What follows is a somewhat lengthy Opinion, which the Court deemed prudent to write in order to reaffirm the duties incumbent on parties and their attorneys during the discovery process, especially in the context of electronic discovery.

In Yas Caribe, eight requests for production and four interrogatories were in dispute.  The issue that this blog post focuses on is unsupervised self-collection by Defendants.  “[T]he EEOC highlights that several of its document requests entailed the collection of ESI, but maintains that defendants’ collection efforts were unsupervised by counsel and demonstrably incomplete.”

WERE DEFENDANTS’ SELF-COLLECTION EFFORTS SUFFICIENT?

The Parties’ Contentions

EEOC challenged the sufficiency of Defendants’ search for documents.  Abdullah Yassin admitted that he failed to preserve ESI and failed to review his own the electronic devices, including email and texts, or those of Khalid Yassin, the alleged harasser.  Further, he had not directed any of his employees to do so.  And, the EEOC claimed “that deposition testimony revealed that relevant personnel files and employment-related documents may be stored in the offices of a non-party entity owned and operated by Abdullah Yassin, called Yassin Unlimited Drug Corp. d/b/a Droguería San Juan,” and none of this stored information had been disclosed. Id. at *5.

The EEOC sought two types of relief. First, it asked that “Defendants be required to amend all of their Responses to EEOC’s [document requests] to clearly state: (1) whether responsive documents exist; (2) what steps were taken to locate responsive documents; (3) whether any documents are being withheld.”  Second, it asked for forensic inspection of the cell phones of Abdullah Yassin and Khalid Yassin, and a re-opening of discovery.

Defendants responded that Abdullah Yassin testified that he had not deleted anything and had no responsive documents.  They asserted that the messages EEOC relied on to show insufficient production had eventually been produced.  Further “defendants produced a ‘Messages Search Certification’ subscribed by Abdullah Yassin to the effect that he personally supervised Khalid Yassin’s search of his cellphone for responsive messages exchanged with Ms. Wilkerson, and further produced three responsive pages.”  Finally, in what I suggest is an incorrect position:

[D]efendants’ attorney argued in response to the motion to compel that directly supervising any search for responsive documents in his client’s files would make him a “potential witness” and would be “ethically inappropriate.”

The EEOC challenged the sufficiency of the “Messages Search Certification” and it had obtained the messages independently from Ms. Wilkerson, not from Defendants. Id. at *10-11.

Discovery on Discovery

There was a threshold issue.  The court described the EEOC’s position as a request for “discovery on discovery.”  This is sometimes called “satellite discovery” or “culpability discovery.”  The court enunciated several principles governing that process.

“Discovery on discovery has been described broadly as ‘any discovery seeking information regarding a party’s preservation, collection, and retention efforts.’ …  Although some trial courts have considered these types of discovery requests to be outside the scope of Rule 26(b)(1), others have not.” Id. at *6 (citations omitted).  The court continued:

In any case, the general structure of the discovery process drawn into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strongly implies that such discovery should be the exception, not the rule. “The federal discovery system in some ways resembles an ‘honor system,’ ” where the party seeking discovery “must generally ‘rely on the representations of the producing party or its representative that it is producing all responsive, relevant, and non-privileged discovery….’  Casting doubt on a responding party’s efforts to provide full and complete discovery responses is by no means taboo, but anyone attempting to obtain a remedy on that ground must overcome the default assumption of good-faith compliance. This is even more so when the attempted second-order discovery targets a person’s electronic systems or devices….”

Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted).  Here, however, the threshold was crossed.  For more information about “discovery on discovery,” please see the citations at the end of this post.

Defendants’ Efforts Were Insufficient

The court wrote: “Defendants’ initially deficient response to the document request and Abdullah Yassin’s deposition testimony as to the inadequacy of his search raise substantial doubts as to defendants’ compliance with their discovery obligations.”

While a single missing text message does not normally justify discovery on discovery, id. at *11, here there was also testimony that Abdullah Yassin had failed to preserve and collect documents related to the alleged harassment, had failed to search his own email and text messages, had failed to search the electronic devices of relevant custodians, including the alleged harasser, and had not instructed anyone else to do so.  Id. at *11.  Further, while the EEOC had suggested search terms that the court viewed as reasonable, “Defendants did not describe what, if any, search terms they used to find responsive documents….” Id.

Self-Collection Should Be Supervised by Counsel

With limited exception, the requirement that an attorney supervise a client’s collection is well established:

• Unsupervised Self-Collection Predictably Led to Problems (Jan. 2, 2021);
• Self-Identification and Self-Preservation: A Fool for a Client? (May 26, 2011);
• Losey, “Another ‘Fox Guarding the Hen House’ Case Shows the Dangers of Self-Collection” (Mar. 20, 2011).

There is contrary authority, which may be limited to a situation where there is no indication that relevant information has gone missing. Maker’s Mark: A Different View of Self Collection (Aug. 3, 2021).

Further, there are defensible ways to conduct self-collection.  “Self-Collection” May Be Reasonable Using Ralph Losey’s Dual-Protection System (Jan. 19, 2024). However, that method was not used in Yas Caribe.

Defendants’ Attorney’s Argument That Supervising a Search Would be Improper

Defendants’ attorney in Yas Caribe wrote:

It is my understanding that being with a witness while s/he searches for the requested records, explaining to the witness what is requested, verifying that the information is pertinent to the request, and asking the witness to produce everything he has, complies with a “reasonable inquiry” requirement. Otherwise, a counsel’s active search for those records will make a counsel a potential witness if a client misses a text message or for any other reason. I believe that my discussing every question or discovery request with my witnesses, while they are answering, producing documents, or giving instructions to their secretaries or assistants to look for and produce exactly what was asked for, is involvement that complies with Rule 26(g)…. And how would I remember what I saw? How would I know if they are showing me everything, or if messages were deleted, or if they have changed telephones? … Still, I believe it is inappropriate for me to get involved in the witnesses’ telephones, computers, etc., beyond what I already have.

As noted above, he argued that supervising his client’s collection would make him a “potential witness” and that it would be “ethically inappropriate.”  Id. at *6.  In my opinion—and more importantly, the court’s opinion—he was incorrect.

Supervising a Client’s Search Does Not Make an Attorney a Witness

In response to the argument that supervision would make the attorney a witness, the court wrote: “The Court first notes that neither supervising nor assisting a clients’ document search converts an attorney into a witness in a case. In fact, such supervision may be required in appropriate circumstances….  Indeed, the existence, relevance, and discoverability of ESI is one such circumstance that counsels in favor of attorneys exercising diligent supervision over their clients’ efforts to comply with discovery requests….”

