and documents Ms. Cooper reviewed in preparation for her expert testimony in this case…. This information includes, by definition, communications between Ms. Cooper and Ardell&#8217;s counsel for the purpose of rendering legal advice in this matter.</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Id</em>. at *4.</p>
<p>Based in substantial part on the history of the amendments to the Rules, the court held that Ardell did not waive privilege by designating Ms. Cooper as a hybrid, or non-reporting, expert. <em>Id</em>. It concluded that the 2010 rules amendments did not change prior protections for such experts. It then looked at the principles applicable prior to 2010 and wrote: “KISS cites no cases, and this Court is unaware of any, prior to 2010 in which courts found that a company was found to waive privilege by designating its employee as a non-reporting witness.”  <em>Id</em>. at *7.  The court wrote:</p>
<blockquote><p>The Court therefore concludes that there is no automatic waiver of privilege where, as here, the witness at issue is an executive employee at the defendant company who was first designated as a fact witness, and then later designated as a non-reporting expert witness, expected to proffer testimony on the same subject matter.</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Id</em>. at *8.</p>
<p>The court rejected the argument “that Ardell is improperly using privilege as a ‘sword’ and a ‘shield.’” <em>Id</em>.  However, it provided important clarification:</p>
<blockquote><p>To be clear, Ardell cannot refuse to disclose the facts on which Ms. Cooper bases her expert opinions…. And given that Ms. Cooper&#8217;s testimony appears to be based on her personal knowledge of facts arising prior to this lawsuit, it is unlikely there is any attorney-client or work product protection that applies to the facts underlying her expert testimony. Ms. Cooper&#8217;s deposition testimony is consistent with these principles. She answered questions about the content of her expert opinions and the factual basis for them, and only invoked privilege when asked for the substance of communications with counsel.</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Id</em>. at *9.  The <em>KISS</em> court’s holding was that Ardell did not waive attorney-client or work product protection “by designating Ms. Coooper as a non-reporting expert under Rule 26(a)(2)(C).”  <em>Id</em>. at *9.  For that reason, it denied KISS’s motion to compel.</p>
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		<title>Court Finds Subject Matter Waiver in Expert Communications Under Fed.R.Evid. 502(a)</title>
		<link>https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/court-finds-subject-matter-waiver-in-expert-communications-under-fed-r-evid-501a/</link>
		<pubDate>Sat, 09 Aug 2025 09:29:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Berman]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Commercial Litigation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ESI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Experts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Objections]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/?p=4478</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Attorney-expert communications and documents were discoverable under the principle of subject matter waiver of work product and privileged information in Fresh Air for the Eastside, Inc. v. Waste Mgt. of N.Y., LLC, 2025 WL 2107878 (W.D.N.Y. Jul. 28, 2025). FACTS An advocacy group and 94 individuals brought this environmental action against a<span class="excerpt-hellip"> […]</span>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Attorney-expert communications and documents were discoverable under the principle of subject matter waiver of work product and privileged information in <em>Fresh Air for the Eastside, Inc. v. Waste Mgt. of N.Y., LLC</em>, 2025 WL 2107878 (W.D.N.Y. Jul. 28, 2025).</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><u>FACTS</u></strong></p>
<p>An advocacy group and 94 individuals brought this environmental action against a landfill operator and city. Before suit was filed in 2018, plaintiffs hired a consulting expert, Mary E. Holvey, to conduct air sampling. The court wrote that: “Plaintiffs’ counsel and Ms. Holvey exchanged written communications, mostly via electronic mail, during the time Ms. Holvey conducted testing and thereafter.”</p>
<p>Ms. Holvey prepared a report in 2025 and plaintiffs cited it in their amended Complaint.  They also quoted it in answers to interrogatories and attached it to a permit modification application filed with a government agency.</p>
<p>Plaintiffs produced the report first with redactions, but they later removed the redactions.  “Finally, during discovery in this matter, Plaintiffs produced an email sent to an attorney at the [government agency] that inadvertently included communications between Ms. Holvey and one of Plaintiffs’ counsel.”</p>
<p>During the same time period that Ms. Holvey performed testing for plaintiffs, she performed other testing.</p>
<p>Defendants asserted that Ms. Holvey was a fact witness and served a subpoena on her. Plaintiffs asserted privilege, provided a privilege log, and withheld 115 documents.</p>
<p>A sample of 29 email threads was provided to the court for in camera review.  The court wrote:</p>