Quoting a prior decision,[1] it added: “Attorneys have a duty to oversee their clients’ collection of information and documents, especially when ESI is involved, during the discovery process. Although clients can certainly be tasked with searching for, collecting, and producing discovery, it must be accomplished under the advice and supervision of counsel, or at least with counsel possessing sufficient knowledge of the process utilized by the client. Parties and clients, who are often lay persons, do not normally have the knowledge and expertise to understand their discovery obligations, to conduct appropriate searches, to collect responsive discovery, and then to fully produce it, especially when dealing with ESI, without counsel’s guiding hand.”

Of course, where there is a prima facie showing of spoliation, an attorney may be compelled to disclose how the litigation hold was implemented and how the search was conducted. The Hon. Paul W. Grimm, M. Berman, et al., “Discovery About Discovery Does the Attorney-Client Privilege Protect All Attorney-Client Communications Relating to the Preservation of Potentially Relevant Information?,” 37 U.Balt.L.Rev. 413 (2008).

Failure to Supervise May Run Afoul of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g)

The Yas Caribe court also looked to Fed.R.Civ.P.26(g), the so-called “stop and think” rule:

As to Attorney Mihailovich’s compliance with Rule 26(g)(1)’s reasonable inquiry requirement, his position warrants discussion. As mentioned above, Rule 26(g)(1) imposes on the signer of a discovery request, response, or objection a duty to perform a “reasonable inquiry.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)….  In the case of a response to a document request, this duty falls squarely on the attorney, whereas interrogatory responses must be signed by both the attorney and the person who answers them. Fed. R Civ. P. 26(g)(1), 33(b)(5). [emphasis added].

The Yas Caribe court added: “An attorney’s failure to adequately guide and supervise a client’s search for responsive ESI may run afoul of Rule 26(g).”  Quoting a prior decision, it wrote: “[A]n attorney cannot abandon his professional and ethical duties imposed by the applicable rules and case law and permit an interested party or person to ‘self-collect’ discovery without any attorney advice, supervision, or knowledge of the process utilized.”

Application of Principles to Facts Presented

The court had little trouble rejecting the attorney’s argument on the facts presented:

In this case, such supervision was objectively warranted. Abdullah Yassin testified that he did not perform an adequate search for responsive documents, even when his attorney represented that he was “with a witness while s/he searches for the requested records, explaining to the witness what is requested, verifying that the information is pertinent to the request, and asking the witness to produce everything he has ….”

While, in making an inquiry, the court wrote that an attorney may rely on assertions of the client, that is permissible only “‘as long as that reliance is appropriate under the circumstances.’ 1983 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26(g).”  The court added:

A discovery request for ESI in a party’s cellphones and computer systems is a circumstance that triggers an attorney’s need to, at a minimum, understand how a client stores and uses ESI and how and where the client is searching for responsive documents.

As officers of the court, attorneys have a duty to make legally sound arguments and good-faith factual representations to the court. If an attorney does not have sufficient information to know whether his client is being accurate or not in a discovery response, particularly one involving ESI, this duty requires that he or she inquire deeper. “[T]he ethical rules now require attorneys to be competent with technologies such as ESI.” City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt ARD Inc., 326 F.R.D. 489, 492 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (citing Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.1, comment 8 (A.B.A.)).[2] Attorney Mihailovich should have assumed a more active role in guiding defendants’ search beyond what he described in the opposition to the motion to compel. At the very least, he should have inquired into how and where the searches were being made so that he could give a reasonably informed certification of the thoroughness of what sources were and were not searched. Ideally, he would have discussed and run the keyword searches proposed by the EEOC or a mutually agreed upon version of them. Judging from the subsequent interactions of the parties that are on record, defendants’ position has been to engage in piecemeal corrections to their deficient responses and only when specific deficiencies are revealed by the EEOC’s efforts. This is not the way. [emphasis added].

The court provided “an admittedly extreme example: when attorneys receive documents that have been redacted by their clients and do not know what has been redacted, they cannot responsibly certify that the factual basis for a disclosure is compliant with Rule 26(g)(1).”

The court added that perfection is not the standard of review.  Instead, review is under an objective standard similar to Rule 11.

CONCLUSION

Applying principles of proportionality, the court considered privacy interests related to a forensic copy of the cell phones, and concluded that the burden would outweigh the benefits:

While there is certainly a well-founded suspicion that an adequate search was not carried out, and that defendants thus failed to comply with their discovery obligations, that does not necessarily mean that defendants are withholding responsive documents. After all, defendants represented that they had no messages between Abdullah and Khalid Yassin about Ms. Wilkerson or the alleged sexual harassment incident…, and the messages subsequently produced by defendants matched those in possession of the EEOC. In other words, there is no indication that, as of today, defendants have willfully withheld responsive documents or incurred in spoliation—only that they have not adequately searched for documents that may exist relating to the alleged sexual harassment incident at the center of the EEOC’s complaint.

As such, the request for a forensic inspection was taken “off the table for now” and the EEOC’s alternative request to compel Defendants to run supervised searches was granted.  For example, “defendants are ORDERED to perform an attorney-supervised search of both Abdullah Yassin and Khalid Yassin’s cellphones for responsive communications (email, text messages, call logs, etc.) across all relevant e-mail and messaging platforms/applications for [specified] periods….” As to one search, the response must include “the persons assisting in said searches….”

While the Yas Caribe court addressed several other issues, it stands for the principle that unsupervised self-collection is insufficient, at least where there is a factual predicate showing that the searches were insufficient.

For more information on “discovery on discovery,” please visit:

• The Case of the Missing Lab Notebooks (Aug. 28, 2026);
• “The Court is keenly interested in whether Defendants’ counsel issued a litigation hold.” – E-Discovery LLC (Feb. 19, 2026);
• “Discovery on Discovery” Ordered After Amazon’s Flawed Implementation of Litigation Hold (Oct. 15, 2025);
• Limited “Discovery on Discovery” Permitted; Judicial Definitions of “Hit Report” and “Families” Held Unnecessary (Oct. 13, 2025);
• “Discovery on Discovery” Permitted (Sep. 4, 2025);
• Guidelines for “Discovery on Discovery” (Aug. 5, 2025);
• Request for “Discovery on Discovery” Was Overbroad; Uber Deponent Was Ordered to Bring Uber Laptop to Deposition; Discovery About Uber Information Governance Training Resolved (Jul. 4, 2025);
• Google Avoids Discovery on Discovery Based on Insufficient Foundation for Request (De. 18, 2024);
• The Hon. Paul W. Grimm, M. Berman, et al., “Discovery About Discovery Does the Attorney-Client Privilege Protect All Attorney-Client Communications Relating to the Preservation of Potentially Relevant Information?,” 37 U.Balt.L.Rev. 413 (2008).

This blog was initially posted on  Electronic Discovery Reference Model and  JD Supra.

____

[1] For a discussion of the prior decision, please see Unsupervised Self-Collection Predictably Led to Problems (Jan. 2021).

[2] For an update on the ethical duty of “technological competence,” please see 40th State Adopts a Duty of Technological Competence – Is It a Good Idea? (Mar. 31, 2022); Proposed Changes to the MD Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct Re: AI (Jul. 21, 2026).

Cimplify discussed a number of cases and wrote:

As noted by Michael Berman in his blog for his site E-Discovery LLC, “Protective orders addressing the use of A.I. to review materials produced to an opponent in discovery are becoming routine.”

Cimplify concludes: “Given the risks associated with public AI platforms, protective orders that limit the ability of opposing parties to upload sensitive and confidential produced documents into a public AI tool are essential today. But the considerations associated with AI are changing rapidly. It’s important to keep that in mind when drafting your own protective order to protect your organization’s sensitive and confidential data.”

Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence Tools and Large Language Models. Protected Material, and all information derived therefrom, shall not be inputted, uploaded, or submitted to any open, publicly accessible or freely available consumer-grade Large Language Model (“LLM”) or Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) tool (collectively, “AI Tools”). Protected Material may only be inputted, uploaded, or submitted to an AI Tool that is enterprise-grade and maintains confidential information using industry standard data security safeguards (“Confidential AI Tool”) after the Receiving Party first ensures that its contract with the AI Provider of the Confidential AI Tool:

(1) Prohibits the AI Provider from storing or using inputs to train, refine, or improve its model;

(2) Prohibits the AI Provider from disclosing inputs, metadata, and any information generated by the Confidential AI Tool to any third party, including integrated third party tools, except where such disclosure is essential to facilitating delivery of the service, in which case that third party shall be bound by obligations no less protective than those required by this Order; and

(3) Permits the Receiving Party to remove or delete the Protected Material, and any information generated by the Confidential AI Tool upon request.

A Receiving Party intending to use a Confidential AI Tool that it contends meets these requirements must retain written documentation of these contractual protections. In addition, the Protected Material, and any information generated by the Confidential AI Tool, including residual information stored in the Confidential AI Tool as a result of the submission of the Protected Material, must be deleted from the Confidential AI Tool at the close of the litigation, and in accordance with the Final Disposition section below. Any inputs, outputs, models, or other artifacts (e.g., embeddings, indexes, or logs) used in or created by a Confidential AI Tool that are derived from or contain Protected Material shall be subject to Section 7.1 and shall not be used for any purpose other than prosecuting or defending this litigation.

For the avoidance of doubt, submitting Protected Material, or excerpts therefrom, to any AI Tool that does not meet the requirements of this section is considered unauthorized disclosure to a third party under Section 10 of this Order. Nothing in this provision shall alter the obligations set forth in Section 1 (“Purposes and Limitations”) and Section 12.9 (“Data Security”) of this Order.

For more information on A.I. Protective Orders, please visit:

• No Violation of A.I. Protective Order (Sep. 11, 2026);
• Another Dispute over A.I. Protective Order (Sep. 6, 2026);
• A.I. Protective Orders Are Becoming Routine (Aug. 27 ,2026);
•  Another A.I. Protective Order – Part 10 (Aug. 21, 2026);
• Restrictions on Use of Artificial Intelligence Tools to Process Disclosure Materials (Jul. 27, 2026);
• Another A.I. Protective Order (Jul. 9, 2026);
•  A.I. Protective Order—Again (Jun. 18, 2026);
• Unicorn Rejects A.I. Protective/Confidentiality Order – Order Entered in Criminal Case (Jun. 4, 2026);
• Are Protective Orders Limiting Upload to AI of Documents Produced by an Opponent in Discovery Becoming the Standard of Care?  (May 26, 2026), discussing Rudasill v. Swiss Re American Holding Corporation, 2026 WL 1329451 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2026);
• Another Confidentiality Order Limiting Use of AI to Analyze Protected Materials (Apr. 27, 2026), discussing In re: ByHeart, Inc., Infant Formula Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation,2026 WL 1103170 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2026);
• A.I. Protective Orders Are Becoming Routine (Apr. 20, 2026), discussing Stansfield v. International Business Machines Corporation, 2026 WL 1031230, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 16, 2026);
• “Deepfake Executives, Created Via Depositions, Pose Grave Threat”: Protective Order Suggested (Apr. 5, 2026);
• Morgan v. V2X, Inc.,2026 WL 864223 (D. Col. Mar. 30, 2026), as also discussed in Important A.I. Work Product and Protective Order Decision (Mar. 31, 2026);
• Order Prohibiting Upload of Confidential Discovery Documents to Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) (Nov. 3, 2025), based on Warner v. Gilbarco, Inc., 2025 WL 3047881 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2025);
• Protective Order Limited Uploading Discovery Responses to Open A.I.(Mar. 26, 2026), discussing Jeffries v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc.,2026 WL 820218 (D. Kans. Mar. 25, 2026).

UPDATE: “Use of Large Language Model or Generative AI. A Party must not load, upload, input, import, submit, or otherwise transfer Confidential Information, Highly Confidential Information, or Restricted Highly Confidential Information to a publicly accessible Large Language Model (“LLM”) or generative artificial intelligence (“GenAI”) platform. Before using Confidential Information, Highly Confidential Information, or Restricted Highly Confidential Information in any non-publicly accessible LLM or GenAI platform, a Party must ensure that the LLM or GenAI platform cannot and will not utilize Confidential Information, Highly Confidential Information, or Restricted Highly Confidential Information to train public models or otherwise disclose Confidential Information, Highly Confidential Information, or Restricted Highly Confidential Information to other users of the LLM or GenAI platform not authorized to receive such materials.”  U.S.A. v. The New York and Presbyterian Hosp., 2026 WL 2547094, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2026)(Amended Protective Order).