<blockquote><p>During oral argument, counsel for [defendant] WMNY clarified that his client is only arguing that Plaintiffs waived work product protection because they cited to Ms. Holvey and quoted her in the Second Amended Complaint and interrogatory responses. WMNY is not claiming waiver occurred because Plaintiffs produced Ms. Holvey’s redacted and unredacted report.</p></blockquote>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><u>FED.R.EVID. 502(a)</u></strong></p>
<p>The court looked to the cherry-picking provisions of Fed.R.Evid. 502(a).  Under that rule, if a litigant intentionally discloses privileged information, it cannot do so selectively and unfairly.  It must disclose any information on the same subject matter that “in fairness” should “be considered together.”</p>
<p>The court quoted at length the November 28, 2007, Advisory Committee Notes to Fed.R.Evid. 502(a).  In part, they state that “a subject matter waiver (of either privilege or work product) is reserved for those unusual situations in which fairness requires a further disclosure of related, protected information, in order to prevent a selective and misleading presentation of evidence to the disadvantage of the adversary.”</p>
<p>The Note continues: “Thus, subject matter waiver is limited to situations in which a party intentionally puts protected information into the litigation in a selective, misleading and unfair manner.”</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><u>THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS</u></strong></p>
<p>Defendants contended that plaintiffs’ quotation and affirmative reliance on Ms. Holvey’s testing was an effort to use privilege as both “a shield and a sword….”  They asserted “that Plaintiffs have opened the door to producing Ms. Holvey’s opinions about the test results because Plaintiffs included Ms. Holvey’s opinion in the operative complaint.”<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> They claimed the information would show where and when testing was conducted.</p>
<p>Plaintiffs disagreed, raising several arguments.  They asserted that the quoted portions were merely factual and sampling data that anyone with equipment could have obtained. They maintained that all the information about when and how testing was done was contained in the report.  They asserted that communications with an expert are privileged and work product and that there was no effort to unfairly gain an advantage.</p>
<blockquote><p>At oral argument, Plaintiffs asserted that if there is subject matter waiver it should not apply to communications between Plaintiffs’ counsel and Ms. Holvey regarding strategy because there are a series of emails contained on the privilege log that involve strategy, and they constitute attorney work product.</p></blockquote>
<p>Finally, they argued that fairness considerations should limit the scope of any waiver.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><u>THE COURT’S ANALYSIS &amp; HOLDING</u></strong></p>
<p>The <em>Fresh Air</em> court found it undisputed that the waiver was intentional.  That met the criteria of Fed.R.Evid. 502(a)(1).</p>
<p>Further the disclosed and undisclosed information related to the same subject matter, because it all related to Ms. Holvey’s January 2018 sampling, testing, and analysis.  That disposed of Fed.R.Evid. 502(a)(2).</p>
<p>The court wrote: “Thus, based upon Plaintiffs’ express waiver, they must produce all communications and documents related to Ms. Holvey’s January 2018 sampling and testing and subsequent analysis of the same.”</p>
<p>That left subsection (3), which is whether “they ought in fairness to be considered together.”  In the court’s words: “The question remains, however, as to whether Plaintiffs may limit their waiver to their chosen scope—any waiver should exclude communications or documents that involve attorney work product and discussions of strategy—or whether fairness requires disclosure of the related materials.”</p>
<p>The court stated:</p>
<blockquote><p>Having conducted an <em>in camera</em> review of several of the disputed documents, I find that considerations of fairness require that [defendant] WMNY have access to them so that it is able to have a contextual understanding of the information disclosed by Plaintiffs in the Second Amended Complaint and interrogatory responses. Without access to the information WMNY would be at a disadvantage in defending themselves in this litigation due to Plaintiffs’ actions, which would be unfair.</p></blockquote>
<p>Based on its <em>in camera</em> review, the court explained:</p>
<blockquote><p>Plaintiffs contend that the information contained in the Second Amended Complaint is factual and that anyone with the requisite equipment could have obtained the same information. However, this is not true. It is clear from my <em>in camera</em> review and a review of the subject matter column in Plaintiffs’ privilege log that the timing of the testing was of paramount importance. The pungency of the odors allegedly emanating from the Landfill depended on a variety of factors including time of day and the direction of the wind. WMNY could not have known what dates and times Ms. Holvey was going to conduct her sampling. WMNY cannot recreate that sampling now. What it can do is try to understand the data that Plaintiffs have affirmatively used as proof of their case against WMNY.</p></blockquote>
<p>The court also pointed to an email that was inadvertently produced which showed that the expert discussed equipment that tested for a <em>half</em> hour while her report referred to a <em>one</em>-hour standard.</p>