UPDATE: U.S.A. v. Jones, 2026 WL 2607719, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 3, 2026).

UPDATE: Doe v. Google LLC, 2026 WL 2584519 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 1, 2026):

Any person in possession of Protected Material will maintain appropriate administrative, technical, and organizational safeguards (“Safeguards”) that protect the security and privacy of Protected Material, including restrictions regarding the disclosure or use of Protected Material in any large language models or any artificial intelligence services. The Safeguards will meet relevant industry standards and limit the collection, storage, disclosure, use of, or access to Protected Material solely to personnel and purposes authorized by this Order. As part of these Safeguards, each person will use a secure transfer method for all transfers or communication of Protected Material, and take reasonable measures to password protect and encrypt Protected Material. Each person will ensure that anyone acting on that person’s behalf is subject to the Safeguards or otherwise provides equivalent or greater protections for the security and privacy of Protected Material. [emphasis added].

“Such restrictions shall, at a minimum, prohibit the disclosure or use of Protected Material in any large language models or artificial intelligence services that are accessible to the public or will capture entered data in order to train what is accessible by the public.”

In Elgin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2026 WL 2664674, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 9, 2026), Wells Fargo asserted that Plaintiff violated such a protective order.  “Specifically, Wells Fargo contends that Plaintiff violated the stipulated protective order by uploading Wells Fargo’s discovery requests into an AI tool and then responding to those rewritten requests rather than the requests propounded.”  Id.  Two weeks later, Plaintiff served corrected responses.

The court wrote:

In opposition, Plaintiff clarifies that the stipulated protective order was not violated, because the material uploaded into the closed AI tool was not confidential and AI was not used to respond to the rewritten requests. Moreover, Plaintiff explains that Wells Fargo did not produce any documents marked “Confidential” until one week after the errant responses were served.…. Plaintiff’s points are well taken. Since Plaintiff provided corrected responses to all of the discovery devices within two weeks of the errant responses, and Plaintiff did not violate the stipulated protective order, the Court declines to find that Plaintiff waived all objections to the respective discovery devices or find that the requests for admission must be admitted.

Id. at *1 (emphasis added).

The court added: “Furthermore, the parties are advised that the Court has limited, judicial resources and does not appreciate unnecessary motion practice. Plaintiff served the corrected responses to all three discovery devices prior to the parties’ completion of the meet and confer process, which should have resolved this dispute informally. This is particularly true given the extreme relief sought by Wells Fargo. The Court trusts that, going forward, the parties will be more judicious in deciding which disputes require court intervention.”

For more information on AI Protective Orders, please visit:

• Another Dispute over A.I. Protective Order (Sep. 6, 2026);
• A.I. Protective Orders Are Becoming Routine (Aug. 27 ,2026);
•  Another A.I. Protective Order – Part 10 (Aug. 21, 2026);
• Restrictions on Use of Artificial Intelligence Tools to Process Disclosure Materials (Jul. 27, 2026);
• Another A.I. Protective Order (Jul. 9, 2026);
•  A.I. Protective Order—Again (Jun. 18, 2026);
• Unicorn Rejects A.I. Protective/Confidentiality Order – Order Entered in Criminal Case (Jun. 4, 2026);
• Are Protective Orders Limiting Upload to AI of Documents Produced by an Opponent in Discovery Becoming the Standard of Care?  (May 26, 2026), discussing Rudasill v. Swiss Re American Holding Corporation, 2026 WL 1329451 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2026);
• Another Confidentiality Order Limiting Use of AI to Analyze Protected Materials (Apr. 27, 2026), discussing In re: ByHeart, Inc., Infant Formula Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation,2026 WL 1103170 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2026);
• A.I. Protective Orders Are Becoming Routine (Apr. 20, 2026), discussing Stansfield v. International Business Machines Corporation, 2026 WL 1031230, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 16, 2026);
• “Deepfake Executives, Created Via Depositions, Pose Grave Threat”: Protective Order Suggested (Apr. 5, 2026);
• Morgan v. V2X, Inc.,2026 WL 864223 (D. Col. Mar. 30, 2026), as also discussed in Important A.I. Work Product and Protective Order Decision (Mar. 31, 2026);
• Order Prohibiting Upload of Confidential Discovery Documents to Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) (Nov. 3, 2025), based on Warner v. Gilbarco, Inc., 2025 WL 3047881 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2025);
• Protective Order Limited Uploading Discovery Responses to Open A.I.(Mar. 26, 2026), discussing Jeffries v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc.,2026 WL 820218 (D. Kans. Mar. 25, 2026).

“Plaintiff served two Rule 30(b)(6) notices of deposition on Nye County. ECF No. 58 Exhibits A and B. Both notices (1) name Mark Gancarz as the person to testify on the County’s behalf, (2) request the production of documents, and (3) designate the recording method by stenographic means and/or video recording.”

Plaintiff moves to use the Mobvoi TicNote, an artificial-intelligence voice recorder, to maintain a secondary audio record of the depositions…. Rule 30(b)(3)(B) permits any party, with prior notice to the deponent and the other parties, to designate an additional method of recording the testimony. Plaintiff’s motion supplies the notice Rule 30(b)(3)(B) requires, so no procedural defect remains for this Court to resolve.

Because the depositions noticed in Exhibits A and B will not proceed on the current notices, the motion is moot. Should Plaintiff re-notice his 30(b)(6) deposition and designate this methos of recording, Defendants may file the appropriate motion to address any concerns they might have.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(3) states:

(3) Method of Recording.

(A) Method Stated in the Notice. The party who notices the deposition must state in the notice the method for recording the testimony. Unless the court orders otherwise, testimony may be recorded by audio, audiovisual, or stenographic means. The noticing party bears the recording costs. Any party may arrange to transcribe a deposition.

(B) Additional Method. With prior notice to the deponent and other parties, any party may designate another method for recording the testimony in addition to that specified in the original notice. That party bears the expense of the additional record or transcript unless the court orders otherwise.

It is fairly easy to envision the same issue arising in, for example, a Rule 26(f) Conference of the Parties.

It will be interesting to see who bears the burden of persuasion to show that the specific AI tool is reliable.  Has it been tested?  Does it have a known error rate, for example? See Otter.ai “Transcript” Was Excluded From Consideration (Apr. 25, 2026); Felder: Part 1 of 4:  Court-Ordered Transcription of “Meet and Confer” Session (Aug. 13, 2024); Sometimes Discovery Disputes Do Not Bring Out the Best in Us – Part II (Jun. 20, 2024)(“courts have ordered that the parties record – by video or court reporter – their Local Rule 37.2 meet-and-confer sessions for the court’s review”).

“Three-strata validation” was requested and rejected in In re Class Action Settlement Administration Litigation, 2026 WL 2444936 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2026). The parties in that case had narrowed their disputes and their “only remaining disagreement concerns how a party producing documents in discovery must validate that its productions are substantially complete.”

Plaintiffs asked for “three-strata validation.”  Defendants objected to the second and third strata.

The court explained the “three-strata” approach as:  “validation of documents coded as non-responsive, validation of documents coded as responsive, and validation of documents excluded from the universe of ESI material subject to discovery review.”

THE PARTIES AGREED TO NULL SET TESTING

The parties agreed that there is an obligation  “to confirm that responsive documents are not erroneously coded as non-responsive and omitted from their productions.” This involves review of a “statistically valid random sample” of documents coded as non-responsive. Id. at *1.

This standard practice is commonly called “elusion testing,” review of the “discard pile,” or, review of  the “null set.”  See Deal Genius, LLC v. O2COOL, LLC, 682 F. Supp. 3d 727, 734–35 (N.D. Ill. 2023) (“explaining that elusion testing, where the producing party reviews a random sample from the ‘null set’ of documents that did not hit on search terms and documents that were deemed non-responsive, is a ‘standard quality assurance practice’ that can ‘confirm the reasonableness and proportionality’ of the production”).

VALIDATION OF DOCUMENTS CODED AS RESPONSIVE – REJECTED

Defendants argued that validation of documents coded as responsive, to find false positives, was superfluous.  They asserted that Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g) required that they certify that their response is complete and correct.  The court wrote: “Rephrased in statistical terms, producing parties must confirm that their false-negative rate falls within acceptable limits.”  In my less elegant words, a production may include nonresponsive documents; but, it cannot be a “dump truck.”

The court explained:

Review of documents marked responsive falls outside the bounds of litigants’ Rule 26(g) obligations because such review cannot identify whether documents are missing from a production, rendering it incomplete. Confirming that documents designated responsive are truly responsive reveals only the production’s false-positive rate, a proxy measure for whether the litigant has overproduced discovery material. But the Federal Rules do not prohibit parties from overproducing documents. Accordingly, this Court will not require defendants to incur additional costs re-reviewing documents that they have previously coded as responsive and intend to produce, barring claims of privilege. [emphasis in original].

VALIDATION OF DOCUMENTS EXCLUDED FROM THE UNIVERSE – REJECTED

The second strata consists of “ documents excluded from the universe of ESI material subject to discovery review.”  In other words, Plaintiffs asked for a review of documents that Defendants had not collected and that, presumably, were  not in Defendants’ litigation review platform.

The court wrote that examination of this set of documents, the “Excluded Set,” “could reveal false-negatives: responsive materials that should be produced but were erroneously omitted from the universe of materials collected for discovery review.”

However, the court responded that Plaintiffs’ request was duplicative and made too late, long after collection.  It wrote:  “Yet the Court is puzzled why plaintiffs request review of the Excluded Set after discovery review is largely complete, given that the parties also intend to review the Excluded Set for responsive material prior to beginning that review.” [emphasis in original].

The court explained that “ESI discovery generally proceeds in two phases: document collection and merits review.”  The parties had earlier “set forth agreed upon parameters for collecting the universe of documents that will be subject to merits review.”  That earlier agreement had required statistical sampling.

Insofar as the parties have agreed to statistically validate the completeness of the set of documents collected for merits review before even beginning that review, the Court finds that further validation of the Excluded Set after merits review is largely complete would be duplicative and unnecessary.

However, Plaintiffs made a different argument—so-called “substantial completeness evaluation.”  They argued that:

[T]heir proposed validation efforts “answer different questions at different points in time,” because search term validation “tests whether agreed terms are performing as intended before review begins,” while substantial completeness validation of the Excluded Set “tests whether the entire process — including all downstream coding decisions, review workflow, and production choices — resulted in a complete production at its conclusion.”

This argument was unsuccessful because the court held that “the Excluded Set is a collection of documents excluded before merits review begins and not subject to downstream coding decisions, review workflows, and production choices.”

Plaintiffs also contended that “the prevailing practice is for parties producing discovery to validate the Excluded Set both upon its creation and after merits review….”  The court noted that the authorities are split; however, it held that “the Court will not require producing parties to incur the cost and burden to re-validate the Excluded Set at the substantial completeness stage, provided that they statistically validate that documents excluded from merits review do not contain responsive material before beginning that review.”

I would add that “substantial completeness validation” of the Excluded Set could de-rail a case and mandate a “do over.”  If a sufficient number of false negatives was found in that set—and sufficiency is always debatable–presumably Defendants would have to engage in a new collection, review, and production process.

This blog was initially posted on  Electronic Discovery Reference Model

In Campbell v. TidalHealth, Inc., 2026 WL 2162749 (D. Md. Jul. 28, 2026)(Austin, J.), the Court wrote: “Campbell denies submitting documents into any generative artificial intelligence tools but admits to using unspecified ‘available tools solely to express [her] arguments in proper legal format, the same way any litigant uses available legal resources.’” Id. at *8.

After cautioning Campell about the use of GenAI, the Court wrote:

In addition, Campbell must ensure that any use of generative artificial intelligence does not violate the stipulated order governing confidential materials…. TidalHealth expresses concern that Campbell violated the February 27, 2026 Protective Order’s prohibition on submitting discovery material to public generative artificial intelligence tools. … see ECF 21 at ¶ 8 (imposing limitations on use of generative artificial intelligence). Campbell denies doing so…. If future filings suggest improper submission of discovery materials to generative artificial intelligence tools, the Court will be more inclined to issue a show cause order and consider sanctions.

Id. at *10 (emphasis added).

These orders are standard of care and are most often entered by consent. But not all orders are created equal and they are not always fair.  I have echoed Craig Ball’s novel post on the need for equity.  Another A.I. Protective Order – Part 10 quoting Craig Ball, The AI Protective Order Double Standard | Ball in your Court (Jul. 27, 2026).