<p>The court wrote: “While I cannot determine the importance of this information, from what I have been provided and knowing the facts of this case as they stand now, this appears to be very relevant information that should, in fairness, be disclosed.”</p>
<p>In addition to setting parameters for the expert’s deposition, the court held: “Based on the forgoing, I direct Plaintiffs to review their entire privilege log related to Ms. Holvey and to produce all communications and documents relating to when, where, and how she conducted the January 2018 sampling and testing and related analysis of the same. <em>This includes communications between Plaintiffs’ counsel and Ms. Holvey if they relate to the same subject matter.”</em> [Emphasis added].</p>
<p>The court also discussed what I will call gaming the system: “As an example of the [plaintiffs’] selective production of information, during oral argument [defendant] WMNY asserted that a comparison of the redacted and unredacted versions of Ms. Holvey’s report reveal that <em>Plaintiffs redacted information that was not helpful to them.</em>”  [Emphasis added].  Perhaps that fact plus the half hour v. one hour email that was inadvertently produced added weight to the fairness analysis.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><u>Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(C)</u></strong></p>
<p>The <em>Fresh Air</em> court did not cite to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(C).  It states:</p>
<blockquote><p><em>Trial-Preparation Protection for Communications Between a Party&#8217;s Attorney and Expert Witnesses</em>. Rules 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) protect communications between the party&#8217;s attorney and any witness required to provide a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), regardless of the form of the communications, except to the extent that the communications: (i) relate to compensation for the expert&#8217;s study or testimony; (ii) identify facts or data that the party&#8217;s attorney provided and that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed; or (iii) identify assumptions that the party&#8217;s attorney provided and that the expert relied on in forming the opinions to be expressed.</p></blockquote>
<p>Rule 26(a)(2)(B) defines what is required in an expert’s report.  Rule 26(B)(A) and (B) states:</p>
<blockquote><p>(A) Documents and Tangible Things. Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative (including the other party&#8217;s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent). But, subject to Rule 26(b)(4), those materials may be discovered if:</p>
<p>(i) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1); and</p>
<p>(ii) the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.</p>
<p>(B) Protection Against Disclosure. If the court orders discovery of those materials, it must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party&#8217;s attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.</p></blockquote>
<p>It appears to me that, based on the court’s analysis, the defendants in <em>Fresh Air</em> could show substantial need for 2018 testing that was disclosed in a 2025 report. However, any discovery would be limited to protect against disclosure of attorney mental impressions.</p>
<p>This blog was initially posted on  <a href="https://edrm.net/author/michaeldberman/">Electronic Discovery Reference Model</a>.</p>
<p>____</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> In my view, if that argument sufficed, it would undercut Rule 502(a).  It, alone, did not suffice.</p>
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		<title>Initial Disclosures Cannot Await Expert Opinions</title>
		<link>https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/initial-disclosures-cannot-await-expert-opinions/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2025 00:23:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Berman]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[ESI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Experts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News Stories]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Discoverability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Objections]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/?p=4420</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Lively v. Wayfarer Studios LLC, 2025 WL 1999355 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 17, 2025), involves a lot of money.  It has also generated a cottage industry of discovery decisions. Westlaw lists 13 decisions (not all on discovery) since February 2025.  For blogs on some of them, please see “It Ends With Us” (Apr. 8,<span class="excerpt-hellip"> […]</span>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Lively v. Wayfarer Studios LLC,</em> 2025 WL 1999355 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 17, 2025), involves a lot of money.  It has also generated a cottage industry of discovery decisions.</p>
<p>Westlaw lists 13 decisions (not all on discovery) since February 2025.  For blogs on some of them, please see <a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/it-ends-with-us/">“It Ends With Us”</a> (Apr. 8, 2025); <a href="https://www.ediscoveryllc.com/crime-fraud-exception-to-privilege-not-shown/">Crime-Fraud Exception to Privilege Not Shown</a> (Jun. 8, 2025).</p>
<p>Contextually, the litigation has been described in popular media. L. Italiano, <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/other/blake-lively-must-turn-over-detailed-business-income-records-to-justin-baldoni/ar-AA1INZQw?ocid=BingNewsSerp">Blake Lively must turn over detailed business income records to Justin Baldoni</a> (Jul. 14, 2025);  I. Vasquez, <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/entertainment/entertainment-celebrity/blake-lively-s-deposition-pushed-back-by-2-weeks-after-judge-s-latest-ruling-in-justin-baldoni-case/ar-AA1IKVdu?ocid=BingNewsSerp">Blake Lively’s Deposition Pushed Back by 2 Weeks After Judge’s Latest Ruling in Justin Baldoni Case</a> (Jul. 14, 2025); E. Saunders, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20n6jl83v8o">Blake Lively and Taylor Swift messages can be included in Justin Baldoni legal case, judge rules</a> (Jun. 19, 2025); B. Lang, <a href="https://variety.com/2025/film/news/judge-issues-mixed-ruling-blake-lively-subpoena-justin-baldoni-phone-records-1236323911/">Ruling in Blake Lively’s Subpoena for Justin Baldoni Phone Records</a> (Feb. 28, 2025); L. Neumeister, <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/movies/celebrity/blake-livelys-lawyers-seek-tight-hold-over-release-of-information-in-lawsuit-against-justin-baldoni/ar-AA1Apcm7?ocid=BingNewsSerp">Blake Lively’s lawyers seek tight hold over release of information in lawsuit against Justin Baldoni</a> (Associated Press, undated); R. Aizin, <a href="https://people.com/blake-lively-justin-baldoni-drama-explained-key-players-8768985">Blake Lively and Justin Baldoni Lawsuits, Explained: Allegations, Key Players &amp; More</a> (Feb. 19, 2025).</p>
<p>In the most recent decision, Wayfarer Studios LLC, Justin Baldoni, Jamey Heath, Steve Sarowitz, It Ends With Us Movie LLC, Melissa Nathan, The Agency Group PR LLC, and Jennifer Abel (collectively, the “Wayfarer Parties”) moved to compel Blake Lively (“Ms. Lively”) to provide specific information about her claimed damages.  <em>Id</em>. at *1.</p>
<p>In her initial Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures, Ms. Lively stated in part: “At a later date, Ms. Lively will provide an estimate of damages in an amount to be determined by an expert in accordance with the scheduling order in this case.”</p>
<p>In her answers to interrogatories, “Lively objected on a number of grounds including that the interrogatory prematurely sought information that was properly the subject of expert testimony and was an improper contention interrogatory….”  <em>Id</em>.</p>
<p>In her written response to the request for production of documents, Ms. Lively objected and wrote: “Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, and only after the entry of a mutually agreed upon ESI protocol, Ms. Lively will conduct a reasonable search for and produce non-privileged documents responsive to this Request, to the extent any exist.”  <em>Id</em>.</p>
<p>As an aside from the <em>Lively</em> opinion:</p>
<ul>
<li>“To the extent” responses such as this have been condemned. “Such objections are considered mere hypothetical or contingent possibilities, where the objecting party makes no meaningful effort to show the application of any such theoretical objection to any request for discovery. Thus, this Court has deemed such ostensible objections waived or [has] declined to consider them as objections.” <em>Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co.,</em> 253 F.R.D. 354, 359 (D. Md. 2008)(citation omitted); and,</li>
<li>Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b)(2)(C) mandates that: “An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.”</li>
</ul>
<p>The <em>Lively</em> court wrote that Rule 26(a)(1) requires a computation of each category of damages and the disclosing party must make available the documents on which the computation is based.  <em>Id</em>. at *2.  The court wrote:</p>
<blockquote><p>Although Lively&#8217;s damages may depend largely on expert discovery, this does not relieve her of the obligation to comply with Rule 26. [C]ourts in this district routinely find that a party may not refuse to respond to interrogatories seeking damages calculations on the ground that expert analysis will refine the damages calculation…. There is no exception to Rule 26(a)(1) in cases in which damages will be proved by experts: the disclosing party still has the responsibility to provide each category of required disclosures based on the information it has at the time, and to supplement those disclosures as more information is gained.</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Id</em>. (cleaned up; citations and quotations omitted).  The <em>Lively</em> court added:</p>
<blockquote><p>The plaintiff may not be able to clarify the precise method of calculating damages prior to expert discovery, and the amount initially claimed may turn out to be inaccurate…. But Lively must have some basis for stating that she has suffered economic damages.… Lively is obligated to comply with Rule 26 as best she is able, including by providing a calculation of damages and supporting documents. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii).</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Id</em>. (same). The court also decided an issue on the scope of financial information that was discoverable. <em>Id</em>. at *3-4.</p>
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