UPDATE:

“Because the parties’ proposed protective order adequately complies with the standards set forth above, the Court will enter an order based on the parties’ submission. The Court makes four minor modifications to the parties’ protective order: … and (4) to establish parameters for the use of Artificial Intelligence as it pertains to confidential documents, see infra Paragraph (F).”  Zask v.Kohl’s Corp., 2026 WL 2531856 (E.D. Wisc. Aug. 27, 2026)(emphasis added). The order states:

F. USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (“AI”)
A receiving party may use AI tools in connection with discovery materials produced in this action only if the AI tool is operated in a secure environment and is subject to enforceable contractual terms that (a) prohibit the provider from retaining, using, disclosing, selling, or using the materials to train, improve, or develop any AI system; (b) prohibit the materials from being made publicly available or accessible to any other customer or third party; and (c) require commercially reasonable administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the materials. Discovery materials, whether designated CONFIDENTIAL or ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY, shall not be entered into any publicly available or consumer-based AI platform. Any use of AI tools must remain consistent with this Order and with the requirement that discovery materials be used solely for purposes of this litigation.

One defendant’s privilege log was untimely.  Plaintiff moved to compel, challenging privilege based on alleged subject matter waiver by production of privileged materials and also on an alleged untimely and deficient privilege log.

The court wrote that: “In diversity cases, the application of the attorney-client privilege is governed by state law—in this case, the law of South Carolina.”

As to the waiver issue, the court found that the communications between defendant’s general counsel and others were not for the primary purpose of securing legal advice.  Because they were not privileged, there was no subject matter waiver by disclosure.

Turning the choice of law issue regarding the privilege log, the court wrote:

As an initial matter, Stiles mistakes the extent to which South Carolina law governs the conflict over its privilege log. In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 (1938), the Supreme Court held that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law. Under the Erie Doctrine, “a federal court is to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law in diversity cases.” …. Assertion of attorney-client privilege requires a party to satisfy both procedural and substantive criteria…. In claiming that the privilege applies, Stiles is correct that the Court’s assessment of whether attorney-client privilege applies to the documents at issue is governed by South Carolina law…. However, the production of a privilege log asserting attorney-client privilege over certain documents in order to withhold that information from discovery is procedural and, therefore, governed by federal law…. Accordingly, the Court applies federal law to determine whether Stiles’ privilege log was sufficient. [cleaned up; emphasis added].

The court held: “Upon review, the Court finds that these disclosures on Stiles’ privilege log are insufficient to allow Plaintiff to determine whether Stiles has properly asserted privilege over these documents.”

The court determined that it had four options: “(1) give the party another chance to submit a more detailed log; (2) deem the inadequate log a waiver of the privilege; (3) inspect in camera all of the withheld documents; and (4) inspect in camera a sample of the withheld documents.”  It engaged in detailed factual analysis and granted plaintiff’s motion in part and denied it in part.

This blog was initially posted on  Electronic Discovery Reference Model.

Basically, these orders limit use of artificial intelligence by the recipient of discovery materials.  But, they are not always fair.

Craig Ball has explained that these orders can create a double standard.  He quoted a District of Colorado decision stating “that practically speaking, and in light of the current state of AI, this provision will (at least for now) bar the parties from using most, if not all, mainstream low-to-no cost AI to process Confidential Information.”  Craig added:

If other courts follow uncritically, it will do what every prior technology-gatekeeping effort has done: widen the gap between well-funded litigants and everyone else, while delivering no meaningful improvement in data security.  My hope is that this post will shed light on a distinction without a difference so as to not hinder the use of properly configured, ‘consumer grade’ AI for processing sensitive data.

U.S. v. Dygdon, 2026 WL 2225226 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2026), provides another example of an AI  protective order entered by consent in a criminal case.  The materials disclosed in discovery  would affect “the privacy, confidentiality and business interests of individuals and entities,” and “would risk prejudicial pretrial publicity if publicly disseminated….” The consent order states:

9. Restrictions on Use of Artificial Intelligence Tools to Process Disclosure Materials.

   a.  “AI tool” means any automated system that uses statistical modeling, machine learning, or similar techniques to process inputs and generate outputs, recommendations, or predictions, including but not limited to large language models, generative AI services, or AI-assisted software tools, whether cloud-based or otherwise.

   b.  Under no circumstances will any member of the defense team submit Disclosure Materials to a publicly accessible AI tool, or any AI tool, that retains and uses submitted data to train models. Such AI tools pose unique risks to the security and integrity of Disclosure Materials, given the practical inability to claw back or delete data once it has been incorporated into a model.

   c.  With respect to any AI tool used by the defendant, defense counsel must be able to certify that (i) the AI tool(s) will maintain the confidentiality of any Disclosure Materials; (ii) the AI tool(s) will not expose any Disclosure Materials to third parties not authorized under this Protective Order to receive such materials; (iii) the AI tool(s) will not retain or use any Disclosure Materials for model training; and (iv) all Disclosure Materials will be removed from the AI tool(s) at the conclusion of this case.

I suggest that there is general agreement that a degree of protection of materials produced in discovery is reasonable.  Craig has some excellent suggestions, writing: “I’m not arguing for anarchy or carelessness. I’m arguing for proportionality….”

Craig lists five provisions for a “properly scoped Ai provision….” They are: 1) no training; 2) no public accessibility; 3) matter isolation; 4) deletion at conclusion; and, 5) documentation.  He adds: “Five requirements, all achievable at any budget. All providing genuine protection against the actual risks that protective orders target: unauthorized use, competitive exploitation, and ongoing exposure. Anything beyond this isn’t really protecting data. It’s protecting market position.”

I suggest that AI protective orders are now the standard of care. I agree with Craig’s well-written suggestion that “we can protect discovery materials without building a toll booth that only the well-heeled can pass through.”

I also very much appreciate Craig’s endnote: “Hat tip to my friend Michael Berman, whose frequent and excellent series of posts about AI and discovery law got me thinking about this today.”

For more on this topic, please visit:

• Restrictions on Use of Artificial Intelligence Tools to Process Disclosure Materials (Jul. 27, 2026);
• Another A.I. Protective Order (Jul. 9, 2026);
•  A.I. Protective Order—Again (Jun. 18, 2026);
• Unicorn Rejects A.I. Protective/Confidentiality Order – Order Entered in Criminal Case (Jun. 4, 2026);
• Are Protective Orders Limiting Upload to AI of Documents Produced by an Opponent in Discovery Becoming the Standard of Care?  (May 26, 2026), discussing Rudasill v. Swiss Re American Holding Corporation, 2026 WL 1329451 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2026);
• Another Confidentiality Order Limiting Use of AI to Analyze Protected Materials (Apr. 27, 2026), discussing In re: ByHeart, Inc., Infant Formula Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation,2026 WL 1103170 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2026);
• A.I. Protective Orders Are Becoming Routine (Apr. 20, 2026), discussing Stansfield v. International Business Machines Corporation, 2026 WL 1031230, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 16, 2026);
• “Deepfake Executives, Created Via Depositions, Pose Grave Threat”: Protective Order Suggested (Apr. 5, 2026);
• Morgan v. V2X, Inc.,2026 WL 864223 (D. Col. Mar. 30, 2026), as also discussed in Important A.I. Work Product and Protective Order Decision (Mar. 31, 2026);
• Order Prohibiting Upload of Confidential Discovery Documents to Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) (Nov. 3, 2025), based on Warner v. Gilbarco, Inc., 2025 WL 3047881 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2025);
• Protective Order Limited Uploading Discovery Responses to Open A.I.(Mar. 26, 2026), discussing Jeffries v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc.,2026 WL 820218 (D. Kans. Mar. 25, 2026).

This blog was initially posted on  Electronic Discovery Reference Model.

UPDATE:

After the first posting of this blog, an AI protective order was entered by consent in U.S.A. v. Marrow, 2026 WL 2389395 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2026).

7. Restrictions on Use of Artificial Intelligence Tools to Process Disclosure Materials.

a. “AI tool” means any automated system that uses machine learning, or similar techniques to process inputs and generate outputs, recommendations, or predictions, including but not limited to large language models, generative AI services, or AI-assisted software tools, whether cloud-based or otherwise.

b. The defense team will not submit Disclosure Materials to a publicly accessible version of an AI tool (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude, Grok, Gemini, Copilot, Perplexity, Midjourney, Canva). The defense team will not submit Disclosure Materials to an AI tool for which the AI tool provider or vendor (e.g., OpenAI, Anthropic, Microsoft, Google) uses submitted data for its own model training, allows submitted data to be publicly accessed, discloses submitted data to third parties, or, except as specified below, retains submitted data.

c. The defense may submit Disclosure Materials to an AI tool (i) that maintains the confidentiality of Disclosure Materials; (ii) that will not expose any Disclosure Materials to third parties not authorized under this Protective Order to receive such materials; (iii) that will not retain or use any Disclosure Materials for model training; and (iv) all Disclosure Materials will be removed from the AI tool(s) at the conclusion of this case.

Additional consent cases are U.S.A. v. Spatola, 2026 WL 2351459 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2026), U.S.A. v. Davis, 2026 WL 1333520 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2026).  The protective order in Spatola is the same as Marrow.  The order in Davis states:

Restrictions on Use of Artificial Intelligence Tools to Process Disclosure Materials.

a.  “AI tool” means any automated system that uses statistical modeling, machine learning, or similar techniques to process inputs and generate outputs, recommendations, or predictions, including but not limited to large language models, generative AI services, or AI-assisted software tools, whether cloud-based or otherwise.

b. Under no circumstances will any member of the defense team submit Disclosure Materials to a publicly accessible AI tool, or any AI tool, that retains and uses submitted data to train models. Such AI tools pose unique risks to the security and integrity of Disclosure Materials, given the practical inability to claw back or delete data once it has been incorporated into a model.

A different A.I. order was entered by consent in U.S. v. Stamp, 2026 WL 2321897 (S.D.N.Y.  Aug. 11, 2026).  It added:

d. Any translation, transcript, summary, or other output that reveals the substance of Disclosure Material shall be treated as Disclosure Material, but draft legal briefs, counsel memoranda, and other attorney work product shall not be considered Disclosure Material irrespective of whether they were created in part through the use of an AI tool.

e. Defense counsel may permit access by AI tool provider personnel, affiliates, and subprocessors, to databases containing Disclosure Material only as reasonably necessary to provide, maintain, secure, or support the AI tool, subject to confidentiality obligations set forth herein.

UPDATE: U.S.A.v. Morell, 2026 WL 2676582, at *1 (S.DN.Y. Sep. 11, 2026).

The issue before the court arose out of the developer’s motion to compel. Blue Moon made an interesting challenge to privilege based on a disclosure to the condominium’s management agent.

This blog, however, addresses the search methodology issue and Blue Moon’s assertion that Trailsedge must search all current and former unit owners’ email and text messages.  Trailsedge Owners Ass’n., Inc. v. NED Ski Associates, LLC, 2026 WL 2083546 (D. Vt. Jul. 16, 2026).

While the court rejected defendants’ untimely demand to use their search terms, it found gaps in plaintiff’s keywords and ordered broad disclosure.  The court rejected defendants’ demand to search the ESI of all current and former unit owners over more than a decade.  However, based on certain statements of plaintiff, it found that plaintiff had opened the door to additional unit owner disclosure, which was ordered by the court.

SEARCH METHODLOLGY

In my opinion, both parties were at fault when it came to search terms.  Trailsedge decided on its keywords, unilaterally and without consultation.  However, “Trailsedge argues that Blue Moon … never asked to negotiate search terms, and failed to propose its own terms until approximately two years later.”  Id. at *3.

But, “[i]n reply, Blue Moon denies it acquiesced to Trailsedge’s unilateral search process, arguing it did not know Trailsedge had used keyword search terms until many months after the discovery production and was entitled to assume Trailsedge had produced all responsive materials…. Blue Moon also argues that the scope of the requested search is proportional because Trailsedge seeks damages exceeding $10 million for alleged defects dating back to the period when the buildings were constructed and occupied while refusing to identify the date range, custodians, and results of its searches.”  Id. at *4.

The court looked to the Sedona Conference, id. at *4, passim, and  Judge Peck’s decision in William A. Gross Constr. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), writing that “when a party uses keyword searches to identify responsive ESI, the search process must be cooperative, well-informed, capable of explanation, and sufficiently transparent to permit the opposing party and the court to evaluate it if challenged.”  It wrote that cooperation and proportionality are the dominant drivers. “As Gross explained, keyword searches must be developed with input from custodians who know the terminology used in the relevant communications and must be tested to ensure accurate retrieval and reduce false positives.” Id. at *5.

The Trailsedge court continued:  “Applying the principles described above to this case, the court first rejects Blue Moon’s request to impose its proposed keyword search” on Trailsedge.  Id. at *5.  It found that those terms may be overbroad, redundant, “or likely to generate excessive false positives.”  Further, Blue Moon was untimely:

Sedona’s principles do not give a party license to wait until late in discovery and then demand a wholesale redo of its opposing party’s collection process using its preferred terms….  Trailsedge also notes that Blue Moon did not request search-term information or propose its own search terms until approximately two years later…. The timing and proportionality considerations weigh against granting Blue Moon’s request in full.

Id. at *5.

However, Trailsedge was not off the hook with its unilateral selection of keywords. It wrote that: “The court… also rejects Trailsedge’s argument that Blue Moon’s delay ends the inquiry. Trailsedge chose to use keyword searches as part of its collection process, and the reasonableness of that process became a fair subject of discovery once it was challenged.” Id. at *6.

Again citing Sedona and Judge Peck, the Trailsedge court noted “the more basic principle that counsel must understand, supervise, and be able to describe the search process used to identify responsive ESI in enough detail to assess its adequacy.” Id. at *6.  Finding “apparent gaps” in the terms designed unilaterally by Trailsedge, the court wrote:

Trailsedge has not met its obligation to provide enough information to permit a meaningful assessment of whether the searches were reasonable and proportional. The record does not show that Trailsedge has identified the custodians searched, the date ranges applied, the dates the searches were conducted, the terms used for each custodian or source, or the results returned by each term….  Trailsedge must therefore provide additional information about its search methodology.

Id. at *6.  It added that Trailsedge’s  “omission of central party names and words related to critical legal issues raises a sufficient question about the adequacy of Trailsedge’s prior search sufficient to warrant additional discovery.”  Id.

Accordingly, within fourteen days, Trailsedge shall serve on Defendants a written description of its prior ESI search methodology. That description shall identify: (1) each custodian whose emails, text messages, or other ESI were searched; (2) each data source searched; (3) the date range applied to each search; (4) the date on which each search was performed; (5) the search terms used for each custodian or source; and (6) the number of hits returned by each term (to the extent reasonably available). Trailsedge shall also state whether custodians were instructed to use particular search terms, whether custodians self-selected additional terms, and what steps counsel took to supervise or validate the searches.

Id. at *6.  This was to be followed by a court-ordered “meet and confer.” Id.; see generally, the Hon. Paul W. Grimm (ret.), Michael D. Berman, et al., “Discovery about Discovery: Does the Attorney Client Privilege Protect All Attorney-Client Communications Relating to the Preservation of Potentially Relevant Information,” 37 U. Balt. L. Rev. 413 (2008).

SEARCHES OF EVERY CURRENT AND FORMER UNIT OWNER

The court explained the unit owner issue as follows:

Blue Moon seeks an order requiring Trailsedge to collect and produce responsive documents from all current and former unit owners for the period of January 1, 2011 through May 12, 2023…. Blue Moon argues Trailsedge was required to search all unit owners’ files because Trailsedge “is suing on behalf of all unit owners” and because Trailsedge’s initial disclosures allegedly identified members, not just Board members, as persons likely to have discoverable information.

Id. at *7. “Trailsedge responds that the Association is a Vermont nonprofit corporation distinct from its members and that the unit owners are not parties or custodians of Association records merely because they own units…. Trailsedge further argues that, except in limited governance matters, the Association acts through its executive board under the Vermont Nonprofit Corporation Act and that the Association’s statutory authority to litigate in its own name on behalf of itself or unit owners does not collapse the distinction between the Association and its members….  Trailsedge also argues that the request is disproportionate because Trailsedge consists of twenty-four units that have been bought and sold over the years by an unknown number of owners and Blue Moon seeks documents from January 1, 2011 through May 12, 2023.”  Id. (emphasis added).

The court resolved the issue by applying the “possession, custody, and control” and proportionality  standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 34.  “In the District of Vermont, ‘control’ is construed broadly and is not limited to legal ownership or actual physical possession; documents may be within a party’s control when the party has the ‘right, authority, or practical ability’ to obtain them.”  Id. at *7.

It held that Blue Moon had the burden of proving control by Trailsedge and failed to carry it: “The record also does not support treating all unit owners as custodians simply because some unit owners may possess relevant information. Rule 34 control requires more than relevance.”  Id. at *7.  The court noted that the Sedona conference calls for “caution” in evaluating information in the possession of non-parties.

Although the [Sedona Conference] Commentary’s recommended “legal right” standard is narrower than the “practical ability” standard applied by district courts in the Second Circuit, it identifies generally applicable practical and fairness concerns implicated when discovery obligations are extended to ESI held by third parties. The Commentary explains that an expansive approach may require parties to preserve, search, and produce documents they do not actually possess and may not have the ability or legal right to obtain…. That concern is present here. Blue Moon has shown that unit-owner communications may be relevant, but it has not shown that Trailsedge has actual possession, legal authority, or a practical ability to obtain every current and former unit owner’s personal emails and text messages on demand.

Id. at *7 (emphasis added).  The court also evaluated proportionality: “The documents Blue Moon seeks may be relevant to notice, knowledge, and statute-of-limitations issues. Blue Moon’s requested owner-wide search, however, would encompass more than twelve years, cover all current and former owners of twenty-four units, and include potentially sensitive personal texts and emails.”  Id. at *8.

However, Trailsedge was not off the hook. Its discovery responses “reasonably could have led Blue Moon to believe that at least some non-Board Association members had supplied documents or information.” Id. at *8.  In my words, Trailsedge opened the door.  Therefore:

In light of the ambiguity created by Trailsedge’s interrogatory responses, however, the court finds the responses require clarification. Rule 26(g) requires Trailsedge’s discovery responses to be formed after a reasonable inquiry, and Rule 26(e) requires supplementation if the responses were materially incomplete or incorrect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e), (g). Because Trailsedge’s responses suggest that some member-produced materials were considered but do not identify which members provided documents, what sources were searched, or whether any non-Board member communications were requested or reviewed, Trailsedge must clarify those issues in the search-methodology disclosure ordered in the previous section. The disclosure shall state whether Trailsedge requested documents from any non-Board unit owners; identify any non-Board unit owners from whom Trailsedge obtained documents or information used in preparing its discovery responses or productions; identify the categories of documents obtained from those members; and certify whether Trailsedge has produced all responsive, nonprivileged documents from those member-provided materials that are within its possession, custody, or control.

Id. at *8.

For more on “possession, custody, and control,” see:

• Possession, Custody, or Control – Need for a Uniform National Standard – Part II;
• Isn’t It Time for a Uniform National Standard on “Possession, Custody, or Control”?